Romania’s place in the European Southeastern Flank: historical ambitions and structural limits

1. Introduction

Romania occupies a unique position within the broader South-Eastern European region, both geographically and culturally. It stands at the intersection of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Balkans: a confluence where different historical influences have merged and clashed. This strategic positioning has not only shaped Romania’s identity but has also made it a pivotal actor in regional integration and European cooperation. Positioned along the Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, Romania provides access to vital transportation routes, including the trans-European transport network. Romania controls over 30% of the Danube, Europe’s most important waterway and benefits from direct access to the Black Sea. This strategic positioning makes it a crucial link between Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East. The country has the potential to serve as a logistics hub for European and global trade, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, commerce and energy.^[1]

Figure 1. Political map of the Black Sea

Romania possesses significant natural resources, including coal, timber, fertile agricultural land and substantial reserves of natural gas and oil. It is also among the most promising European countries for renewable energy development, particularly in wind power.^[2] The hydroelectric power station at the Iron Gates (Portile de Fier), one of the largest in Europe, underscores Romania’s role in regional energy production.

The country’s trajectory within the European framework has been marked by resilience and ambition. While the process of European integration has not been without its difficulties, Romania has embraced the path of openness, modernisation and alignment with European values. The nation’s journey towards full participation in the European project reflects a long-standing aspiration for stability and growth.

Romania is no longer just a country of passage but a strategic crossroads in full emergence. In the space of thirty years, Bucharest has travelled a path that has led it from the quicksand of post-communism to the threshold of European centrality. This progress has not been accidental, but rather a result of historical necessity and strategic decision. Located on the eastern edge of the ‘West’ but at the centre of Eurasian tensions, Romania has been able to capitalise on its liminal status to present itself as a linchpin of both the EU’s and NATO’s south-eastern flank, as well as an active interlocutor in the Black Sea quadrant. Since joining NATO in 2004, Romania has reinforced its strategic role in defense and security. The country hosts American military bases and has allowed NATO to establish key defense infrastructure, including the missile defense system at Deveselu^[3]. Romania’s active participation in international military operations has solidified its role as a security provider within the alliance.^[4]

To understand the evolution of the Romanian position between Euro-Atlantic ties and regional ambition, between the defence of its identity and the building of its influence, we need to follow the red thread that connects Constanta to Chişinău, the Black Sea to Brussels and the Atlantic to the Caucasus. The trajectory, while marked by diplomatic successes, remains incomplete due to structural fragility and internal ambiguities. To understand the current and future role of Bucharest, Romania, should be seen not as a periphery but as a frontier: an area of contact, of friction and, perhaps, of synthesis.

A Romanian proverb states, “Unde-s doi, puterea crește,” which translates to “When two stand together, strength increases.” This sentiment captures the essence of Romania’s path forward: one that embraces both national progress and regional solidarity.

2. Historical notes and geostrategic roots

Romania’s modern identity has been shaped by its strategic geographical location at the intersection of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

2.1. Romania’s historical path to European integration

Emerging from the historical regions of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, the formation of a unified Romanian state was a long and complex process, influenced by external pressures from the Ottoman, Russian and Habsburg empires. The creation of modern Romania can be traced back to the unification of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859 under the leadership of Alexandru Ioan Cuza. This laid the groundwork for a period of modernization and institutional reforms, further reinforced with the establishment of a foreign monarchy in 1866 under Carol I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.

The country’s independence was solidified following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, with Romania emerging as a recognized sovereign state after the Treaty of Berlin. However, full national unity was only achieved in 1918, when Transylvania, Banat, Bucovina and Bessarabia joined Romania following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. This unification transformed Romania into a mid-sized European power with expanded territorial resources and a growing population.

Despite this progress, Romania faced significant ‘geopolitical’ challenges throughout the 20th century. World War II led to territorial losses, including the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, as well as the cession of Northern Transylvania to Hungary. The subsequent shift in alliances saw Romania first aligned with the Axis powers before switching to the Allies in August 1944, a decision that ultimately placed the country within the Soviet sphere of influence. The communist regime, which took hold in 1947 following the abdication of King Michael, transformed Romania into a one-party state aligned with Moscow.

Under communist rule, economic policies oscillated between Soviet-style central planning and nationalist-driven economic independence, particularly under Nicolae Ceaușescu. His refusal to participate in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia briefly positioned Romania as an outlier within the Eastern Bloc, garnering temporary Western support. However, by the 1980s, Ceaușescu’s policies of debt repayment, economic austerity and an increasing cult of personality led to widespread hardship, ultimately culminating in the revolution of December 1989.

