The Transition of CEE Countries to the Sixth Technological Order

Written by: Maksym Loharzhevskyi, Charles University – Faculty of Social Sciences.

Abstract

This article examines the trend of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards the sixth technological order and its possible effects on the political development paths of these countries, as well as on the relations within systems of regional cooperation. Starting with an analysis of the area’s technology development over time—from Soviet modernization to post-Soviet integration and the arrival of fifth-order development—along with the prevailing hybrid conditions, this study uses case studies from Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Ukraine to demonstrate the variety of paths of adaptation. It is argued that the complicated nature, capital intensity, and systemic character of sixth-order technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and blockchain call for enormous regional collaboration, particularly within the context of European Union programs such as Horizon Europe, European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, European Digital Infrastructure Consortium, and European Blockchain Services Infrastructure, to ensure successful outcomes for Central and Eastern European nations. Meanwhile, it is contended that this technological revolution has a profound impact on political philosophy and trajectories, exacerbating such existential predicaments as freedom or control, equality or inequality, sovereignty in relation to interdependence, and questions of identity, while deepening the role of the state. Also, it is argued that strategic coordination and proactiveness are needed on the part of CEE nations in order to successfully employ the benefits and mitigate the dangers of the new technological age.

Keywords: Sixth technological order, Central and Eastern Europe, political trajectories, regional cooperation, AI, biotechnologies, blockchain, EU initiatives.

1. Introduction

Imagine a morning in a city where drones deliver medicines individually tailored to your DNA, nanorobots diagnose diseases even before symptoms appear, and artificial intelligence doesn’t just assist but collaborates with you as an equal. This isn’t a scene from science fiction but a reality that Europe is already building as part of the transition to the sixth technological paradigm.

It is characterized by the integration of NBIC technologies (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information, and cognitive sciences), and moves beyond the digital focus of the fifth, enabling unprecedented control over matter at atomic and molecular levels and influencing biological and cognitive systems. Investments in these fields are now rapidly transforming industry, medicine, and daily life. For example, according to the latest data, in 2023, investments in biopharmaceutical R&D in Europe amounted to €46.2 billion, which is a 4.4% increase compared to 2022 (EFPIA 2023) – a key indicator of this shift. As Europe transitions into this sixth technological paradigm, countries are not just adapting to the future – they are actively designing it. And I believe that is precisely why it would be particularly interesting to explore how the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (a region that has historically balanced between industrial heritage and innovative aspirations) are navigating this transformative new era.

For countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Ukraine, Estonia, and others, this transition offers a chance not just to catch up with the West but also to set their own innovative trajectory. This hypothesis is supported by significant examples, such as Estonia that already invests over 1.7% of its GDP in R&D, particularly in digital technologies, and 33% of Polish startups utilize artificial intelligence technologies (Statista 2024; GGI 2024).

This phenomenon also deserves deeper study because CEE countries act as a kind of ‘transition laboratory’: their experience allows us to trace how innovations are shaped not only by technological progress but also by political decisions, European integration, and new forms of regional cooperation. Moreover, I will examine this transition not only from the perspective of technology but also as part of institutional transformation. I believe that this approach is important because it allows us to understand that innovations do not emerge in a vacuum; they develop within the context of values, policies, and collective decisions. This “non-vacuum” spirit will be further reinforced by referencing to history – my analysis is made on the clear timeline, which will particularly help to understand the dynamism of the changes and compare it with the samples from previous times.

One of the main points of my research is that the complexity, cost, and systemic nature of the sixth technological order technologies will make enhanced regional cooperation, primarily within the framework of European initiatives (like Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, EuroHPC, EBSI, etc.), not just desirable but a critically necessary condition for the successful implementation and competitiveness of CEE countries. At the same time, I propose the thesis that this technological shift will significantly impact political vectors of these countries: on one hand, it will likely strengthen the pro-Western (pro-European and transatlantic) orientation of most countries due to the need for access to resources, standards, and security umbrellas. On the other hand, it will intensify domestic political debates and fundamental dilemmas concerning freedom versus control, equality versus inequality, sovereignty versus interdependence, identity, and the role of the state in the new technological era. Furthermore, by analyzing the examples of Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Ukraine, I will demonstrate the diversity of adaptation paths to the sixth technological order and the potential consequences for their future development and interaction within the region.

2. Historical context and current situation in the technology sphere

To gain a deep understanding of how the transition of the Central and Eastern European countries to the 6th technological paradigm will influence their political future and regional cooperation, it is necessary to establish the nature of the transition first. To that end, looking into the region’s technological history, analyzing past change in technology, and learning from it is the most helpful. Particularly, historical context must be taken into account since the heritage of the past – ranging from Soviet-imposed industrialization to market reforms in the 1990s – has created specific institutional, infrastructural, and even societal features in each nation that will surely influence the pace and form of new technology adoption.

2.1 Soviet period and its effects

Historically, industrial development in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the Soviet period was defined by substantial regional disparities. While certain territories, mainly Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland and Hungary, had achieved a relatively developed industrial base corresponding to the later stages of the second and elements of the third technological paradigms, most regions remained predominantly agrarian (Berend 1998).

The subsequent Soviet era was marked by forced industrialization following a uniform model focused on the mass implementation of technologies associated with the third (electrification, heavy industry, chemicals) and fourth (automobiles, petrochemicals, mass production) paradigms. Priority was given to heavy industry, the military-industrial complex, and resource extraction (Gregory & Stuart 2004). However, centralized planning and technological isolation from the West substantially hindered innovation processes and the flexibility of economic systems, particularly in the advanced fields constituting the fifth paradigm. Consequently, by the late 1980s, the region’s economies, operating primarily within the framework of the fourth paradigm, were already demonstrating a significant lag in information technology development compared to Western countries (Hanson 2003).

As far as I can see, this historical legacy creates a complex backdrop for the transition to the sixth technological paradigm. In particular, on the one hand, industrial capacities and engineering resources at hand may be a basis for modernization. However, on the other hand, institutional and infrastructural limitations carried over from the past system, combined with path dependencies formed in the 20th century, could make rapid adaptation to the radical innovations of the sixth paradigm challenging and will require deep structural reforms and directed investments in new capabilities. And I think that the necessity to overcome this complex legacy and the accrued technological backlog, especially in fifth-paradigm sectors, defined the agenda and nature of the transformations initiated in the region after Soviet times.

2.2 General overview of the contemporary situation

As we can observe in our daily lives, contemporary technological space in Central and Eastern Europe is hybrid in nature: the fifth technological paradigm, which is founded on the widespread application of information and communication technologies, digitalization, and globalization, is dominant. And simultaneously, key elements of the fourth paradigm, connected with classic industry, still persist in the region, especially in the Czech Republic.

Additionally, evidence of the prevalence of the fifth paradigm exists by means of wide internet and mobile coverage penetration and engaged public administration, banking, and commerce digitalization. Estonia, for example, led in e-governance and constructed the “e-Estonia” model (Atlantic Council 2020). Besides, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and the Czech Republic have become major hubs of IT outsourcing and software development for Western companies, which signifies their integration into global digital value chains (Intellias 2025). This is evidenced in Figure 1, in which the volumes of IT outsourcing in the region are depicted as progressively growing between the years 2016 and 2028—particularly in services like web hosting, application development, administrative support, and other IT services.

Figure 1. Growth of IT outsourcing in Eastern Europe: services by segment (2016–2028).

Source: Intellias 2025.

A substantial portion of the region’s economy, as mentioned earlier, still relies on the fourth technological paradigm. The automotive industry in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania remains a core industry, focusing on European and international motor interests’ assembly and component manufacturing. Moreover, longstanding industries such as metallurgy, chemicals, and machine building remain crucial, particularly for those countries with a background of Soviet industrialization (Stöllinger 2019).

2.3 On the way to the sixth paradigm

Regarding the sixth paradigm, the region is taking gradual steps towards renewable energy and the implementation of high technologies. In Poland, for instance, transition from coal to renewable energy sources is observed, although dependence on fossil fuels still persists (Perez 2010). Additionally, the main manifestations of the sixth paradigm – the evolution of technology startups, the formation of research and innovation infrastructure, and the development of specialized industry niches—are concentrated in frontier cities such as Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Kyiv, and Tallinn. These cities’ startup ecosystems have been expanding considerably throughout the last decade, particularly in the fields of financial technology, biotechnology, and artificial intelligence. Warsaw, for example, has emerged as a hub for fintech startups that combine machine learning with new digital banking service models, as evidenced in the fact that it hosts approximately 45% of Poland’s fintech companies (City of Warsaw n.d.). In Tallinn, projects related to cybersecurity are actively developing, closely linked to the country’s national priorities in digital security and its reputation as an “e-state” (RIA, 2024). Similarly, the number of AI-oriented startups is growing in Ukraine, many of which target the international market, e.g., such companies as Grammarly (Sydorov n.d.). Concurrently, I believe that the example of the Polish biotechnology startup Ingenix.ai, which raised €9 million to develop AI solutions for medical research (Vestbee 2025), demonstrates that countries in the region can be not only outsourcers but also creators of high-technology products.

