Written by: Benedek Várszegi, Central European University.
1. Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine brought about immense destruction to the country. As of this year, tens of thousands of civilians, as well as soldiers defending against Russian aggression, have lost their lives, with DGAP estimating this number to total around 80,000 (Meiners 2024). Adding to the hardship of the local population is the wartime destruction of infrastructure accompanying modern armed conflicts. By 2024, this meant the destruction and damage of a third of the country’s housing, $35.7 billion in damage to the transportation sector, and the destruction of airports, bridges, railways, and roads, all necessary for everyday civilian and economic activities (ibid.). Through a comparative historical analysis utilising the case of post-war Vietnam the Solow model, and the Total Factor Productivity framework, this paper aims to bring attention to Ukraine’s potential to recover, despite all destruction. The sections below answer the research question “In what ways can Vietnam’s experience of post-war economic recovery provide a viable framework for Ukraine’s reconstruction?”
2. Ukraine Today
As mentioned above, the Russian invasion of Ukraine had a huge disruptive impact on the country. Apart from the most tragic dimension of the war, human casualties and the psychological suffering stemming from them, the Russian aggression also brought significant devastation to Ukrainian infrastructure and the economy. According to estimations by the Kyiv School of Economics, the national GDP of the country shrank by 29% in 2022 and is only seeing a slow recovery, remaining significantly below pre-invasion levels (KSE 2022, 5).
Due to intense fighting in cities and near other civilian infrastructure, as well as the targeting of key economic facilities by the Russian military as a strategic practice, Ukraine’s infrastructure suffered severe damage throughout the invasion. As of the end of 2024, the Fourth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimates infrastructure losses at around US$176 billion, with the most affected segments being housing (over US$57 billion), transport (over US$36 billion), commerce and industry (over US$17 billion), energy and extractives (over US$20 billion), and agriculture (US$11 billion) (RDNA4 2025, 16–38). These numbers indicate that the damage is concentrated not just in key areas of modern economies but also in sectors crucial to Ukraine, as its economy heavily relies on exports, mainly agricultural products and materials such as iron ore and coal (Kosse 2023; IEA 2024). RDNA4 estimates total recovery costs at US$524 billion over the next decade (RDNA4 2025, 40). Despite these staggering numbers, Ukraine has a chance to come back stronger from the devastation of war, as demonstrated by Edward Miguel and Gérard Roland, who reviewed the economic and human development impact of the “most intense bombing campaign in military history” (Miguel and Roland 2010).
2. Vietnamese Recovery
The Vietnam War (1955–1975) caused tragic and unprecedented destruction. The war cost millions of lives, with many more displaced or maimed due to the use of conventional and chemical warfare tactics. Another chilling aspect of this conflict is the scale of material destruction, mostly caused by United States forces through military campaigns such as Rolling Thunder and the mass use of chemicals like Agent Orange. To put this into perspective, the amount of bombs dropped during this conflict by US forces alone equals three times the total tonnage dropped during World War II and 15 times the amount dropped during the Korean War (Miguel and Roland 2010, 2). Regarding infrastructure, the Rolling Thunder campaign destroyed 65% of North Vietnam’s oil storage capacity, 59% of power plants, and 55% of major bridges. This was accompanied by significant deforestation and soil destabilisation caused by chemical defoliants like Agent Orange, which also resulted in long-term environmental and health effects (ibid.). The destruction was unevenly distributed, with extremes like Quang Tri province, where only 11 out of 3,500 villages were left unbombed, receiving over 3,000 bombs per km² in some districts (ibid.).
Miguel and Roland conducted a case study on the Vietnam War due to these extremes, both in terms of overall destruction and the well-documented differences within subnational units. Using the 17th parallel (the division of South and North Vietnam in the Geneva Accords) as a basis for a quasi-natural experiment and the geographical distance from it as an instrumental variable, the authors observed the impact of wartime destruction on long-term economic development. Their findings indicated no persistent hindrances to economic and human development in heavily bombed areas. Moreover, these regions experienced a consumption boom between 1992 and 2002, indicating “catch-up” growth (Miguel and Roland 2010, 9, 11). This recovery, both nationally and on a comparative subnational level, was attributed to government policies in the 1980s, which focused on infrastructure development and modernisation, primarily in the most devastated areas.