2.2. Post-Soviet transition and European integration

The collapse of communism in 1989 marked the beginning of Romania’s complex transition to democracy and a market economy, motivated by the desire to distance itself from Russian influence and build a solid affiliation with the European bloc. The early 1990s were characterized by political instability, economic struggles and social tensions, as the country navigated the challenges of post-communist transformation. Despite initial resistance to deep structural reforms, successive governments gradually aligned Romania’s policies with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The country formally applied for NATO membership in 1993 and became the first participant in the Partnership for Peace program in 1994. However, it was only in 2004 that Romania officially joined NATO, following a wave of internal reforms aimed at modernizing its defense sector and strengthening its democratic institutions. NATO membership significantly enhanced Romania’s security position, embedding the country within the broader transatlantic defense framework and reaffirming its commitment to regional stability.^[5]

Parallel to its NATO aspirations, Romania pursued membership in the European Union. Although diplomatic relations with the EU had been established in 1990, the country faced significant hurdles, particularly in governance, judicial independence and anti-corruption measures.^[6] The formal EU accession process began in 2000, culminating in Romania’s entry into the Union in 2007, alongside Bulgaria.^[7] This milestone marked the completion of Romania’s reintegration into the European family, providing access to structural funds, trade opportunities and deeper institutional alignment with EU norms.

Romania’s post-Soviet trajectory had two symbolic moments: joining NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007. These two steps confirmed Bucharest’s Euro-Atlantic anchorage, which was only completed, at least formally, in 2025, with Romania’s full entry into the Schengen area and the definitive removal of internal border controls, including land borders. The long Austrian veto, which lasted over a decade, had long represented a diplomatic wound and reflected the ambiguities of the Union. The revocation, which took place in two phases (March 2024 for air and sea borders, January 2025 for land borders), marked the recognition of Romania’s full European status.

Historically, Romania has always occupied a liminal position: on the edge of the Ottoman Empire, then subject to Tsarist and Soviet imperial pressure. Today, it is trying to capitalise on its geographical position and turn it into a strategic advantage.
A place of transit and friction, suspended between worlds – Latin and Slavic, Orthodox and Catholic, Eastern and Western – has repeatedly been divided or ignored by the great powers.

It is no coincidence that Bucharest is often defined as a ‘geopolitical in-between’^[8], wedged between the tensions of the Black Sea, the Anatolian Peninsula and the heart of Central Europe. And it is precisely this geographical instability that has fuelled Romania’s desire not to remain on the sidelines but to become the keystone of the south-eastern flank of the Union.

Figure 2. European Union as of July 2025

Romania is not simply a bastion but aspires to be a hinge and a protagonist. This ambition is reflected in the constant desire to play an active role in regional decision-making processes, not as a simple executor of Western directives but as an autonomous interlocutor, capable of mediating between the great powers and local dynamics. This is a challenge that is not without obstacles, but one that Romania seems determined to overcome.

From the founding of the B9 group with Poland to support Ukraine to a leading role in the Balkans and in cooperation with Moldova, Bucharest is attempting a difficult synthesis between Atlantic allegiance and regional autonomy. At the same time, it has wholeheartedly joined the Three Seas Initiative, seeking to establish itself as an infrastructural and strategic hub between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, as well as containing Russian and, more tacitly, German influence.

In recent years, the Black Sea has emerged as a real arena of confrontation and possibility, prompting an increasingly cautious positioning in the geopolitical triangle between Brussels, Washington and Istanbul. For instance, the Mihail Kogălniceanu military base, strengthened by the American presence, testifies to a desire to make Atlantic integration irreversible. At the same time, Romania’s interest in greater cooperation with neighbouring countries signals its ambition to forge its own ‘geographical hinterland,’ extending its influence along the north-south and east-west axes.

Bucharest wants to be a bridge between the periphery and the centre of the European area in terms of security, not only a consumer but also a provider. It aims to serve not only as a border, but also as a frontier. This position implies costs, ambiguity and continuous adaptations, but it represents the very essence of the Romanian condition.

