By Francesco Cortese (LinkedIn).
Cover image: Kosovo ethnic Serbs take part in the traditional Epiphany swimming competition in the lake of Gazivoda (Valdrin Xhemaj, Reuters).
1. Introduction
‘Our dispute with Serbia doesn’t alter the fact that our Republic belongs to all its citizens, of all ethnicities’.
This is a quote from the X profile of Albin Kurti, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo, who has in several occasions described himself as the prime minister who has done the most efforts in integrating the Kosovo-Serbs in the Kosovar institutions, even though the relationship between his government and the Kosovo-Serbs has been characterised by tensions and difficulties.
Although consisting of over 90% ethnic Albanians, Kosovo as an independent state has been created on the idea that the new Republic would not have been a state of the Albanians, but rather a multi-ethnic state that belongs to all its citizens without any difference. If on the one hand this principle has worked with all other ethnicities, which are well integrated in the democratic institutions of the newborn republic, on the other hand there have been continuous tensions with the Serbian minority living in the north of the country which, due to many reasons, is failing to fully integrate in the Kosovar state.
Figure 1. Political map of Kosovo with details on Serb-minority areas
Source: Centre for Strategic & International Studies.
In fact, the northern region of Kosovo, predominantly inhabited by ethnic Serbs, has long represented the most acute flashpoint in the difficult relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. While Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, the ethnic Serb minority, has remained politically and psychologically attached to – and perhaps manipulated by – Serbia. The picture is more than a frozen conflict: it is a multilayered dispute encompassing politics, economics, identity, nationalism, and international diplomacy. Before proceeding further, it is important to define the numbers in order to give a correct picture of the situation: according to the 2024 census [1], the Serbian minority represents 3.31% of the total population, of which more than 60% (approximately 36,000 Kosovo-Serbs) live in the north, although the numbers could be higher since the census was boycotted by the Serbian population.
The roots of the Serb-Albanian tension in Kosovo date back centuries but were dramatically exacerbated during the 1990s Yugoslav wars. In 1999, after NATO intervened to halt widespread massacres, violations of human rights and crimes against humanity committed by Serbian military and paramilitary forces against Albanian civilians, Kosovo came under international administration though UNMIK until 2008, ultimately leading to a unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, which was seen as the only viable solution also by the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary- General on Kosovo’s future status Martti Ahtisaari, given that reconciliation within a united state appeared to be impossible. For many Albanians, as well as for the majority of the international community, this marked the culmination of a struggle for self-determination; for many Serbs, it was seen as an illegitimate partition of their national territory.
This short paper explores the persistent tensions between the Kosovar institutions and the Serbian minority living in the four municipalities north of the Ibar river, with a focus on four interconnected dimensions: the influence and manipulation of Kosovo Serbs by the Serbian government, the Kosovar government’s efforts to close illegal parallel institutions, the constitutional framework granting minority protections and the evolving process of integration among Serbs.
2. Belgrade’s Leverage: manipulation of the Serb Minority in northern Kosovo
In light of the failure of any negotiated agreement on Kosovo’s final status and the consequent unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 that established Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state, which has by now been recognised by more than 115 countries, Serbia has since then used every political, economic and communication tool available to maintain influence and control over the Serbian population, considering that any concrete sovereignty over any part of Kosovar territory has de facto ended with the NATO intervention in 1999. Thus, due to Belgrade’s leverage and pressure, the northern municipalities of North Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Zvečan, and Leposavić have consistently resisted integration into the new Kosovar state, creating parallel systems that threatens the integrity and full functioning of Kosovar institutions in those areas.
The Serbian government directly funds health clinics, schools, municipal buildings, and salaries for public employees who reject Kosovar authority. This support has been aiming to create a parallel society where Serbian institutions, rather than Kosovar ones, are seen as legitimate. Beyond mere political issues, which will be presented below, the economic situation in northern Kosovo plays a crucial role in perpetuating the current tensions. It is worth to be noted that funding of any activity for the benefit of Serb municipalities or organisations in Kosovo is accepted by Kosovar government, and is done by official institutions and private entities by using the available and legal banking transactions and by following the normal procedures applicable for every country that wishes to finance an activity of public and private institutions. However, Serbia insists to apply their own system of funding disregarding entirely Kosovo law and procedure. Thus, many Serbs in the north are economically dependent on Serbian-funded jobs. Parallel institutions offer stable employment and benefits not always matched by Kosovar equivalents. This is precisely why Kosovo’s northern municipalities remain poorly integrated into the national economy, providing fertile ground for political manipulation and reduces the incentive to engage with central institutions.