Source: Miguel and Roland (2010, 9).
Source: Miguel and Roland (2010, 11).
3. Policy Recommendations
The work of Miguel and Roland demonstrates the strength of neoclassical growth models, particularly the Solow long-term economic growth model, which emphasises diminishing returns on capital accumulation and the role of state investment in recovery (Solow 1956). Neoclassical growth models assume that economic output is a function of total factor productivity (technology) and the productive inputs of labour and capital. In Vietnam, this approach manifested in the government’s targeted investments in heavily bombed areas, focusing on rebuilding and modernising critical infrastructure, such as agricultural production systems and electricity grids (Vanham 2018; Miguel and Roland 2010). For example, by 1999, heavily bombed regions had higher rates of electricity access compared to less devastated areas, underscoring the efficacy of these investments in driving “catch-up” growth (Miguel and Roland 2010, 6).
The aim of this paper is to highlight productive policy directions for Ukraine’s post-war recovery, once a peace agreement is reached and the geopolitical situation stabilises. Drawing on the Vietnamese example of sustained economic growth despite immense wartime devastation, this paper proposes a policy agenda informed by the neoclassical approach to growth. These recommendations focus on key dimensions for adapting this framework to Ukraine’s context, with a first section on structural differences, and a second on key economic sectors for future governmental investment. While not comprehensive, this paper aims to offer a structured overview of promising pathways for reconstruction and long-term development in Ukraine.
4. Key Structural Differences
4.1 Demographic Challenges
The neoclassical model of development successfully executed by countries such as Vietnam relied on an important circumstance: a booming post-war population, with a large proportion of active community members compared to the inactive population (Vanham 2018). Ukraine on the other hand had been in a difficult situation even before the Russian invasion, as its population has been shrinking since the 90s, from 51.5 million at its independence in 1991 to 37.3 million in 2019, excluding the Crimea and Russian-occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk (Meiners 2024, 2). This trend is attributed to low birthrates, a low life expectancy, and high outward migration (ibid.), and is significantly exacerbated by the ongoing conflict. According to the estimation of KSE, the population displacement is at 3.7 million in IDPs, and 6.3 million stay abroad individuals. This is of course on top of the casualties of war, ranging in the tens of thousands (Meiners 2024). This shrinkage of population prevents economic growth due to a lack of active population as well as a trained workforce needed for reconstruction and regular economic activities.
The Ukrainian government has recently accepted a comprehensive legislative package aimed at mitigating the demographic decline from five directions, under the title Strategy of Demographic Development (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine 2024). The five key areas addressed by the policy package are: improving the birth rate; reducing premature mortality and excessive migration; addressing population displacement; accommodating an aging population; and addressing other challenges confronting the nation (Libanova 2024, 2). While this policy package addresses all key areas of the demographic issue at hand, even the most optimistic predictions on its effects estimate a steadily declining population, reaching 31.6 million by January 2051 (ibid.).
Following the neoclassical growth model successful in Vietnam, a country with highly contrasting demographic trends, the Ukrainian economy will have to significantly rely on compensating with productivity per worker capita increase, also known as total factor productivity (TFP), which encompasses improvements in workers’ skills (human capital) and technological progress. The next section regarding the key sectors of the Ukrainian economy to focus governmental investment on, will cover the most promising technological directions which address the need for a domestic economy proportionally more reliant on TFP than labour when compared to Vietnam, both by increasing TFP and lowering the needed workforce for certain operations.
To effectively help Ukraine in addressing the above demographic challenges, while simultaneously benefiting from an additional labour force, receiving countries, especially within the EU have several key policy options at their disposal. First, providing easy access to the job market for Ukrainians will allow them to gain valuable training while working, transforming them into a skilled labour force for Europe and potentially creating a pool of trained professionals who can return to Ukraine, rather than remaining inactive as refugees. Additionally, offering Ukrainian language courses for children and ensuring the transferability of diplomas is crucial in helping eliminate barriers that may hinder families’ return to Ukraine, even though this may not directly serve EU interests. Furthermore, EU member states should create specialised training programs tailored to advance qualifications in sectors critical for Ukraine’s reconstruction, ensuring that the skills developed align with future needs in both the EU and Ukraine.