3. Romanian foreign policy: security, identity and regional influence

Romania’s foreign policy follows a dual approach, clearly outlined in official strategic documents: on the one hand, the consolidation of Euro-Atlantic integration; on the other, the affirmation of a proactive regional role, especially in the Black Sea and Balkan regions. In Romanian military strategic thinking, the defence of national interests is pursued through ‘an integrated and comprehensive approach’ aimed at strengthening response capacity, resilience and active contribution to collective security.^[9]

This two-pillar doctrine is rooted in the National Defence Strategy, which defines Romania as ‘a regional stability actor’ and emphasises the importance of multilevel cooperation, both within NATO and in regional and bilateral formats.^[10]

Historical experience, always suspended between empires and borderlands, has fostered the development of a strategic culture based on what we might call ‘proactive survival’: a permanent tension between deterrence and alignment, between decision-making autonomy and membership of broader alliances. It is especially since 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, that Bucharest has begun to develop a more autonomous strategic thinking, seeking to transform its geographical vulnerability into diplomatic leverage.^[11]

Today, Romania presents itself not only as a NATO outpost on the south-eastern flank, but also as a connecting platform between Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In this context, the interconnection of territories, agendas and alliances becomes the pivot around which the entire external action is structured.

This vision is manifested in a series of concrete initiatives which can be summarised as follows:

• The development of the Mihail Kogălniceanu air base, destined to become NATO’s main logistics hub in south-eastern Europe;^[12]
• A diversified energy policy, opposing the projects as Nord Stream 2 and favouring alternative corridors such as the BRUA;^[13]
• Enhanced cooperation with Moldova, considered both a cultural partner and a geopolitical buffer zone, and other regional partners
• Active participation in multilateral formats, such as the Bucharest Nine (B9) and the Three Seas Initiative, where Romania aspires to a leadership role.

Although diverse, these elements are consistent with an overall strategy that aims to position Bucharest as a security provider and regional mediator, capable of overcoming the traditional passive and marginal role attributed to Europe’s periphery.

3.1. The Euro-Atlantic bond

Bucharest’s strategic position is fundamentally rooted in its alliance with the United States. The central role of Romania as an operational platform for the Alliance is confirmed by the military bases on Romanian territory, particularly the one at Mihail Kogălniceanu, which serves as NATO’s logistical centre for the Black Sea. The escalation in Ukraine after 2014 resulted in an increase in cooperation with Washington, which eventually became one of the cornerstones of national security.

Romania transitioned from a peripheral member to a critical centre of the Euro-Atlantic architecture in 2022, following the extensive Russian invasion of Ukraine. The NATO contingent was expanded, military exercises were multiplied and the American presence was stabilised as a long-term strategic guarantee.^[14] However, the Euro-Atlantic bond is also political. Bucharest portrays itself as a “good student” of the Western front, uncompromising in its adherence to NATO directives and respect for international law. It aspires to serve as the “security provider” for the European Union, particularly along the southern-eastern axis. ^[15]

This aspiration isn’t always translated into concrete obligations. Although Romania formally commits to allocating at least 2% of its GDP to defence (with more than 20% of that directed toward modernisation and R&D)^[16] in practice, actual investment in research and innovation remains significantly lower. In 2023, R&D expenditure was estimated at just 0.54% of the defence budget, largely due to the absence of a dedicated research line in the Ministry of Defence’s financial planning​.^[17] It is an active participant in NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) and serves as the host of multinational battlegroups on its territory. ^[18] Romanian forces participate in joint patrols and surveillance missions in the Black Sea while conducting extensive training rotations on land, which include joint operations with American, French, Polish and British forces. ^{[19] [20]} Bucharest also provides support to EU security missions, thereby enhancing its reputation as a contributor to collective defence rather than merely a beneficiary.^[21]

Washington regards Romania as a dependable ally and a geostrategic fulcrum.^[22] It borders Ukraine, secures a gateway to the Black Sea and provides logistical depth to NATO’s eastern flank. The Black Sea is increasingly recognised as a critical theatre for transatlantic deterrence against Russia. This is evidenced by the fact that Mihail Kogălniceanu will become the largest NATO base in Europe by 2030.

Romania’s involvement in Moldova’s Europeanization is a component of the EU’s Eastern Partnership strategy, which is designed to stabilise the eastern region of the EU. Romania serves as a cultural and political bridge, providing Moldova with energy interconnections, administrative training and a paradigm for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Bucharest’s role as a buffer, corridor and platform for Western influence beyond the EU’s current borders is reaffirmed by its support for both civilian and military assistance in Ukraine, as well as the facilitation of the transit of energy, grain and refugees ^[23]

As a result, Romania is not merely a security consumer; rather, it is a critical enabler of Euro-Atlantic strategic depth. This function is designed to ensure that Romania’s geopolitical objectives are in accordance with the security visions of both the United States and Europe.

3.2. Regional focus: Moldova, Ukraine, Black Sea

Regional vocation is the other essential component of Romanian foreign policy.