Another critically important technology that emerged towards the end of the fifth technological paradigm, but I believe is fundamental to the sixth and requires separate attention, is blockchain. Its significance for the sixth paradigm stems from several key capabilities that align with the core characteristics of the paradigm: decentralization, intelligent automation, and the deep integration of physical and digital systems. As M. Swan (2015) argues, first and foremost, blockchain establishes trust, transparency, and data immutability in distributed networks without central intermediaries. Also, S. Nakamoto (2008) assumes that this decentralized protocol is key for managing complexity in 6th paradigm applications such as cyber-physical systems and AI ecosystems. Amidst Big Data and AI, blockchain’s cryptographic security and immutable ledger ensure comprehensive data protection, addressing the security challenges of interconnected data flows. Moreover, tokenization, representing assets digitally on a blockchain, facilitates new models for ownership and value exchange, bridging physical and digital realms (Tapscott & Tapscott 2016), which is a characteristic of the 6th paradigm’s integrated reality.

In addition to domestic initiatives, multinational corporations are very important in stimulating technological breakthroughs by establishing research centers in the region. For example, the German automotive concern Continental invested over €47 million in creating three R&D centers in Hungary. These centers specialize in autonomous driving and safety systems—fields directly corresponding to sixth-paradigm technologies (The Recursive 2023). Similarly, R&D units in information technology and intelligent systems are developing in the Czech Republic and Romania, often in collaboration with universities. However, it should be noted that the region’s large-scale engagement with the “deep” technologies of the sixth paradigm remains limited. Indigenous fundamental research is still comparatively underdeveloped, partly explained by the uneven levels of investment in R&D among the region’s countries and their significant lag behind EU leaders. As illustrated by Eurostat data (see Figure 2), in 2023, only a few CEE countries, such as Slovenia (2.2% of GDP) and the Czech Republic (1.9%), demonstrated R&D investment levels approaching the EU average (2.2%). In contrast, most countries in the region, including Poland (1.5%), Lithuania (1.1%), Slovakia (0.9%), Hungary (1.0%), Bulgaria (0.7%), and Romania (0.5%), invested considerably less. This picture contrasts sharply with the figures for leading innovative EU economies like Sweden (3.3%) or Belgium (3.5%) and underscores significant intra-regional disparities. I conjecture that such asymmetry poses a threat of techno-economic polarization within the CEE region itself and complicates the formation of the critical mass needed for breakthroughs in sixth-paradigm technologies.

Figure 2. Gross Domestic Expenditures on R&D (% relative to GDP), 2013 and 2023.

Source: Eurostat 2024.

Aside from this, there is some degree of specialization in promising niches in some CEE countries. For instance, Estonia has become one of the world’s cybersecurity hubs, actively integrating these skills into both the public and private sectors. Poland has become, in turn, an exclave of the video game industry in Europe: companies such as CD Projekt RED or Techland demonstrate their capability to create world-class products with elements of artificial intelligence, cognitive design, and machine learning. Also, the Czech Republic is approaching specialization in the field of defense technologies and deep tech startups, especially in collaboration with the corporation CSG, in investing in advanced security solutions (Reuters 2025).

Thus, the Central and Eastern European states demonstrate positive, but still not widespread, tendencies to build the sixth technological paradigm. The appearance of startup ecosystems, growth in R&D expenditure, and establishment of niche industries prove the improved technological capability of the region. But the key challenges still lie ahead, e.g., institution building in the research and development base, closing the gap between applied and basic research, and effective integration into global value chains. It is my conviction that if these challenges are overcome, the region has a fair chance but also to bring its own unique technological solutions to the global scene.

3. The implementation of the 6th technological order and its prospects

Although I touched upon the topic of implementing the sixth technological paradigm in CEE countries in the previous part, I did so within the framework of understanding the region’s overall technological landscape. Now, I would like to delve deeper into the implementation of the paradigm as such and its prospects by proposing the certain analysis model, demonstrating its connection to the topic of the paper and outlining the different case studies from Estonia, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and the Czech Republic.

3.1 Christensen’s model and its application

Analyzing the transition of CEE countries to the sixth technological paradigm requires an understanding of the innovation adoption mechanisms shaping it. For this analysis, I will primarily use the model proposed by Clayton Christensen, which distinguishes between market-creating, sustaining, and efficiency innovations and thus provides a useful analytical framework for this process (Christensen et al. 2019). Namely, as C. M. Christensen (2019) defines, they create entirely new markets by transforming complex and expensive products or services into significantly simpler and more accessible ones, thereby targeting vast groups of ‘non-consumers’ – people who previously lacked access to relevant solutions. I think that in the context of the sixth paradigm, examples of such innovations could include the development of accessible AI-based platforms for data analytics, engaging small and medium-sized enterprises (traditional ‘non-consumers’ of complex business analytics); the advancement of personalized medicine based on genomics and biotechnology, opening up treatment possibilities for patients with rare diseases; or the creation of decentralized energy solutions (microgrids, affordable solar panels) providing energy to remote or previously off-grid communities. Blockchain technology, in turn, can create new markets through the tokenization of previously illiquid assets or through decentralized finance, engaging users excluded from traditional financial systems.

Meanwhile, sustaining innovations are also important, as they improve existing products and services for current customers. Within the framework of the sixth paradigm, this might include using AI to enhance the accuracy of medical diagnostics (e.g., analyzing MRI scans), developing more efficient solar panels or energy storage batteries, or applying nanotechnology to create superior materials for existing products. Finally, efficiency innovations allow existing goods and services to be produced more cheaply, often through automation (using AI and robotics), logistics optimization via IoT, or implementing chatbots for customer service.

But, as we can see, the prospects for implementing the sixth paradigm in CEE through these types of innovations are heterogeneous. As S. Radosevic and T. Stanculovic (2012) argue, the transition will most likely occur unevenly, with tech hubs and strong IT sectors leading the way, while traditional industrial regions may lag behind. As far as I can see, the success will largely depend on external factors like the volume of foreign direct investment in high-tech industries, the speed of advanced technology transfer, the effectiveness of integration into pan-European research and innovation programs (e.g., Horizon Europe, Digital Europe), and overall geopolitical stability in the region. Also, the nature of the transition is likely to be predominantly catch-up, focused on implementing and adapting sixth-paradigm technologies already proven in the West within the framework of sustaining and efficiency innovations. However, I believe that the strong IT sector, a legacy of the fifth paradigm, and growing potential in specific technological niches (e.g., cybersecurity, fintech, biotechnology) create an opportunity for some CEE countries for technological ‘leapfrogging,’ meaning the development of their own market-creating innovations. The main focus, however, is likely to remain on the applied use of technologies (e.g., AI in industry, Industry 4.0 solutions, cybersecurity), rather than on fundamental research, which is typical for countries outside the core of global innovation. Also, stimulating specifically market-creating innovations, adapted to local needs and ‘non-consumption’ markets, will require targeted public policy and the creation of a conducive institutional environment.

After outlining this theoretical framework and the general regional perspectives, I want to move on to examining specific examples to illustrate these dynamics in practice.

3.2 Estonia

Estonia, well-known as a world leader in digitalization and a prime example of the successful implementation of the fifth technological paradigm, holds a distinctive starting position for the transition to the sixth one. I believe that its advanced digital infrastructure, known as ‘e-Estonia’, which encompasses electronic identification, the secure X-Road data exchange layer, and the almost complete digitalization of public services, creates a strong foundation for implementing next-generation technologies (e-Estonia n.d.). Also, Estonia uses the KSI Blockchain (Keyless Signature Infrastructure), developed by Guardtime and implemented since 2008, to ensure data integrity in key public registries and X-Road system logs (Buldas et al. 2013; e-Estonia n.d.). Though not a conventional blockchain for payments or smart contracts, KSI provides cryptographic proof through hash-chains and timestamps, supporting trust in the digital state. This foundation also enables Estonia’s role in European blockchain initiatives like the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI), including projects such as cross-border digital diploma authentication (Ariño 2022). Furthermore, the country is actively developing a national artificial intelligence strategy “KrattAI” that aims not only to use AI to improve the efficiency of existing public services but also to promote AI development and deployment in the private sector, creating new opportunities for entrepreneurs and citizens (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2019). This is supplemented by an extremely vibrant startup ecosystem that has given birth to globally recognized startups like Wise and Bolt, with a very high number of ‘unicorns’ per capita. Estonian startups, as Startup Estonia (2023) states following Figure 3, exhibit steady growth in the number of employees: Wise and Bolt together added more than 800 new jobs in 2022 alone. As far as I can see, this indicates not only the dynamism of the sector but also its increasing impact on the national economy.

Figure 3. Top 10 biggest employers among Estonian startups in 2021 and 2022.

Source: Startup Estonia 2023.

Also, this ecosystem is a breeding ground for innovation, especially in financial technology and cybersecurity – key areas where advanced technologies of the sixth paradigm are applied.

Through the lens of Christensen’s model, Estonia’s digital innovation landscape primarily reflects efficiency and sustaining innovations, particularly evident in the “KrattI” strategy, which incrementally improves existing e-governance tools using AI rather than radically transforming them. While Estonia’s KSI Blockchain (Buldas et al. 2013; e-Estonia n.d.) exemplifies a foundational efficiency innovation ensuring data integrity across public registries, it does not itself constitute a market-creating force, as it reinforces existing institutional structures rather than enabling fundamentally new user behaviors. True market-creating innovation remains limited and largely speculative—potentially visible in niche sectors such as personalized medicine enabled by the National Genome Project (Estonian Genome Centre n.d.). Despite Estonia’s reputation as a digital pioneer, much of its progress remains within the bounds of system optimization, raising questions about whether it is truly leading the sixth paradigm or merely adapting it to existing paradigms.