4.2 Natural Resources
A dimension in which Ukraine holds a marked advantage over the historical case of Vietnam is in its substantial deposits of natural resources. The country possesses around 20,000 discovered mineral and hydrocarbon deposits, with key materials including iron, manganese, uranium, titanic and zirconium ores, coal, gas, oil and condensate, kaolin, and graphite (National Atlas of Ukraine 2025). Despite ageing infrastructure and the destruction caused by ongoing conflict, industry estimates place Ukraine among the top ten global producers of nearly all these resources (UkraineInvest 2025). Its potential is even greater, with vast untapped reserves such as 20% of the world’s known graphite resources (Liepins 2024) and, according to some estimates, approximately 10% of global lithium reserves (Lozhnikov et al. 2024).
Vietnam’s successful post-conflict reconstruction offers relevant lessons for Ukraine, particularly in the domain of natural resource management. Like Vietnam after its wars, Ukraine is likely to emerge with formal state ownership of vast mineral wealth but will require substantial foreign capital and technical expertise to develop and exploit these resources effectively. Vietnam’s 1986 Doi Moi reforms provide a useful model: they maintained state ownership while inviting private and foreign actors into extraction and exploration through joint ventures. Ukraine, with even richer deposits of critical minerals such as lithium, titanium, and graphite, stands to gain significantly from a similar approach.
This strategy is already reflected in Ukraine’s current policies and recent international agreements. At present, subsurface resources remain state-owned, while extraction rights are granted through temporary licences and public-private partnerships. The latest agreement with the United States preserves this ownership framework but introduces powerful incentives for foreign investment, including a 50/50 revenue share from new extraction projects. Moreover, it establishes the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund, designed to inject liquidity into post-war infrastructure and industrial development.
4.3 International embeddedness and financing modalities
When considering historic parallels to potentially inform policy making, it is important to consider another one of Ukraine’s significant “head-starts” to post-war Vietnam, which is a massive international financial, diplomatic, and military support since 2022 (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 2025). This international embeddedness which is a lifeline for the country fighting off an invasion, can both constitute an enormous advantage in the post war reconstruction and long term economic development of Ukraine, but can easily turn into a severe hindrance as well. Therefore, it is crucial to consult existing literature and contemporary examples of failed development efforts, with special attention to Dutch disease and other forms of domestic distortions arising from heavy aid dependency.
In practical terms, Ukraine’s international embeddedness has materialised through a mix of direct budget support and risk-sharing mechanisms. Grants and concessional loans from partners such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada, and the IMF have provided more than $100 billion since 2022, covering immediate humanitarian, social, and defence expenditures (Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 2025). These flows keep the Ukrainian state solvent and ensure continuity of basic services during wartime. Alongside this direct financing, multilateral initiatives such as the World Bank’s MIGA guarantees and the EBRD’s Ukraine Recovery & Reconstruction Guarantee Facility help sustain private-sector activity by reducing war-related risk premia and stabilising investment conditions (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 2025; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2025). Together, these instruments create the fiscal space needed to keep the economy operating under extreme duress, while also laying a foundation for the larger task of post-war reconstruction.
However, it is important to address potential pitfalls of reliance on aid. These span over a wide range including scenarios of repeated and open ended external financing schemes can
undermine incentives for domestic revenue mobilisation and reform, or be fungible with non-productive expenditures among more (Marc 2015; Wako 2018, 23). The most relevant risks for Ukraine revolve around the Dutch disease and other manifestations of the resource curse, as we have seen extensive diplomatic negotiations about conditional aid tied to foreign mineral extraction rights and income shares of the industry. The most significant example of these is the “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ukraine on the Establishment of a United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund” signed in April 2025, which entails the capitalisation of mineral extraction revenues at its core (Baskaran and Schwartz 2025; US and Ukraine 2025). Ukraine’s domestic economy can greatly suffer from a disproportionate post-war boom in the mining industry prompted by imported US infrastructure and targeted investment, which could lead to an overly appreciated hryvnia, hurting export oriented sectors such as agriculture (NRGI 2015). Therefore for Ukraine, it is crucial to adopt a specific policy framework which successfully navigates the unprecedented amount of foreign capital flowing into its economy during and after the conflict in forms of aid, investment and other guarantees, with the long term implications on the overall economy in mind.