Moldova, repeatedly referred to as a ‘sister country’ by former Romanian President Klaus Iohannis^[24], is a top priority for Romania, not only because of its linguistic and cultural proximity, but above all because of the geopolitical imperative to prevent Chișinău from falling back into Russia’s sphere of influence. For Bucharest, Moldova is not just a neighbouring state, but a civilisational extension of its national identity, whose integration into the Euro-Atlantic space is perceived as both a historical responsibility and a strategic necessity.

Since 2014, Romanian support has intensified on several fronts: from energy cooperation to administrative convergence and regulatory assistance for harmonisation with European standards. A prime example is the Iași–Ungheni–Chișinău gas pipeline, operational since 2021, which allows Chișinău to receive alternative energy supplies to Russian gas. After 2022, Bucharest further expanded its energy exports to Moldova to compensate for disruptions caused by Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure.^[25]

In addition to energy, Romania provides assistance in strengthening administrative capacities, infrastructure investments and growing media, educational and cultural support.^[26] This set of interventions has helped to project an image of ‘soft hegemony’, stabilising and modernising, in stark contrast to Russia’s coercive approach.

At the same time, Bucharest has avoided an explicit hegemonic stance, preferring a nuanced strategy that does not fuel local resistance or international friction. Its focus on hybrid threats, from disinformation to destabilising manoeuvres in the Transnistria region, has led to predominantly bilateral cooperation, but one that is increasingly aligned with NATO’s neighbourhood policies.^[27]

Romania’s diplomatic goal is clear: to transform Moldova from a grey zone into a democracy fully anchored in the West, helping to redefine the regional security architecture. In this perspective, Romania’s interest is not limited to protecting its own eastern flank, but includes a broader ambition: to consolidate a leading role on the south-eastern flank of NATO and the EU, even in partial competition with Poland. Formats such as the Bucharest Nine (B9), co-founded by Bucharest and Warsaw in 2015, and Romania’s leading role in the Three Seas Initiative, testify to its desire to be recognised as a privileged strategic interlocutor in both Brussels and Washington.

Romania has also offered substantial support for Ukraine, both bilaterally and within NATO and EU structures. ^[28] Humanitarian corridors, medical help, fuel supplies and military assistance (especially through training and logistics) have defined Bucharest’s reaction since February 2022.^[29] Following the disruption of sea channels through Odessa, Ukrainian grain shipments have relied on Constanța, while Danube river traffic has expanded to accommodate emergency commodities and migrants ^[30]

Friction points persist. Diplomatic concerns remain about Ukraine’s Romanian minority in Chernivtsi and Zakarpattia, particularly regarding education rights and language regulations. ^[31] Bucharest is also concerned about environmental hazards and international treaties in the Bastroe Canal dispute, a Ukrainian initiative to deepen a Danube Delta trade route.^[32] Romania responded assertively but cautiously, balancing national interest with strategic unity against Russia

Romania’s strategic goals are reflected in the Black Sea. Once called a “Russian lake”, it is now a geopolitical stage where Romania attempts to reinvent itself as a marine stakeholder. Three pillars ^[33] support this vision:

• Security: NATO deployments and coastal defence investments (missile batteries, drone surveillance);
• Connectivity: Danube-Black Sea corridor development and Constanța port upgrade;
• Diplomacy: participation in multilateral formats like BSEC and EU-NATO Black Sea strategy advocacy.

Bulgaria is a partner and counterpart in this delicate situation. Sofia supports Bucharest’s NATO and EU ambitions, although its mixed relations with Russia (particularly in energy and culture) cause occasional differences. Romania has prioritised collaboration in areas such as joint naval drills in the Black Sea, regional energy projects and coordinated border control to address migration and hybrid threats. ^[34]

The “Eastern Flank axis”, the Bucharest-Sofia-Athens triangle, has also begun to form as a framework for synchronised defensive postures and EU advocacy. Romania sees Bulgaria as a vital partner in regional security, bolstering NATO’s South-Eastern frontier.^[35]

Overall, Romania’s regional strategy is stabilisation through integration. Bucharest wants to connect allies, shape neighbourhood dynamics and turn its vulnerabilities into strategic leverage from Moldova to the Black Sea basin.

4. Partnerships and multilateral platforms: Bucharest’s diplomatic network

As mentioned, Romania’s geopolitical strategy is not limited to its bilateral axis with the United States or its role in NATO: on the contrary, over the years Bucharest has been able to build a complex multilateral system that projects it as a key player in regional formats. Despite their differences in purpose and ambition, these partnerships all aim to reinforce Romania’s position as the geopolitical hub of South-Eastern Europe, a safeguard against instability in the East and a link between Europe and the post-Soviet region.