3.3 Poland

Compared to Estonia’s strong focus on the digital state and startup community, Poland—the largest economy in the CEE—pursues a more diversified approach to sixth paradigm technologies. With a dual economic structure combining legacy heavy industry (a legacy of the fourth paradigm) and a dynamic IT sector known for gaming and outsourcing, Poland follows a mixed strategy of modernizing existing sectors while nurturing emerging tech. This duality is reflected in strategic documents like the Policy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence in Poland from 2020 (Ministry of Digital Affairs 2020) and Industry 4.0 initiatives. In the blockchain domain, Poland’s efforts appear more fragmented and exploratory than Estonia’s systemic model. Private-sector initiatives dominate—such as the Polish Credit Bureau’s use of Hyperledger Fabric with Billon Group to secure interbank data exchange (Billon Group 2019)—while public projects remain limited to pilots in areas like vehicle records and customs transparency. Overall, blockchain is treated as a niche solution rather than a foundational digital infrastructure.

I believe that, applying Christensen’s model, the implementation of the sixth paradigm in Poland is proceeding along several parallel paths. First of all, efficiency innovations are prominent there in traditional industry through automation, robotization, and Industry 4.0—essential for sustaining Poland’s large manufacturing base but typically focused on optimizing legacy systems rather than transforming them. In the IT sector, sustaining innovations dominate: the shift from outsourcing to proprietary tech development and the expansion of globally competitive gaming (leveraging VR/AR and AI) reflect sectoral maturity, yet do not necessarily disrupt existing markets. Market-creating innovations are emerging but remain limited in scope. They stem from dynamic startups in AI, biotech, and fintech—supported by growing venture capital activity—and R&D centers established by multinational corporations. However, these initiatives often remain fragmented and lack strong policy alignment.

The Polish blockchain trajectory reflects this broader pattern: its use is largely experimental and sector-specific, as seen in the Polish Credit Bureau’s partnership with Billon Group using Hyperledger Fabric to secure interbank data exchange (Billon Group 2019), without a systemic national framework like Estonia’s. This fragmentation suggests missed opportunities to position blockchain as foundational infrastructure. Although the Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D has more than doubled since 2010—reaching 1.56% of GDP in 2023 (see Figure 4)—it still falls below leading EU innovation economies, indicating a persistent underinvestment in long-term innovation capacity. The rise of biotechnology clusters in Gdansk, Krakow, and Wroclaw illustrates potential for market-creating growth, but I believe that without stronger coordination and policy commitment, this progress may remain isolated rather than transformative.

Figure 4. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a percentage of GDP in Poland from 2010 to 2023.

Source: Statista 2025.

3.4 Czech Republic

The Czech Republic, in contrast to Estonia’s digital focus and Poland’s large-scale diversification, demonstrates its own path of integration into the sixth technological paradigm, largely determined by its strong industrial base and significant scientific potential. The country has one of the most industrialized economies in the EU, with a strong legacy of the fourth paradigm, particularly in automotive and mechanical engineering. This structure is complemented by a relatively high level of Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D compared to many other CEE countries (as seen from Eurostat data, see Figure 2 in the previous section), as well as a network of quality technical universities and research institutes. Accordingly, I assume that the Czech Republic’s main strategy is aimed at modernizing the existing economy through the implementation of advanced technologies.

This can be best illustrated by the National Artificial Intelligence Strategy, adopted in 2019, which does not merely view AI as an independent technology but as a central instrument for increasing the competitiveness of the Czech economy and society (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2019). The policy welcomes a wide range of sectors: it provides for the creation of support for R&D in AI, with particular focus on the creation of a European center of excellence; the creation of education and training personnel capable of working with new technologies; creating a favorable regulatory and ethical environment for the application of AI; encouraging the development of AI use in the private sector, mainly in industry, energy, and healthcare; and actively integrating AI into public administration to improve the efficiency of services (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2019).

State support for AI research has significantly increased, especially after 2016, with a peak in 2018–2019 aligned with NAIS adoption. As shown in Figure 5, the majority of public funding flows to universities and university hospitals, highlighting their central role in AI capacity-building (Government of the Czech Republic 2021).

Regarding blockchain, the Czech approach is more cautious and research-focused, resembling Poland’s trajectory but with fewer private-sector pilots. While large-scale implementations are lacking, potential use cases in energy data management and real estate cadastre transparency are under exploration (Kholiavko et al. 2022). The Czech National Bank is actively studying central bank digital currencies and distributed ledger integration into finance (Derviz 2023), and the country participates in European initiatives like EBSI. In contrast to Estonia’s deep integration of blockchain into governance, the Czech Republic remains in the preparatory and observational phase.

Figure 5. Annual^[1] state support for AI R&D in research sectors in the Czech Republic (million CZK).

Source: Government of the Czech Republic 2021.

Analyzing the Czech Republic’s technological trajectory through Christensen’s model reveals a landscape dominated by efficiency and sustaining innovations. Major efforts focus on boosting productivity in established sectors—particularly automotive manufacturing—through automation, robotics, AI, and IoT. These are clear examples of applying sixth paradigm technologies to modernize existing markets rather than to create new ones. At the same time, the country holds substantial potential for market-creating innovations, but this remains largely underutilized. The Czech Republic possesses strong competencies in materials science and engineering, which form a solid base for advanced fields like nanotechnology. Recognized centers in Brno and Liberec, supported by organizations such as the Czech Nanotechnology Industries Association, are already active. Promising research is also taking place in AI—especially natural language processing and computer vision—as well as in biomedical engineering. However, unlike Estonia, where new ideas are rapidly commercialized, the Czech innovation ecosystem lacks dynamism. The process of turning research into startups and scalable products is slow and fragmented, pointing to a weak link between academia, entrepreneurship, and investment.

The country’s approach to blockchain further illustrates this pattern. Through Christensen’s lens, blockchain in the Czech Republic is pre-dominantly sustaining or preparatory, with few signs of disruptive or market-creating use. While potential applications in energy and land cadastre are being studied (Kholiavko et al. 2022), implementation remains limited. The Czech National Bank is actively researching central bank digital currencies (Derviz 2023), showing institutional awareness, but private-sector engagement lags behind, especially compared to Poland’s BIK project. Participation in initiatives like EBSI signals interest, yet it remains more observational than transformative.

Overall, while the Czech Republic has the technical capacity and academic strength to become a sixth paradigm innovator, the innovation-to-market pipeline is underdeveloped. I believe that without stronger commercialization channels, a more agile startup ecosystem, and better coordination between public and private sectors, much of this potential risks to remain unrealized.

3.5 Romania

Another CEE country – Romania – demonstrates another unique trajectory of transition to the sixth technological paradigm. The major driving force behind the country’s technological revolution is its very dynamic information technology industry, which remains a model to be emulated for fifth paradigm evolution. According to figures from the US International Trade Administration, there were approximately 192,000 software developers in Romania in 2023, one of the highest in the region (International Trade Administration 2023). Also, the country’s two main IT centers, Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca, concentrate most of this professional pool, thus creating an appropriate environment for high-tech services, startups, and global IT multinationals. Romania was long a pioneer in IT services outsourcing, but in recent years there has been steady growth in the number of product firms and successful IT startups. The most prominent example is UiPath, which grew from Romania to the world’s top spot in Robotic Process Automation—a technology deeply connected to artificial intelligence and central to sixth paradigm automation (UiPath n.d.).

While blockchain development began later and is less institutionalized than in Estonia, Romania is gradually increasing its engagement, mainly through research-driven initiatives. Institutions such as the National Institute for Research and Development in Informatics are actively exploring blockchain’s potential, organizing thematic events and promoting knowledge transfer. Discussions around pilot applications in public transparency and elections exist, but large-scale adoption remains limited. Romania also participates in the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure, yet blockchain here, like in Poland and the Czech Republic, is still seen more as a technology for niche or future use than as a foundational element of the digital state.

As I have already noted, in Romania, the implementation of the sixth paradigm occurs primarily through sustaining innovations within its dynamic IT sector. A gradual shift is visible from traditional outsourcing to developing proprietary software products and complex digital solutions, supported by growing value-added activity (Popescu et al. 2023). Global success stories such as UiPath in Robotic Process Automation (UiPath n.d.), Bitdefender in cybersecurity (Bitdefender n.d.), and FintechOS in financial software (FintechOS n.d.) illustrate Romania’s capacity to deliver globally competitive solutions. As shown in Figure 6, key clients of Romanian IT vendors now include highly regulated and technologically demanding sectors such as finance, healthcare, and business services (N-iX 2024), underscoring the increasing maturity of the ecosystem. Yet, while Romania’s IT sector has demonstrated considerable strength, this sectoral concentration may also become a bottleneck. From the Christensen’s framework perspective, focusing primarily on sustaining innovations—improving existing services for established markets—can limit a country’s ability to disrupt or lead new markets, especially if broader sectors remain technologically stagnant.