5. Key Economic Sectors
5.1 Transportation
The transportation sector, while alone contributing around 6.5% of the Ukrainian GDP, also facilitates other sectors of the Ukrainian domestic economy which is heavily reliant on exports. The country is the largest exporter of sunflower oil, accounting for roughly half of global exports (Kosse 2023, 9). Ukraine is also among the top exporters of many other agricultural products, such as grains, earning it the label ‘the breadbasket of Europe’. Additionally, Ukraine is one of the leading producers and exporters of iron ore and steel, due to the vast natural resources of the country (EC 2024b). As an export-oriented nation situated in a key location for global trade, Ukraine has an extensive network of transportation infrastructure, with over 200,000 kilometres of roads and railways spanning more than 19,800 kilometres (Kosse 2023, 9). This is complemented by a significant maritime transportation system, which facilitated around 90% of grain exports before the war (Kosse 2023, 10).
However, despite its extensiveness, Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure was relatively outdated and inefficient before the war and was significantly damaged by the Russian invasion (World Bank’s logistics performance index ref; Kosse 2023). This is evident in low infrastructure density and efficiency, with less than half of the railways electrified in the country prior to the war (Kosse 2023, 9). The Russian invasion resulted in massive damage to this transportation network by 2023, with 25,000 km of roads reported as damaged or destroyed, along with 344 bridges and overpasses, 19 civilian airports, 507 km of railway track, and 126 railway stations (ibid.). Furthermore, the war caused significant disruption in maritime trade due to the Russian occupation of Crimea and the Black Sea ports.
The rebuilding of Ukrainian transportation infrastructure will inevitably involve the construction of more modern facilities and networks, a process that can enhance the transportation sector and its contribution to economic growth if coordinated adequately. The most important aspect to consider is energy efficiency and consumption, as the country had a relatively underperforming infrastructural setup in this regard before the war (Kosse 2023, 13). Newer technologies, such as the electrification of railway systems, can significantly reduce energy consumption levels in modern transportation systems (idem, 16). Furthermore, due to its reliance on diverse forms of transportation platforms to facilitate exports, Ukraine would benefit greatly from investment in up-to-date multimodal platform hubs, enhancing efficiency through coordination between modes of transportation (Kosse 2023).
Furthermore, investments in drone technologies and remote sensing for infrastructure monitoring and maintenance can significantly reduce reliance on manual labour for upkeep and inspection. The use of autonomous drones for surveying roads, railways, and bridges allows for real-time diagnostics, faster repair prioritisation, and lower long-term maintenance costs. In the context of demographic decline, such technologies are not just efficient but necessary, as they help sustain the functionality of critical infrastructure with a reduced workforce.
5.2 Energy Sector
The energy sector is a vital component of the Ukrainian economy, contributing approximately 17% to its GDP (Kosse 2023, 11). Ukraine has a diverse energy mix, with significant resources in coal, and renewable energy sources. This is complemented by a significant gas transportation infrastructure, through which Ukraine provided Europe with Russian gas before the war. As of 2021, the country generated around 50% of its electricity from nuclear power, 30% from fossil fuels, and 20% from renewable sources, including hydropower, wind, and solar (ibid.).
Before the war, the energy sector faced several challenges, including an ageing infrastructure, high levels of energy loss during transmission (at around 12-15%), and a reliance on imported fossil fuels (Kosse 2023, 11). The Russian invasion has led to significant damage to energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread power outages and increased energy insecurity for the population.