4.1. Bucharest Nine (B9)

Launched in 2015 on the joint initiative of former Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and Polish President Andrzej Duda, the B9 format brings together the NATO countries on the eastern flank, from Bulgaria to the Baltic states. Its objective is clear: to coordinate defensive and deterrent strategies towards Russia, strengthening the common position within the Atlantic Alliance.

With the deterioration of regional security since 2022, the B9 has taken on a new central role. The invitation to US President Biden (2021) ^[36] and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (2022) ^[37] to participate in the group’s summits marked a symbolic and political leap in quality. Bucharest aims to reaffirm its leadership in this context, countering growing Polish influence. Today, a subtle intra-Eastern competition is unfolding for leadership of the Alliance’s eastern front.^[38]

Figure 3. Bucharest 9 map

4.2. The Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative (3SI), established in 2016 and comprising 12 states between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, represents another pillar of Romania’s strategic vision. The 3SI is rooted in a long-standing historical concept: the Intermarium, a strategy originally envisioned by Poland to counter military threats from Russia. However, as Piotr Wójcik observes ^[39], today’s iteration of the initiative is primarily focused on infrastructure development rather than security. The region, accounting for 28% of the EU’s territory and 22% of its population but only 10% of its GDP, has suffered from decades of underinvestment. Nevertheless, beyond its economic and infrastructural goals, the initiative carries a latent geopolitical dimension, particularly concerning the influence of the two major powers flanking the region, Russia and Germany. One notable example is the collective opposition to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 projects, which bypass Central and Eastern Europe in favour of direct German-Russian energy cooperation. The initiative’s focus on regional energy security, exemplified by increased interest in liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, including U.S. exports, suggests that it is, in part, a response to geopolitical pressures. ^[40]

Figure 4. Three Seas Initiative map

One of the fundamental challenges facing the 3SI is the divergence of interests among its three maritime regions: the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. While the Baltic region currently dominates due to its economic strength and well-established governance structures, the Black Sea remains underdeveloped and fraught with security risks. From Romania’s perspective, the Black Sea should be a central focus of the initiative. Not only does the region offer economic opportunities, such as underutilized port infrastructure in Constanța and strategic energy hubs in Burgas, but it also presents security challenges that must be addressed for the initiative to achieve long-term stability. ^[41] The Black Sea, explored in greater depth in Section 5, remains one of Europe’s most volatile regions. The annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine and uncertainties surrounding Turkey’s strategic orientation in the Caucasus and in the Middle-East all contribute to a fragile security environment.

Romania sees a dual potential in 3SI:

• Internally, to bridge the infrastructural gap with Western Europe;
• Externally, to balance German influence and contain Russo-Turkish influence, also through alternative energy supplies such as US liquefied natural gas.

4.3 China and the 16+1 format

Simultaneously, Bucharest is afforded the opportunity to engage on multiple fronts by China’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 16+1 format, thereby preserving a certain degree of diplomatic adaptability in the face of increasing global polarisation.

Figure 5. Map comparison between the Three Seas Initiative and the former 16+1 format

Romania nominally participates in the 16+1 framework, an initiative that Beijing initiated to promote cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. ^[42] However, it does so with minimal strategic engagement and limited enthusiasm.^[43]

Bucharest has maintained a cautious and frequently ambivalent stance in contrast to countries like Hungary and Serbia, which have established substantial political and infrastructural connections with China. Investment in strategic sectors, including energy, transportation and telecommunications, is negligible in China. Projects that were previously contemplated, such as the construction of nuclear reactors at Cernavodă or high-speed rail links, were either abandoned entirely, downscaled, or postponed. The decision by Bucharest to exclude Huawei from the development of 5G infrastructure in 2021 was widely perceived as a signal of strategic alignment with Washington, which served to reinforce its Atlanticist orientation.^[44]

In general, Romania exhibits minimal interest in strengthening its relationship with East Asia. The political elite, academic discourse and business environment of the country are resolutely orientated towards the West, with minimal cultural, commercial, or institutional engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. Romania is most accurately characterised as a “regional outlier” due to its absence of a Chinese presence. This is the result of a foreign policy culture influenced by Euro-Atlantic integration rather than multi-vector pragmatism, institutional inertia and historical path dependency.

As a result, China’s influence in Romania is primarily symbolic and peripheral, functioning more as a diplomatic hedge than as a genuine strategic pillar. Bucharest’s fundamental commitments to NATO, the EU and the transatlantic alliance are not challenged by its participation in the 16+1 format, which provides it with marginal economic opportunities and a degree of visibility in the Indo-Pacific context.