Applying Christensen’s model further, efficiency innovations—which enable doing more with fewer resources—are less visible at the national scale, particularly compared to countries like Poland or the Czech Republic that apply AI and automation in traditional manufacturing sectors. Market-creating innovations, although present in Romania’s startup ecosystem, have yet to scale broadly. This pattern is also reflected in the country’s approach to blockchain technology. Namely, engagement remains primarily within research institutions such as the National Institute for Research and Development in Informatics, which promotes blockchain exploration and academic transfer through initiatives like the Blockchain Intelligence Academy. While pilot discussions on blockchain for electoral transparency or anti-corruption in public services exist, they lack follow-through. Romania’s involvement in the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) signals awareness but not strategic commitment. In this light, it is my deep conviction that blockchain, much like other emerging technologies, risks being siloed within academic and niche applications.

Figure 6. Key industries served by Romanian IT vendors.

Source: N-iX 2024.

Thus, I believe that Romania, relying on its powerful and growing IT sector and large pool of talented specialists, has significant potential to become an important European hub for software development and services based on artificial intelligence. Its path to the sixth paradigm is primarily defined by evolution and innovation within the digital economy of the fifth paradigm, with less emphasis on modernizing traditional industries compared to Poland or the Czech Republic, and without the deep state integration of blockchain, as seen in Estonia.

3.6 Ukraine

After examining the diverse strategies and priorities of CEE countries under conditions of relative stability, I now want to turn my analysis to Ukraine – a country whose path to the sixth technological paradigm and innovation landscape have undergone unique transformations under the influence of the full-scale war.

Before the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine had already established itself as one of the largest and most dynamic IT hubs in Europe, with a strong fifth-paradigm ecosystem that included thousands of IT companies, an extensive outsourcing network, numerous R&D centers of international corporations, and a growing number of successful product startups, exporting billions of dollars worth of services (IT Ukraine Association 2022). This development relied on a strong engineering school and a large pool of talented specialists.

Already at this stage, the country demonstrated significant ambitions regarding next-generation technologies, particularly blockchain. Unlike the more cautious approaches of its neighbors, the Ministry of Digital Transformation actively promoted this technology: back in 2018, the State Land Cadastre transitioned to using blockchain technology to increase transparency and protect data from unauthorized changes (Transparency International Ukraine 2018). Also, pilot projects on blockchain-based e-voting were conducted, and in 2021-2022, progressive legislation “On Virtual Assets” was finally adopted, creating one of the most favorable jurisdictions for the crypto industry in the region (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2021). Moreover, blockchain technologies after the start of the full-scale war found unexpected practical application: cryptocurrencies became an important tool for rapidly collecting significant amounts of international aid – hundreds of millions of dollars – through official and volunteer initiatives that were effectively coordinated, demonstrating the real utility of decentralized finance in extreme conditions (Kirichenko 2024).

The full-scale war has dramatically reshaped Ukraine’s technological priorities, delivering a devastating blow to its economy and infrastructure while simultaneously acting as a paradoxical accelerant of sixth paradigm technologies—most notably in the military sphere. The war has triggered an unprecedented surge in the development and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rapidly transforming Ukraine into a global leader in FPV drone production, with output reaching millions of units (United24 Media 2024). This shift is not anecdotal: Figure 7 demonstrates an order-of-magnitude increase in drone procurement through the transparent Prozorro system between 2022 and 2023, reflecting institutionalized prioritization and rapid integration of these technologies into defense planning. Similarly, artificial intelligence is being operationalized to analyze vast streams of battlefield data, enhance situational awareness (e.g., via systems like “Delta,” already being aligned with NATO standards (NATO Allied Command Transformation 2023)), and optimize logistical flows under extreme constraints. Cyber warfare has also become deeply entrenched in Ukraine’s military doctrine, driving a surge in national cybersecurity capabilities.

Figure 7. Wartime drone procurement on Prozorro.

Source: Transparency International Ukraine 2024

Through the lens of Christensen’s model, these developments represent a striking case of forced market-creating and efficiency innovations, often emerging from bottom-up initiatives under battlefield conditions. However, while this wartime innovation ecosystem demonstrates agility and resilience, its rapid, necessity-driven character also raises critical concerns. Much of this innovation is reactive rather than strategic, shaped by short-term military imperatives rather than long-term national planning or civilian application. I believe that without deliberate efforts to translate wartime technological breakthroughs into scalable, peacetime industries, Ukraine risks losing the opportunity to convert this moment of accelerated innovation into sustainable economic transformation. Moreover, the overconcentration of innovation within the military sector could lead to imbalances—where civilian industries, education, and healthcare lag behind in adopting sixth paradigm technologies. Therefore, while Ukraine’s miltech surge is undeniably impressive, it also exposes the urgent need for institutional frameworks to steer these innovations beyond the battlefield and into broader national development.

Hence, it is my deep conviction that in the future reconstruction could become a unique chance for Ukraine to make a large-scale technological ‘leapfrog’, implementing sixth paradigm technologies directly into new infrastructure, energy, industry, and urban planning. Unlike the gradual modernization in the Czech Republic or diversification in Poland, Ukraine faces the possibility (and necessity) of radical technological renewal. I believe that the unique experience of applying AI, autonomous systems, and cybersecurity in the extreme conditions of war could form world-class niche expertise, where blockchain can play an important role in ensuring trust, transparency, and efficiency in the reconstruction and subsequent development processes, positioning Ukraine not only as a recipient of aid but also as an exporter of unique technological solutions.

Thus, summarizing all above-mentioned, the transition of Central and Eastern European countries to the sixth technological paradigm is proceeding unevenly and multi-directionally. The region is in a complex hybrid phase, where fifth paradigm technologies (ICT, digitalization) dominate, but a significant influence of the fourth (traditional industry) remains, and elements of the sixth (AI, bio- and nanotechnologies, blockchain) are only beginning to form new growth points. I believe that the examples I discussed clearly illustrate this heterogeneity: Estonia acts as a digital pioneer, using its unique e-infrastructure as a launchpad for developing AI in public administration and cybersecurity; Poland is trying to modernize industry while simultaneously building capacity in IT and new technologies; the Czech Republic focuses on integrating sixth paradigm innovations into its strong industrial base, relying on strong R&D potential; Romania shows explosive growth in the IT sector as the main driver, gradually moving up the value chain; and Ukraine, under conditions of war, demonstrates unique resilience, forced innovativeness in critical areas (miltech, digital state), and significant potential for a technological leap during post-war reconstruction.

In my opinion, the prospects of the region’s countries in mastering the sixth paradigm are quite differentiated. Estonia has every chance to become a global niche leader in certain areas, e.g., smart governance, but its small scale limits its overall impact. Poland, as the largest economy, could potentially become a key regional player if it can effectively combine industrial modernization with the development of its own deep technologies. The Czech Republic appears as a strong integrator of new technologies into industry, but it needs to activate the commercialization of its own R&D and stimulate market-creating innovations. Romania will continue to be a powerful IT hub, but its long-term success will depend on its ability to move beyond the service model and create synergy with other sectors. Ukraine, despite the dramatic nature of the situation, has a unique chance for radical rebirth and can turn into an exporter of some technological solutions developed under extreme conditions, but the realization of this potential significantly depends on the security environment and the effectiveness of reconstruction management.

It is also important to note that this transition in CEE differs significantly from similar processes in the technologically advanced countries of Western Europe, North America, or East Asia. There, it often involves not only implementation but also the creation of fundamental sixth paradigm technologies, the formation of global standards, and leadership in fundamental research. As we can see, CEE countries are mostly in the phase of catch-up development or adaptation, with more focus on the deployment of already existing technologies (sustaining and efficiency innovations) and creating niches of their own. Advanced countries tend to have much stronger national innovation systems, more evolved venture capital markets, and more sophisticated institutional infrastructure for R&D.

Having considered the individual trajectories of the countries, I assume that it becomes clear that this complex and heterogeneous process of transition to the sixth technological paradigm will inevitably affect the prospects for regional cooperation. Analysis of this aspect is particularly important, as technological shifts create both new opportunities for synergy, joint research projects, and the formation of regional value chains and the risks of deepening existing divides, intensifying competition for investment and talent, which will directly impact the future cohesion and overall competitiveness of the CEE region.

4. Influence on regional cooperation

The transition to the sixth technological order with its complex and capital-intensive technologies presents unprecedented challenges to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. I am convinced that, given their limited individual capacities, uneven development levels, and rising global competition, regional cooperation is not just an option—it is essential. Only through joint efforts, shared infrastructure, regional value chains, and unified global representation can CEE nations generate the synergy needed to overcome challenges none could manage alone. To understand the possibilities and obstacles of such cooperation, it is important to examine past experiences, since the previous technological shifts significantly shaped cooperation among CEE countries, establishing patterns and dependencies that continue to influence regional dynamics and may inform current strategies for adapting to today’s evolving technological paradigm.

4.1 Historical foundation for cooperation

During the era dominated by the third and fourth orders, which coincided to a great extent with the life of the socialist bloc, cooperation between CEE countries did exist but was largely formal and directive in character, within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. This cooperation was ideology-driven, focusing primarily on planned specialization in heavy industry, resource extraction, and the military-industrial complex, with regular resort to the Soviet model (Berend 2003). Although certain infrastructure was created (pipelines, railways), it often served the interests of the bloc as a whole, rather than stimulating deep scientific and technical cooperation among the CEE countries themselves aimed at advanced civilian innovations. Also, interaction with Western partners was extremely limited due to the “Iron Curtain.”