To modernise the energy sector, Ukraine must prioritise the development of renewable energy technologies and the enhancement of energy efficiency. Key steps to consider include the expansion of solar and wind energy capacity in order to meet EU integration criteria and sustainability targets. The implementation of smart grid technologies can improve energy management and reduce losses, while energy storage solutions, such as battery systems, can enhance grid stability and reliability (Kosse 2023). Additionally, energy efficiency measures, such as the retrofitting of existing buildings and the promotion of energy-efficient appliances, should be integral to the reconstruction efforts. Emphasising decentralised energy systems and community-based renewable projects will also contribute to energy resilience and sustainability in the post-war recovery.
Moreover, the adoption of smart and automated grid management technologies will allow for a substantial reduction in the labour required for maintenance and oversight. Automated diagnostics and grid self-regulation mechanisms reduce dependency on manual intervention, particularly in rural or insecure areas. These measures, together with the integration of digital monitoring systems and predictive analytics, offer a clear path towards increasing TFP in the energy sector, by making more effective use of existing infrastructure and human capital.
The country has taken steps into this direction on the policy-making level, as it adopted multiple packages aimed at modernising and retrofitting its energy sector. The National Energy and Climate Plan aims to cut overall greenhouse emissions by 65% compared to the level in 1990, increase the share of renewable energy sources in the structure of gross final energy consumption to at least 27%, and diversify the energy suppliers of the country, with a cap of 30% of overall energy provision on singular providers (Ukrainian Energy 2024; Energy Community 2024). These policy measures are also coupled with reported developments, such as an increase in renewable energy share in electricity generation by 6.4% in the last year (EXPRO 2024).
5.3 Agriculture
Ukraine, often labeled as the ‘bread-basket of Europe’, relies heavily on its agricultural output, constituting 10% of the GDP along with almost half of the exports, and employing 14% of the workforce before the war according to RDNA3 (2023, 102). The war affected this sector heavily as well, with 20% of the planting area gone in 2022, and significant export drops due to Black sea ports being overtaken and blockaded by Russia (ibid.)
The recovery and reconstruction efforts in the Ukrainian agricultural sector present a unique opportunity to rebuild with greater efficiency and enhance its long-term output. By establishing Water User Organizations, the management of irrigation and drainage systems can be significantly improved, ensuring that water resources are utilised effectively to boost agricultural productivity (ibid.). Additionally, investing in precision agriculture technologies, such as soil testing and advanced monitoring systems, would enable farmers to optimise their practices, leading to higher yields and more sustainable farming methods. Perhaps the most promising technological direction considering the demographic challenges of the country is the introduction of drones in agriculture for crop monitoring, spraying, seeding, and soil analysis, bringing direct and significant decrease in labour intensity.
6. Conclusion
Ukraine’s recovery from the destruction wrought by the Russian invasion requires a clear and actionable strategy that leverages historical lessons from cases like Vietnam. The neoclassical growth model, demonstrated effectively in Vietnam’s post-war recovery, highlights the importance of targeted public investment, which in the case of Ukraine will have to proportionally focus on TFP through the adoption of new technology and training of the workforce due to the demographic context.
In addition to infrastructure modernisation and human capital development, Ukraine must also carefully harness its vast natural resource base, particularly its critical minerals, through policies that preserve national ownership while encouraging foreign capital and expertise. As shown in the Vietnamese experience, maintaining state control over strategic assets while creating structured opportunities for international cooperation can be a powerful foundation for long-term, sustainable economic growth. At the same time, unlike in the Vietnamese case, which lacked comparable international embeddedness, Ukraine must carefully manage the unprecedented inflow of international aid and investment, balancing the opportunities it provides for reconstruction and growth with the risks of Dutch disease, aid dependency, and sectoral distortions highlighted by contemporary experience.
As discussed above, recovery must address the realities of Ukraine’s ageing and shrinking population, making labour-saving technologies and productivity-enhancing investments not optional, but essential, in order to compensate labour with TFP. Digitalisation, smart infrastructure, and targeted automation can provide this compensation for workforce shortages while also contributing to economic resilience. By combining Vietnam’s policy lessons while accounting for the demonstrated differences in international embeddedness, available resources, and demographics, Ukraine has the potential not just to rebuild, but to emerge more resilient and modernised than before the invasion.
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