Romania utilises the 16+1 as a platform for civil engagement, which is beneficial for maintaining diplomatic channels. However, it lacks the strategic intent and domestic momentum to convert this into a substantial Eastern pivot.

4.4. Relations with Moldova and Ukraine: proximity diplomacy

The multi-level participation of Romania is not limited to official formats.

Proximity diplomacy is a key part of Romania’s multilateral strategy, especially towards Moldova and Ukraine, two countries that Bucharest sees as central to the stability of the whole Black Sea region. While sharing geographical and ethno-cultural proximity, Romania’s diplomatic approach stands out for its multi-level depth, combining European advocacy, bilateral support and symbolic positioning.^[45]

In the case of Moldova, Romania has consistently acted as the leading diplomatic sponsor of Chișinău’s European path.^[46] From the granting of EU candidate status in 2022 to the negotiations for the opening of accession chapters, Bucharest has used its influence in Brussels to push the Moldovan agenda within the Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. ^[47] As underlined by Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu during his official visit to Chișinău on October 4, 2024, “The Government of Romania will further support the development of the Republic of Moldova on all levels.” ^[48]

This approach is reinforced by active parliamentary and intergovernmental diplomacy, with frequent bilateral and trilateral summits (e.g. Romania–Moldova–Ukraine) and cooperation initiatives between foreign affairs and defence committees.^[49] The Romanian embassy in Chișinău is also one of the most active diplomatic centres in the region, serving as a laboratory for Moldovan administrative Europeanisation and a sounding board for cross-border cultural and media dialogue.

In the case of Ukraine, Romanian diplomacy has taken on a complementary form: a diplomacy of solidarity and resilience, which developed especially after the Russian invasion of 2022. Bucharest has supported UN and EU resolutions in favour of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, promoted sanctions against Russia and facilitated Ukraine’s accession to European mechanisms such as the European Political Community. At the same time, it has played a mediating role in tensions related to the Romanian minority in Ukraine, favouring direct dialogue between ministries and confidential diplomatic channels.^[50]

Romania has also insisted on including the Black Sea dimension in multilateral diplomatic agendas, both in the EU Council and at NATO summits. As highlighted in the Military Strategy of Romania, the area is defined as ‘an extended strategic neighbourhood whose stability is directly tied to Romania’s national security’. Hence the commitment to support, including diplomatically, institutional resilience and civil security initiatives in Ukraine.^[51]

Bucharest’s proximity diplomacy towards Moldova and Ukraine is therefore not merely a geopolitical reaction: it is a model of proactive and identity-based diplomacy, which aims to transform its eastern neighbours into structural partners of the European Union. In this sense, Romania presents itself as a political, cultural and regulatory bridge between integrated Europe and its eastern neighbourhood.

5. The Black Sea as Romania’s Strategic Frontier

The Black Sea has long since evolved from a mere geographical reference in Romanian geopolitical discourse: it is now the focal point of a strategic vision that encompasses energy, trade, diplomacy and security. Bucharest does not merely regard it as a region of interest, but instead perceives it as a multi-level strategic paradigm that is relevant beyond the national level. In this vision, the Black Sea is transformed into a reflection of Europe’s geopolitical architecture, an environment in which the balance of power is actualised through port logistics, energy routes, military infrastructure and diplomatic coalitions, rather than remaining notional.

Figure 6. Political map of the Black Sea with details on key infrastructures

Bucharest presents itself as the regional centre of gravity in this context, serving as a guarantor of stability and a proponent of a maritime order that is based on cooperation and rules. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the subsequent acceleration of strategic realignment have made this ambition more visible and assertive since 2022. Currently, the Black Sea is a geopolitical fault line that separates the East and the West. Romania is compelled to maintain an unstable equilibrium that has been influenced by the ambitions of Russia, Turkey, NATO and, to a greater extent, China ^[52]

The Constanța port is a symbol of Romania’s strategy, serving as an intermodal gateway that connects the Danube to the Black Sea, terrestrial networks to maritime routes and continental Europe to the Caucasus and Middle East. Constanța has strategic storage capabilities for LNG, fertilisers, cereals and military materiel and is fully incorporated into the EU’s TEN-T network.^{[53] [54] [55]} Additionally, it has emerged as a critical logistics centre for Ukrainian exports and international aid since 2022, accommodating heightened volumes of NATO-related cargo and grain transits ^[56]

This logistical centrality is further emphasised by a complementary energy perspective. Bucharest is at the forefront of Europe’s energy diversification agenda as a result of Romania’s alignment with non-Russian suppliers, such as the United States and Qatar and projects like Neptun Deep. Additionally, Romania has made investments in offshore exploitation. Concurrently, the Three Seas Initiative’s participation promotes a north–south connectivity approach that is intended to diminish the dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on Russian energy flows and German infrastructural constraints ^[57]