The transition to the fifth technological order at the beginning of the 20th century radically transformed this environment. It coincided with the collapse of the USSR and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, as well as the opening of borders and CEE countries’ aspirations to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The most powerful driver of regional integration was the EU accession process, which fostered Western-style cooperation through Single Market integration, regulatory harmonization, and major inflows of foreign direct investment. This enabled local firms to join global value chains. Moreover, EU Structural Funds supported modernization of transport and digital infrastructure, improving connectivity. Also, IT clusters developed, promoting tech collaboration, while scientific and educational ties grew through Erasmus+ and EU research programs, although CEE states initially played junior roles (Radosevic 2003).

4.2 Overview of the contemporary situation

I believe that understanding this historical experience is extremely important today. The legacy of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (certain infrastructural links, but also technological backwardness) and the EU integration model (orientation towards Western markets, dependence on FDI and Western technologies, existing cooperation programs) have shaped the current institutional frameworks, economic specializations, and mindsets regarding cooperation. This experience determines both the opportunities (existing infrastructure, experience participating in EU programs) and possible challenges (the risk of perpetuating the “catch-up development” model, competition for investment instead of cooperation) on the path towards forming effective regional cooperation in the context of the sixth technological order.

The current state of regional cooperation among Central and Eastern European countries is multifaceted and largely shaped by their deep integration into the EU’s economic, legal, and institutional frameworks. A broad network of business-level interactions exists, particularly within the supply chains of major Western European corporations and the rapidly evolving IT sector. Academic and research collaboration is also well developed, primarily through participation in pan-European programs such as Horizon Europe and Digital Europe (European Commission n.d.-c; European Commission n.d.-d). However, purely intra-regional cooperation—beyond EU-led frameworks—often remains less intensive and more vulnerable to political fluctuations. The Visegrad Group, while still operational, has faced significant setbacks in recent years due to political disagreements among member states, particularly regarding foreign policy and the war in Ukraine (Schäffer 2023). Also, the Three Seas Initiative (Three Seas Initiative n.d.), which I see as a promising platform by particularly involving non-EU actors, is currently focused on transport and energy infrastructure, though its digital component (e.g., development of 5G/6G networks, data centers) is growing. Simultaneously, shared challenges persist, including brain drain, underfunded national R&D systems (Eurostat data, Figure 2), and fragmented innovation ecosystems.

I believe that the transition to the sixth technological order, fundamentally changes the requirements for the innovation process and, consequently, for cooperation. Namely, these technologies require unprecedented volumes of long-term investment in R&D, complex and expensive research infrastructure (supercomputers, clean rooms, genomic centers), highly qualified world-class personnel, and the ability not only to adopt but also to create new markets. For CEE countries, which individually often lack sufficient financial resources, scientific potential, or domestic market scale to compete with global leaders, deepening regional and European cooperation becomes a critical element for success.

Moving from the general situation in regional cooperation, I would like to shift the focus to the impact of the transition to the new technological order itself, which stimulates cooperation in several key areas. First, it encourages consolidating resources, such as joint funding of ambitious R&D projects through EU programs or bilateral/multilateral agreements, shared use of costly infrastructure like participation in the European High-Performance Computing initiative (EuroHPC Joint Undertaking n.d.), and collective efforts to attract and retain talented researchers. Second, cooperation helps achieve critical mass by forming strong interdisciplinary research consortia to address complex challenges, creating a larger regional market for testing innovations, developing cross-border startup ecosystems, and promoting regional technological solutions globally. Third, it facilitates risk-sharing, crucial when investing in high-risk breakthrough technologies with uncertain commercial potential. Fourth, cooperation is vital for harmonizing regulation of new technologies—such as AI ethics, data governance, and IoT/6G standards—within the EU’s single digital market. Finally, it enhances the region’s geopolitical influence, enabling CEE countries to coordinate on global tech policy, digital sovereignty, and standards. To realize these big plans and foster cooperation in practice, the European Union offers a range of powerful tools and programs that become key platforms for interaction among CEE countries.

Horizon Europe

Horizon Europe is the European Union’s flagship research and innovation framework program, designed to strengthen scientific excellence and address global challenges through collaborative R&D (European Commission n.d.-c). I believe that it plays a vital role in Central and Eastern Europe because of not only providing access to much-needed funding but also fostering regional cooperation. Through international consortia, it promotes scientific integration, knowledge exchange, and lays the foundation for common research priorities and innovation-driven clusters.

From the perspective of Christensen’s model, Horizon Europe primarily facilitates sustaining innovations by enhancing existing research infrastructures and supporting institutions in improving their scientific capabilities, while also enabling efficiency innovations through coordinated efforts in cross-border R&D collaboration. Moreover, I believe that if strategically leveraged by well-organized CEE consortia, the program holds untapped potential to generate market-creating innovations that could address local needs and open entirely new sectors of economic activity. However, the transition from mere participation in consortia to actual leadership and agenda-setting remains a significant structural and strategic challenge for many CEE institutions, which often lack the institutional capacity, visibility, or influence to shape research priorities. I assume that without deliberate efforts toward regional coordination and capacity building, there is a real risk that Horizon Europe may inadvertently perpetuate existing asymmetries in the European Research Area.

European High-Performance Computing Joint Undertaking

EuroHPC JU initiative is an example of ‘harder,’ infrastructure-based cooperation directly relevant to the sixth order, as access to supercomputers is critical for breakthroughs in AI, materials modeling, genomics, and other advanced research (EuroHPC Joint Undertaking n.d.). I believe that hosting some of these powerful computing systems (see Figure 8) directly in CEE countries is undoubtedly a positive and important political and symbolic step, demonstrating the region’s inclusion in the pool of advanced computing. This creates a real, not just nominal, potential for forming regional competence centers around these machines, which could help retain talent and develop specialized skills, provided that truly attractive conditions for research are created, not just access to equipment.

Figure 8. Site locations of EuroHPC JU supercomputers.

Source: EuroHPC Joint Undertaking 2021.

However, the potential Achilles’ heel of this initiative lies not in the availability of the hardware itself—which is ultimately just a tool—but in the far more complex challenge of ensuring its effective and inclusive use, and in cultivating dynamic, sustainable ecosystems around it. True impact depends on much more than procurement: it requires tailored software development, systematic training of qualified users across disciplines, close integration with industry to address real-world problems, and the establishment of robust, interoperable data infrastructures. From Christensen’s perspective, while EuroHPC clearly supports sustaining innovations by enhancing existing research capabilities, and efficiency innovations by lowering the cost and time of computation, its most profound promise for Central and Eastern Europe lies in enabling market-creating innovations. This would mean using high-performance computing (HPC) not just to improve existing processes, but to develop entirely new scientific domains, business models, or industrial applications accessible to a broader set of regional actors.

It is my deep conviction that yet, without a strategic and regionally coordinated approach, there is a serious risk that these centers—despite heavy EU investment—will become isolated “islands of excellence,” disconnected from local ecosystems and used only by a limited elite. To avoid this, CEE countries must jointly develop training programs, exchange expertise, create regional code-sharing platforms, and co-design cross-border research projects. Otherwise, national inertia and lack of cooperation could diminish the multiplier effect and long-term sustainability of EuroHPC infrastructure.

European Digital Infrastructure Consortia

Then, the new European Digital Infrastructure Consortia mechanism, in my opinion, appears potentially the most transformational instrument among those considered, as it shifts from financing research or providing access to infrastructure towards the joint construction and management of critical digital infrastructure for the future (European Commission n.d.-b). This encompasses extremely ambitious and capital-intensive areas, such as quantum communication networks, pan-European data spaces (key for AI development), and AI testing and experimentation facilities, which represent the absolute forefront of the sixth technological order. Given the still significant digital divide between many CEE countries and EU leaders, particularly in the integration of digital technologies by businesses (as shown by Figure 9), EDIC offers a unique, perhaps unprecedented, opportunity to pool national, European, and private resources to achieve a collective technological leap, avoiding costly fragmentation of efforts. I believe this could become a real catalyst for creating common regional digital assets and services, for instance, a regional medical data space for research or a joint platform for testing Industry 4.0 solutions, bringing significant added value to the entire region.

Figure 9. DESI 2022 ranking.

Source: European Commission 2022.

As far as I can see, from Christensen’s perspective, EDICs can be analyzed as those which foster market-creating innovations by enabling the development of entirely new infrastructures and services that were previously unattainable for individual CEE countries, potentially targeting regional “non-consumption” of advanced digital capabilities.

However, it is precisely EDIC’s ambitious scope and institutional complexity that present its greatest vulnerabilities. Its success hinges not only on political will but on the historically elusive ability of CEE countries to engage in genuine, sustained strategic coordination. I believe that there is a real danger that EDIC could devolve into a slow-moving bureaucratic entity, hampered by fragmented priorities, delayed decisions, and infrastructure investments that go underutilized due to the absence of coherent, region-wide planning. If individual countries pursue narrow agendas, the collective potential of EDIC will remain unrealized. While its theoretical promise for enhancing regional digital sovereignty and innovation is significant, its practical implementation demands an unprecedented level of trust, strategic alignment, and joint governance. Ultimately, EDIC may become a litmus test for whether CEE can act not just as a collection of states, but as a digitally cohesive regional bloc.

European Blockchain Services Infrastructure

Finally, the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI)—the least publicly recognized of the initiatives discussed—aims to establish a unified European framework to enhance trust in blockchain technology (European Commission n.d.-a). I believe that this goal holds particular strategic importance for the CEE region, where historical legacies and transitional governance have made institutional trust a persistent challenge. Encouragingly, several CEE countries are already participating in EBSI pilot projects, signaling interest in digital innovation. However, progress remains slow and largely intangible compared to more mature initiatives like Horizon Europe or EuroHPC. While blockchain is evolving beyond cryptocurrency into broader applications, EBSI’s development—especially in areas like cross-border digital identity—continues to face major technical, legal, and organizational hurdles (European Commission n.d.-a), limiting its immediate impact on regional cooperation.

In my view, the long-term promise of EBSI for Central and Eastern Europe lies less in blockchain’s current potential and more in its capacity to catalyze cross-border standardization in digital identification, credential verification, and secure data exchange. These foundational elements are critical prerequisites for deeper digital integration under the Single Digital Market. From Christensen’s perspective, EBSI is not yet enabling market-creating innovations, but it does lay essential groundwork for sustaining and efficiency innovations by building trust and interoperability. However, I assume that the initiative risks stagnating if it fails to resolve core technical challenges—such as scalability, interoperability, and energy efficiency—or to deliver cross-border services that generate real value beyond limited pilot phases. For CEE, this demands also significant investments to upgrade fragmented national systems. Thus, given the region’s digital asymmetries, EBSI could either be a unifying infrastructure—or another underutilized tool.

Other initiatives

Aside from these large-scale infrastructure and financial programs, regional collaboration among CEE nations in their progress to the sixth order is also achieved through participation in more specialized, sector-specific organizations targeted towards a specific technological field. I believe that these platforms are more likely to be venues for more intense and focused collaboration because their narrower scope allows participants to concentrate resources, share expertise more directly, and pursue clearly defined, mutual technological goals.

AI and cybersecurity are areas where CEE countries have made visible efforts toward regional cooperation—yet serious limitations persist beneath the surface. In AI, initiatives like the Testing and Experimentation Facilities (TEFs), supported by the Digital Europe program, aim to help SMEs and researchers in sectors like manufacturing, healthcare, agri-food, and smart cities test solutions in real-world settings (European Commission n.d.-e). However, while promising in concept, the distribution of TEF nodes remains uneven, raising concerns that only a few countries—particularly Poland and the Czech Republic—will benefit substantively, while others remain marginal participants. Similarly, the AI Centres of Excellence, though framed as pan-European research hubs, often reinforce existing Western-led scientific hierarchies, offering CEE institutions limited leadership roles (Horizon Europe 2022). In cybersecurity, the establishment of the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC) in Bucharest, alongside a network of National Coordination Centres, creates a formal infrastructure for coordination, investment, and capacity-building (European Union n.d.). However, operational fragmentation among national strategies, inconsistent funding, and underdeveloped cross-border collaboration dilute its regional impact. While Ukraine’s frontline experience in cyber warfare could be a strategic asset for the region, current mechanisms lack the agility and political coherence to integrate that knowledge effectively. From the perspective of Christensen’s innovation model, these initiatives largely drive sustaining and efficiency innovations—helping existing institutions modernize and optimize. The TEFs, for instance, support incremental improvements and resource-sharing for established players, while the ECCC enhances resilience within pre-existing security frameworks. Yet their market-creating potential—particularly in empowering CEE-based SMEs or generating region-specific technologies—remains constrained by structural asymmetries, limited access, and over-centralization. It is my deep conviction that without deliberate efforts decentralize technical leadership and build agile, interoperable innovation ecosystems, these initiatives risk entrenching dependency rather than fostering genuine regional transformation.

In the field of quantum technologies—expected to reshape computing, communication, and sensing—CEE countries are attempting to secure a foothold, though their influence remains limited. Namely, in frames of the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI), European researchers aim to build secure quantum networks across the EU, with CEE states contributing cross-border segments (European Commission n.d.-f). I assume that while this could foster shared infrastructure and regional security capabilities, real strategic value depends on long-term investment in domestic expertise and coordination mechanisms—currently uneven across the region. Applying Christensen’s model, CEE participation in quantum efforts reflects sustaining innovation—incrementally advancing capabilities—rather than market-creating innovation, which remains hampered by dependency on external leadership.

Moreover, I am sure that the shift to the sixth technological order is irreversibly transforming defense in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine accelerated this shift, prompting defense policy reform and rapid adoption of advanced technologies. Modern warfare now demands high-tech capabilities, skilled personnel, and new doctrines. Thus, in my opinion, regional military-technical cooperation becomes a necessity for CEE countries for several reasons. First, economic rationale is relevant: joint R&D activities, procurement, and maintenance of advanced systems (e.g., advanced drones, EW systems, AI platforms) make cost-saving and achieving economies of scale possible. Second is enhanced interoperability, which is of special significance in the NATO environment. Thirdly, using similar or compatible technological platforms, data exchange formats, and command-and-control protocols (e.g., for situational awareness) significantly increases the effectiveness of joint operations. Fourth is the exchange of rare experience. Estonia and Ukraine, in my view, play specific roles in this regard. Estonia, specifically, with first-rate cyber defense and digital government expertise, being the location of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, can be a regional leader and center for mutual cyber capacity building (NATO CCDCOE n.d.). Ukraine, after having been made into a de facto testing lab for most of the sixth-order technologies in actual battle scenarios, has gained irreplaceable experience with using drones, AI-enabled intelligence, combat management systems such as Delta, and addressing threats in modern times (NATO Allied Command Transformation 2023).

While regional defense cooperation in CEE appears promising, especially within NATO and EU frameworks like PESCO and the European Defence Fund, serious challenges persist. National interests, industrial competition, and divergent procurement priorities often hinder coordination. Moreover, technological disparities and intellectual property concerns further complicate trust and knowledge-sharing. Furthermore, countries with advanced capabilities may hesitate to collaborate fully, reinforcing existing hierarchies. On top of that, bureaucratic inertia and reliance on Western leadership also risk marginalizing CEE states as implementers rather than innovators. Even with Ukraine’s valuable battlefield experience and Estonia’s cyber expertise, integration into regional planning remains limited. Hence, I believe that without strong political will and a shared strategic vision, regional military-technical cooperation risks remaining symbolic rather than transformative in adapting to the sixth technological order.

Overall, the shift of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries toward the sixth technological order is a complex, multilayered process, shaped by historical legacies and present challenges. In the past, technological paradigms deeply influenced cooperation models—from the ideologically driven CMEA system during the third and fourth orders to the EU-driven integration of the fifth order, which brought modernization and market access but reinforced technological dependency. Today, the sixth order demands historically unprecedented investment, infrastructure, knowledge, and security resilience. In this context, integration—regional and European—is no longer optional but essential. CEE countries must overcome structural deficits through collective participation in initiatives like Horizon Europe, EuroHPC, EDIC, EBSI, and sectoral platforms such as TEFs, ECCC, and defense cooperation frameworks. These mechanisms offer access to funding, shared infrastructure, and standardization—crucial for achieving scale, reducing fragmentation, and amplifying CEE’s influence. Their combined potential lies in transforming dependency into strategic agency within Europe’s evolving technological landscape.

However, the potential of these instruments to generate true regional synergy hinges less on Brussels and more on the clarity of strategic vision within CEE itself. I believe that without deliberate coordination, joint planning, and collective investment in shared regional assets, there is a real risk that EU programs will fuel intra-regional competition rather than cohesion—reinforcing fragmentation instead of building an integrated innovation and security ecosystem. The core challenge is not access to funding, but the political maturity to act as a bloc rather than isolated beneficiaries. Unless CEE countries shift from passive recipients to active agenda-setters—capable of shaping priorities, sharing risks, and executing cross-border initiatives—they risk remaining peripheral players in Europe’s technological future.

Notwithstanding, technological changes of this magnitude affect not only the economy and interstate cooperation; they inevitably touch upon questions of political philosophy, governance models, the balance between individual rights and state capabilities, made possible by AI, biometrics, big data, and other technologies of the sixth order. Therefore, the penultimate part of the essay will be dedicated to the analysis of how the transition of CEE countries to the 6th technological order will influence the aspects of their political philosophy and therefore development trajectories.

5. Implication for political trajectories

Technological orders, as waves of innovation, reshape economies, societies, labor markets, communication, and values, inevitably influencing states’ political and strategic directions. In Central and Eastern Europe, with its history of shifting regimes, external domination, and social upheavals, each technological transition brought economic restructuring and a redefinition of political ideals and geopolitical alignments.

Historical Foundation

Looking back at history, a clear link can be seen between previous technological orders and the political development of CEE. The third and fourth technological orders—driven by electricity, heavy machinery, the chemical industry, and the internal combustion engine—profoundly shaped Central and Eastern Europe’s political reality in the 20th century, especially after World War II. Within the socialist bloc, these orders were imposed under the Soviet model, prioritizing heavy industry and the military-industrial complex, with political philosophy gravitating toward extreme etatism and collectivism (Berend, 2003).