Romania’s security in the Black Sea is most directly and enduringly threatened by Russia. Moscow has been pursuing a strategy of maritime dominance since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This strategy involves the deployment of sophisticated missile systems, submarines and air-defence networks to transform the sea into a contested zone. The conversion of Crimea into a militarised bastion allows Russia to project force not only over Ukraine but also across Romania’s maritime and airspace periphery. ^[58]

Bucharest interprets the Russian navy’s activities, which include frequent incursions, electronic warfare and the harassment of NATO surveillance missions, as components of a broader doctrine of psychological and military pressure. This doctrine is designed to undermine Romania’s strategic confidence and discourage assertive regional leadership. The response of Romania, which is firmly rooted in NATO’s collective defence framework, is indicative of a growing realisation that the Black Sea is no longer a intermediary territory, but rather a forward frontline of hybrid and conventional competition ^[59]

Although Turkey is officially a NATO ally, it serves a dual function in Romania’s strategic calculations. On the one hand, Ankara shares Romania’s interest in preserving freedom of navigation and counterbalancing Russian maritime ambitions. In contrast, Turkey is a regional power with autonomous interests that aims to maximise its geopolitical influence in the Black Sea by engaging in a balancing act between Moscow and Brussels.

The Montreux Convention, which grants Ankara sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, legally restricts the deployment of non-Black Sea NATO navies and restricts the Alliance’s capacity to maintain a continuous maritime presence. As a consequence, Romania continues to be vulnerable and undersupported in the maritime domain, relying heavily on land and air-based deterrence rather than a completely integrated naval doctrine.
Furthermore, Turkey’s pursuit of regional leadership, which encompasses the modernisation of its naval fleet, the proliferation of drones and the selective cooperation with Russia in sectors such as energy and security, introduces a competitive element to the regional equilibrium. Romania continues to foster bilateral cooperation with Ankara, particularly in the context of NATO exercises and the Black Sea Harmony initiative. However, it is wary of Turkey’s strategic ambiguity and occasionally divergent stance ^[60]

Romania has solidified its position as the southern bastion of the Atlantic Alliance on a military level. Romania’s transformation from a peripheral outpost to a strategic pivot of NATO’s eastern flank is emphasised by the permanent rotation of American and allied forces, the reinforcement of installations in Dobruja and the expansion of Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base. These developments are further reinforced by the establishment of command-and-control centres, increased intelligence sharing and the modernisation of national capabilities, all of which are designed to address Romania’s naval deficiencies and respond to Russia’s increasing maritime assertiveness. ^[61]

Nevertheless, structural constraints endure. Romania’s collective situational awareness is diminished by the absence of a Black Sea-wide NATO maritime command and a modern blue-water navy that is capable of sustained regional operations. Furthermore, NATO’s maritime adaptability remains restricted by the legal restrictions imposed by the Montreux Convention. In this context, Bucharest has shifted to a land-air-sea hybrid model, expanding its coastal surveillance systems, drone capabilities and early warning infrastructure. ^[62] Additionally, it is advocating for a more robust EU-NATO coordination mechanism in the Black Sea ^[63]

Romania’s objective is unambiguous: to prevent maritime subjugation, contain Russian aggression, balance Turkish assertiveness and project Euro-Atlantic values across a critical region.
Romania must maintain its investment in infrastructure, alliance interoperability and naval capacity in order to achieve success.

5.1 Risk geopolitics and Black Sea diplomacy

Despite diplomatic efforts, the Black Sea still lacks a shared geopolitical identity.
Attempts to build a ‘Black Sea macro-region’, based on the Baltic model, are coming up against historical rivalries and still weak political capital. Past attempts at regional cooperation, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Community of Democratic Choice, have failed to produce meaningful outcomes.^[64] Romania must therefore advocate for a stronger role for the Three Seas Initiative in regional stability, while also ensuring that security concerns do not overshadow its economic development objectives.