After the collapse of the socialist bloc and the USSR, a radical transformation of the political philosophy and vectors of CEE countries began. Etatism and collectivism were replaced by the ideas of liberal democracy, market economy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. The dominant political vector became the aspiration to “return to Europe” – integration into the European Union and NATO (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005). Digitalization and the development of the information society (hallmarks of the fifth wave) were seen as an integral part of this modernization and Westernization. However, today the political picture of the region is no longer so homogeneous. As we can see, alongside countries consistently adhering to a liberal-democratic course and Euro-Atlantic solidarity, trends towards “illiberal democracy,” populism, strengthening nationalist sentiments, and certain divergences in foreign policy orientations have emerged, even within the EU and NATO. Also, the very technologies of the fifth wave, such as social networks and the rapid dissemination of information, became tools for political mobilization, but also for spreading disinformation and polarizing society.

It’s against this complex backdrop that CEE countries enter the sixth technological order, whose innovations promise economic gains but also profound ethical and political challenges. They exacerbate fundamental dilemmas and pose new questions for the region regarding its future political development, which I intend to explore.

Freedom vs. Control

First and foremost, I assume that the transition to the sixth technological order elevates the basic “freedom vs. control” dilemma to an entirely new, existential level. If the fifth order, with its Internet and social networks, made us worry about data privacy and online surveillance, the sixth one, armed with artificial intelligence, pervasive biometrics, the ability to analyze vast datasets in real-time, and the potential for mass manipulation through deepfakes, creates tools for unprecedented control by both the state and powerful technology corporations. Also, the potential for AI surveillance on streets, analysis of online behavior, biometric identification for access to services, and, in the future, even systems of “social credit” (albeit in softer, Western forms) calls into question the very basis of individual autonomy and freedom of choice. The balance between society’s demand for security (from terrorism, crime, cyber threats, pandemics) and the protection of fundamental freedoms becomes extremely fragile.

I believe that in the CEE countries, this dilemma will unfold differently, reflecting their specific political cultures and trajectories. Estonia, with its philosophy of digital liberalism and high level of trust in the state, is likely to continue its path, but with increased attention to AI ethics and the development of new digital rights. I expect Tallinn to become one of the EU leaders in finding this balance, striving to maintain the efficiency of e-government while implementing robust safeguards against AI misuse, working closely with Nordic countries and EU institutions on regulations like the AI Act.

Then, Poland, where there is historical tension between liberal and conservative-nationalist forces, is likely to become an arena of sharp political struggle over the use of new technologies. Most likely, one part of society and the political establishment may see them as tools for strengthening “national security” and social control, while another will insist on adhering to European human rights standards. The direction of development will strongly depend on the political climate.

Also, I conjecture that the Czech Republic, with its traditional pragmatism, will most likely focus on the economic aspects and practical application of AI and other technologies, avoiding deep ideological debates about freedom, while pragmatically implementing EU regulations.

Also, Romania, remembering the experience of excessive state control in the past, may show particular sensitivity to issues of algorithmic transparency and protection against abuse, especially in the judiciary and law enforcement.

Finally, I assume that Ukraine, facing war and an existential threat, is forced to prioritize security and efficiency over privacy considerations in many areas. This may lead to the retention of certain elements of enhanced control in the post-war period, but a strong societal demand for transparency and accountability (potentially reinforced by technologies like blockchain) will act as an important counterbalance.

Potential for inequality

If the fifth technological wave generated the “digital divide” and reinforced the so-called cognitive meritocracy (where people with high analytical and digital skills had an advantage), I believe that the sixth order carries the threat of an even deeper and more structural societal split. Namely, AI’s ability to automate not only routine physical labor but also a significant portion of highly skilled intellectual work (analysts, lawyers, programmers, designers) challenges the very foundation of the modern social structure based on the value of professional skills. This could lead to the emergence of a vast stratum of “economically redundant” people whose skills become obsolete, creating a chasm between them and a small group of technology owners, developers of advanced AI systems, and those whose work requires unique creative or empathetic qualities. Add to this the potential for bioengineered human “enhancement” (cognitive enhancers, genetic editing), access to which will likely be limited by financial means, and we get the outlines of a potential new caste system based not on origin or even education, but on technological and biological status. In my opinion, this will inevitably revive and radicalize the political discourse on social justice. On the one hand, pressure will increase for the implementation of radical redistribution mechanisms, such as Universal Basic Income, as a way to ensure a dignified existence for those who lose jobs due to automation. On the other hand, a new technological elitism may become entrenched, where access to advanced technologies determines social status and power.

As far as I can see, the response of CEE countries to these challenges will vary. In particular, Estonia’s digital governance and education system mask the fragility of its labor market, where economic resilience depends on a small, highly skilled cohort and heavy reliance on foreign tech investment. Any large-scale job displacement could strain its welfare model, and its emphasis on digital excellence risks leaving behind citizens lacking advanced skills.

Poland’s combination of a strong industrial base, deep social sensitivities, and polarized politics makes it prone to ideological gridlock. Here, debates over UBI or state intervention in automation will likely be less about solving inequality and more about mobilizing electoral blocs, with structural reforms sacrificed to short-term political gain.

The Czech Republic’s preference for stability and incrementalism—historically effective in avoiding crises—could become a liability when confronted with the speed and scale of AI-driven labor market disruption, resulting in delayed action until inequality becomes entrenched.

Romania’s sharp divide between an elite IT sector and a stagnating wider economy risk hardening into a dual society, where opportunities are concentrated in urban hubs while rural and industrial regions experience deepening marginalization; weak governance and corruption further undermine the state’s redistributive credibility.

Post-war Ukraine, despite the temporary employment surge from reconstruction, faces an especially acute challenge: a depleted workforce due to war casualties and emigration, a large veteran population requiring reintegration, and a fragile fiscal base heavily dependent on external donors.

I believe that in all cases, the danger is not only technological unemployment but the political weaponization of inequality—where ruling elites, rather than mitigating divides, exploit them to consolidate power, suppress dissent, or entrench clientelist systems. Without preemptive, structural reforms, the sixth technological order could lock the region into a new hierarchy of winners and losers more rigid than any seen since the socialist era.

Dependence on certain countries

Then, if integration within the fifth order created a dependence of CEE countries on global digital platforms, internet infrastructure, and Western IT companies, I believe that the sixth order generates a new, even deeper, and multidimensional interdependence. Namely, this concerns dependence on a limited circle of global players controlling key technologies: developers of fundamental AI models (mainly the US and China), manufacturers of the most advanced microchips (Taiwan, South Korea, US), holders of patents in biotechnology, and developers of quantum computers. I conjecture that this new reality reinforces the global push for “technological sovereignty” – the ability of a state or group of states to control critically important technologies and infrastructure necessary for their economic development and national security. For CEE countries, which lack their own global technological champions and find themselves in a complex geopolitical situation, this creates an extremely difficult choice.

In my opinion, they have three main paths, although not mutually exclusive. First, deepening integration within the EU, which as a large economic and regulatory bloc can pursue “technological sovereignty” through joint investments (Horizon Europe, EDIC, Chips Act), common standards, and coordinated tech diplomacy. Here, CEE countries must aim to influence, not merely follow, the agenda. Second, focusing on national or subregional niches—cybersecurity in Estonia, gaming in Poland, miltech in Ukraine—can yield successes but risks entrenching dependence on external core technologies and fostering competitive techno-nationalism. Third, forming strategic partnerships with non-European leaders, particularly the US, offers access to security and cutting-edge innovation, but at the cost of deeper geopolitical dependence and vulnerability to shifting foreign policy priorities. But I believe that none of these paths is without trade-offs.

I think that the choice or combination of these paths will determine the political vectors of CEE countries. Namely, Estonia seems to have chosen the first path, viewing the EU and NATO as guarantors of its sovereignty, including digital sovereignty, and striving for leadership in niches precisely within these structures.

Poland presents a more conflicted picture. While formally committed to European integration, it simultaneously pursues national technological ambitions that have often been politicized and inconsistent. This oscillation between EU cooperation and nationalist-driven industrial policy weakens the coherence of Poland’s strategy, undermining its ability to build sustainable technological leadership and increasing vulnerability to political shifts.

Similarly, the Czech Republic’s orientation toward industrial modernization remains closely tied to German value chains, limiting its technological sovereignty. I believe that its economic stability depends on integration within broader European supply networks, but this reliance constrains the country’s ability to cultivate independent innovation capacity, making its technological future dependent on external actors.

Then, Romania, given the importance of the security factor in the Black Sea region, is likely to strengthen both the European and transatlantic vectors, following the first path.

Also, I believe that Ukraine’s existential need for EU and NATO integration is stark, but war-induced fiscal weakness and donor dependency severely restrict its agency. Western technology transfers are focused primarily on defense, risking a post-war reconstruction that deepens dependence rather than fostering broad-based technological autonomy. Without addressing these structural vulnerabilities, Ukraine’s technological sovereignty will remain limited despite its geopolitical aspirations.

Identity issue

Globalization and digitalization, which were the drivers of the fifth wave, have already posed a serious challenge to traditional national cultures and identities, promoting the spread of global trends, the English language, and unified digital platforms. However, I believe that the technologies of the sixth order raise even more fundamental questions, touching not only national but also human identity itself. Recently, I had the university lecture about artificial intelligence, and one of my colleague’s concerns was whether AI being able to create texts, music, or images indistinguishable from human ones would signify “creativity.” Namely, if neuro-interfaces allow direct connection of the brain to a computer, where will the boundary between human and machine lie? And the possibility of genetic editing and bioengineered human “enhancement” raises grave ethical and philosophical questions about the very nature of humanness, and whether to interfere with it, and the desirability and consequences of doing so. My expectation is that this will inevitably cause deep value cleavages within societies, perhaps even more intense than today’s political divides. I assume that we can expect the formation of conditional camps of “bioconservatives,” insisting on preserving the “natural” essence of humanity and limiting radical technological interventions, and “transhumanists” (in a broad sense), who see technology as a tool to overcome biological limitations and evolve humanity.

These global debates will be superimposed on the specific context of CEE countries, influencing their national identities and political vectors. In Poland, where the Catholic Church and conservative values hold strong positions, it is highly likely that bioconservative sentiments will be very influential, and discussions around bioethics and human “enhancement” will become part of the political struggle between conservative and liberal camps. National identity can begin to be framed not only in terms of its culture and history but also in terms of its stance on these new technological questions.

Estonia, being pragmatic and techno-optimistic, may deal with these inquiries more liberally, attempting to craft ethical legislation and individual choice, and its national identity as a “digital nation” will only become more robust.

The Czech Republic is likely to also avoid deep ideological conflicts, focusing on pragmatism and medical applications of bio- and neurotechnologies.

Romania, with its complex historical experience, may be particularly sensitive to issues of equal access to “enhancement” technologies and risks of novel inequality, remembering the Ceausescu regime.

In Ukraine, against the backdrop of war and the need for recovery, the emphasis will likely be on the therapeutic and rehabilitative applications of new technologies (bioprosthetics, neurorehabilitation). On top of that, the technological dimension may become an even more important part of national identity, associated with resilience and innovation in the face of aggression. At the same time, belonging to the “Western world” and its value orientations on these complex issues will become a marker of geopolitical choice. Also, I believe that the regional cooperation here could be useful for exchanging experiences in bioethics and developing common positions within the EU, although deep value differences might also complicate it.

Role of the state

The sheer scope and pervasiveness of sixth-order technologies, in my opinion, will also inevitably bring about a radical expansion of the role of the state, regardless of ideological preferences. This is not a return to the totalitarian practices of the past (although risks of abuse certainly are present), but an objective necessity dictated by the nature of the new challenges. In one case, the state can become one of the primary regulators. Namely, the establishment and administration of ethical norms for AI, norms for using biometric data, security requirements for biotechnology and quantum systems – all this requires active state participation in the interests of public interests and citizens’ rights protection. Secondly, the state may act as a strategic investor. E.g., sixth-wave area basic research, development of expensive R&D infrastructure (genome centers, supercomputers), support for strategically important industries (e.g., semiconductor manufacturing) require massive government investments, which are outside the capacity of the private sector. Third, the government needs to assume the role of guarantor of social stability in the face of potential mass unemployment due to automation, devising new social support institutions (like UBI) and retraining schemes. Fourth route is that the state becomes the custodian of technological sovereignty, seeking to diminish the dependence on external players in critically important technological domains.

The key question is not whether the role of the state will increase (this, in my view, is inevitable), but what exactly this strengthened state will be like. Will it be a democratic, accountable regulator-state acting in the interests of society, finding a balance between innovation and security, freedom and control? Or will it be a more authoritarian controller-state using new technologies to enhance surveillance, manipulation, and suppression of dissent?

Estonia appears committed to building an effective digital state that operates transparently within legal frameworks. Yet, I think that its small size and reliance on EU structures may limit its ability to resist external pressures or fully safeguard democratic accountability. While its digital governance is a model, the risk of technocratic overreach and insufficient political accountability remains, potentially undermining democratic oversight.

In Poland, while there are some signs of centralized control and politicization of technology policy that could push the state toward authoritarian tendencies, I believe such a risk remains minor for now. Despite political volatility, existing institutional checks and a vibrant civil society continue to provide some resistance against unchecked surveillance and erosion of civil liberties.

The Czech Republic is likely to adopt a pragmatic, EU-aligned regulatory approach, seeking a balance between innovation and public interest. However, this cautious stance may translate into reactive policymaking rather than visionary leadership, delaying necessary reforms and leaving citizens vulnerable amid rapid technological shifts.

Romania’s persistent governance challenges—including corruption and weak institutional capacity—threaten to compromise both regulation and social protections related to emerging technologies. I believe that without effective checks, the risk of state capture by powerful interests increases, undermining democratic norms and exacerbating social inequalities during this transformative period.

Finally, Ukraine faces an acute dilemma: it must construct a strong state apparatus to manage reconstruction and defense while preserving the democratic freedoms it is fighting to uphold. War-induced fiscal and institutional fragility, coupled with heavy dependence on external aid, complicate efforts to balance security imperatives with civil liberties, raising the stakes of technological governance.

Summarizing the analysis of the impact of the transition to the sixth technological order on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, I believe that it becomes clear that this process reaches significantly beyond economics and technology, deeply transforming the political philosophy and strategic vectors of the region. However, the aforementioned trajectories are not predetermined. I believe that CEE countries face a choice: either succumb to the temptation of using new technologies to enhance control and national egoism, or jointly build a democratic, human-centric model of innovative development within the framework of European values and structures. Successfully managing the challenges of the sixth order will require not only technological adaptation but also a deep rethinking of political priorities. That is why, concluding this analysis, it is my deep conviction that it is critically important to outline specific recommendations and strategic guidelines: what exactly CEE countries should do, and what pitfalls to avoid, to optimize the advantages of the new technological wave and minimize its risks.

6. Conclusion

Looking at the post-communist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe towards the sixth paradigm of technology presents a complex and multifaceted picture, whereby the past becomes intertwined with oncoming challenges and opportunities. In my opinion, the region’s experience over history best captures how technological paradigms affected models of cooperation: from the ideologically driven and directive cooperation of the CMEA during the third and fourth waves’ rule, to the mainly Western-drawn integration that was triggered by EU accession and the advent of fifth-wave technologies. This second stage, although bringing significant benefits (investment, market access, infrastructure modernization), simultaneously, often entrenched the ‘catch-up development’ model and a certain dependence on external sources.

Today, in the context of the transition to the sixth order, with its unprecedented demands on investment, infrastructure, knowledge, and resilience, the trend towards European integration not only continues but also gains critical importance. I believe that for CEE countries, regional and European cooperation ceases to be merely an option and becomes a key prerequisite for successfully navigating the new technological reality. At the same time, it essentially transforms political philosophy and developmental pathways, Each country in the region – from digital leader Estonia and diversified Poland to industrial Czech Republic, IT-specialized Romania, and resistant Ukraine – demonstrates a unique adaptation trajectory, reflecting its particular history and modern challenges.

Consequently, for Central and Eastern European countries it is essential to not only adapt to the sixth technological order but also become active participants, maximizing benefits and minimizing risks, a proactive and strategically sound approach is essential. In my opinion, this must involve both national efforts and deepened regional and European coordination. Also, critically necessary is to formulate a common regional vision and identify strategic priorities, focusing on shared strengths and specialization niches (like AI, cybersecurity, or biotech), while jointly lobbying for these within the EU framework. This requires deliberately avoiding self-destructive internal competition for resources and instead actively seeking synergies. Moreover, a significant stimulus to national investment in R&D and human capital is needed – subsidizing education, key retraining programs to counter the labor market impact of AI, and basic and applied research. Here, it is crucial not to depend solely on EU funds but to create conditions, perhaps through coordinated regional action, to attract and retain talent. Moreover, modern EU instruments like Horizon Europe, EDIC, and EuroHPC must be used strategically, not as a means of raising finance but as a tool for building strong regional partnerships and actively shaping regional consortia, and hence not being passive actors.

Also, it is crucial to initiate market-creating entrepreneurship and innovation through the establishment of an enabling scape of startups to concentrate on addressing local needs or responding to local unique opportunities, while not having too much reliance on mere catch-up or replication of Western strategies. As the government’s role cannot avoid expanding, equally important is institutionalizing democratic governance of technology, creating open regulation systems for AI, biometrics, and data with popular inputs, and explicitly resisting the seduction of rule by the sword Finally, I believe that embedding trust and information resilience through media literacy, disinformation resistance, and perhaps using technologies like blockchain for transparency is essential; ignoring these issues may pose a significant barrier to cooperation.

Hence, I firmly believe that only through conscious, intentional, and deep cooperation, both within the region and within the EU framework, can the Central and Eastern European countries learn to master the challenges of the sixth technological paradigm and transform them into the opportunities of sustainable development, increased competitiveness, and a better place in a united Europe. Also, I assume that further analysis could delve into the specific impacts of these transformations on the concrete economic policies of the region’s countries – from fiscal and monetary to industrial and social. But a perhaps even more fundamental question is how this new technology reality will redefine the very character and quality of life for people in the region – whether innovation can not only grow GDP, but result in greater social cohesion, personal growth, and realization of human potential in accordance with European values.

We once believed that the future would look like the movie “The Matrix”, but I believe that the future we live in now is much more interesting than the movie, and we need to develop this future with all possible efforts and resources – where the cooperation is one of the most essential.

Endnotes

1. For 2018 and beyond the expenditure is planned. ↑

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