Yet Romania insists, convinced that the only way out of the logic of the regional buffer is the construction of an integrated Eurasian platform. To achieve this, it promotes the inclusion of extra-regional actors such as the United States and the European Union and supports multi-level mechanisms that also involve Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia in existing formats.^[65]

Tbilisi, like Chișinău and Kyiv, aspires to deeper Euro-Atlantic integration and shares with Romania a strong historical perception of Russian assertiveness as a fundamental threat to sovereignty. Bilateral relations between Bucharest and Tbilisi have intensified in recent years with Romania consistently reaffirming its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and its aspirations toward NATO and EU membership. ^[66] The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has underlined Georgia’s role as a key strategic partner in the Black Sea region, particularly in terms of promoting regional stability and connectivity. ^[67]

From an infrastructural standpoint, Georgia is viewed as a strategic complement to Romania’s Black Sea vision. Maritime and energy corridors linking the Caspian Basin to Europe, particularly the Black Sea-Caspian Transport Corridor, position Georgia as a potential pivot for East-West connectivity. Romania’s interest in integrating Georgia into the broader Three Seas logic stems from this geoeconomic alignment: a networked Black Sea that includes Tbilisi would offer not only redundancy in transport routes but also strategic depth in counterbalancing Russian and Turkish ambitions.

6. Concluding Remarks

Situated at the frontier of the European Union, Romania plays a crucial role in maintaining stability in South-Eastern Europe. The country’s geopolitical importance has been reinforced by regional conflicts, including the wars in the former Yugoslavia, tensions in Ukraine and security challenges along the Black Sea. Romania has positioned itself as a reliable NATO and EU partner, contributing to peacekeeping missions, counter-terrorism initiatives and strategic defense programs.

Three decades after the fall of communism, Romania has firmly established itself as a stable and committed member of NATO and the European Union. The country’s strategic location, growing economy and active participation in regional security initiatives make it a key player in South-Eastern Europe. However, ongoing challenges remain, particularly in governance, economic modernisation and social inclusion.

As the European Union faces new geopolitical and economic uncertainties, Romania has the opportunity to further strengthen its role as a bridge between East and West. Nevertheless, structural fragilities remain that risk limiting its potential. The critical issues are not only economic or infrastructural but also political, institutional and related to identity. Internal political strife has significantly undermined Romania’s credibility on the international stage. Power struggles between government factions, widespread corruption and frequent institutional conflicts have weakened the country’s governance framework. The country’s recent political crises have triggered mass protests and EU scrutiny. Such instability diminishes Romania’s influence within European decision-making bodies, its transatlantic alliance and the international scenario.

Perhaps the most significant strategic failures of the past decades have been in the energy sector. Romania’s uncertain position in negotiations over key projects such as South Stream and Nabucco weakened its standing in European energy diplomacy.^[68] The country initially sought direct agreements with Russia for natural gas supply while simultaneously supporting EU-backed projects, leading to a perception of inconsistency and undermining its credibility as a reliable partner.

To complete the picture of critical issues, there is the persistent exposure of the country to transnational crime, which still places it, together with other Balkan players, along the ‘highway of crime’ that crosses the Black Sea, the Danube and the south-eastern borders of the Union. Trafficking of arms, migrants, drugs and even enriched uranium (as reported by the IAEA) continues to pass through Romanian territory, fuelling shady networks and infiltration of economic and political structures. ^[69]

These vulnerabilities compromise Bucharest’s position as a credible ‘security provider’ and amplify the reservations of some European partners. Romania, therefore, finds itself suspended between strategic ambitions and real limits.

The road ahead will require sustained political will. Yet, as history has shown, Romania’s resilience and determination have allowed it to navigate complex transitions before. The future holds significant potential for the country to not only solidify its European identity but also to shape the broader trajectory of South-Eastern Europe within the evolving global order.

The country’s ability to regain strategic significance will depend on:

• Resolving political instability and restoring institutional credibility.
• Strengthening economic policies to attract investment and improve competitiveness
• Enhancing its role in EU security and energy policy, particularly by supporting pan-European energy projects.

Only by reconciling its internal reforms with its external ambitions can Romania truly evolve from a peripheral actor into a pivotal force shaping the future of Europe’s eastern frontier.

References and Endnotes

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2. Laura Popa, ‘Romania’s Vast Green Energy Potential: A Missed Opportunity by Politicians’ (Press One, 2024) <https://pressone.ro/romanias-vast-green-energy-potential-a-missed-opportunity-by-politicians> accessed 21 April 2025. ↑
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10. ibid. ↑
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50. Matteo Montano (n 45). ↑
51. Romania’s Ministry of National Defence (n 4). ↑
52. Săgeată (n 8). ↑
53. Reuters, ‘LNG Terminal off Northern Greece Diversifies Gas Routes to Europe’ (2024)
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56. Veress (n 14). ↑
57. Liviu Muresan and Alexandru Georgescu (n 41). ↑
58. Drăgulin (n 23). ↑
59. ibid. ↑
60. Stoica (n 11). ↑
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