In fact, Serbia’s political influence is channelled primarily through the Srpska Lista (in English: Serb List), a Belgrade-backed party that is charged with protecting the interests and rights of the Serbian minority within Kosovar institutions, which are however not recognised as legitimate even by the MPs that are elected in the Parliament and begin their term of office after swearing an oath to the constitution. The Srpska Lista is aligned with – and de facto governed by – the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of President Aleksandar Vučić and is widely perceived as an extension of his administration’s will and political power.
Many Kosovo Serbs face social and political pressure to support the Serb List, which undermines the development of independent Serbian political voices within Kosovo and therefore damages a good functioning of democratic institutions in those areas where Serbian pressure in stronger. Those who seek compromise with the Kosovar government are often marginalised, accused of betraying the Serbian motherland, verbally and physically threatened, leading also to the killing of former Kosovo- Serb politician Oliver Ivanovic who was a fierce opponent of the Srpska Lista and for whose killing four Kosovo-Serbs have been sentenced to jail. This pressure proved to be effective in the terms that it led to the resignation of many Kosovo Serbs who were serving in the Kosovo Police or in the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF), as well as to the temporary arrest by the Serbian government in 2024 of the Deputy Head of Kosovo police, Dejan Jankovic, who is part of the Serbian minority.
In the 2025 elections [2] however, for the first time since the 2017 elections, one out of the ten seats in the Parliament reserved to the Serbian minority was won by Nenad Rašić, leader of the Party for Freedom, Justice and Survival – current Minister for Communities and Return. He has been involved in Kosovo’s politics since 2008, held several ministerial positions within different governments and in more than one occasion clashed with the Srpska Lista.
The above explained manipulation serves Belgrade’s interests in several ways: it keeps the Kosovo issue alive in Serbian domestic politics, reinforces Serbia’s claim over the territory, and interferes with Kosovo’s internal affairs.
3. The Kosovar Government’s closure of parallel institutions
In recent years, the Kosovar government has increased its efforts to eliminate illegal Serbian parallel institutions operating within its borders. These institutions, though offering essential services, are outside the constitutional and legal framework of the Republic of Kosovo and represent a direct challenge to its sovereignty. Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s administration has taken a firm stance on enforcing the rule of law across the entire territory of Kosovo, including in the four Serb majority municipalities in the north of the country. In a series of high-profile operations between 2022 and 2024, Kosovo Police and special forces dismantled illegal municipal buildings, seized smuggled goods, and shut down unauthorised schools, social services providers and healthcare facilities illegally funded by Belgrade.
These actions have frequently led to confrontations with the local population. Protests, barricades, and sporadic – limited – violence have erupted, leading to temporary peaks of tension. Yet, as explained by the central government, these operations are not about ethnic discrimination as portrayed by the Serbian government, but about ensuring the functioning of official institutions throughout the whole territory and establishing legal order, just like any functioning state has to do, emphasising that Serbs are welcome to participate in legitimate institutions.
These closures executed by the Kosovar government have sparked harsh reactions from the Serbian counterpart, as expected. However, they have also been condemned by the European Union and the United States, which noted how unilateral actions increase tensions and damage the dialogue and therefore, since 2023, have imposed sanctions on Kosovo [3]. It is the author’s opinion that the attitude of Western powers damages, rather than reinforcing, Kosovo’s progressive development and creates a sort of double standard. As denounced multiple times by Kosovar officials, several unilateral – and illegal – actions have been undertaken by Belgrade and are not equally condemned. The key argument is that Western democracies would ever allow the existence of parallel institutions over their territories operating outside their constitutional frameworks.
4. Constitutional Guarantees: minority rights and the electoral paradox
Kosovo’s constitution, drafted under international supervision, includes extensive provisions for minority protection. The most significant political safeguard is the allocation of 20 parliamentary seats to minority groups, with 10 specifically reserved for the Serbian community – far more than proportional demographic representation would suggest. Additionally, minority communities have guaranteed representation in key institutions, including the judiciary, police, and civil service. They hold the power to block constitutional amendments and certain legislation affecting minority interests through a mechanism known as the ‘double majority’.
These guarantees were designed to reassure minority populations, facilitate inclusion, and prevent the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, which was seen as likely to in a post conflict situation where ethnic hatred caused death and destruction. However, they have also produced unintended consequences. The Serb List’s dominance means that these safeguards are now often used not to protect a vulnerable minority, but to serve the geopolitical agenda of Belgrade, thereby gaining disproportionate political influence despite low levels of integration at the societal level.
The electoral process in northern Kosovo has become emblematic of the contradictory relationship between the Serb community and the Kosovar state. In 2022, Kosovo Serb officials resigned en masse from local institutions following disputes over license plate enforcement. In response, the government called for new mayoral elections in four Serb-majority municipalities. Initially, the Serb List and other local leaders demanded these elections as a means of restoring representation. However, following strong political pressure from Belgrade, they then orchestrated a widespread boycott of the vote. Voter turnout in the April 2023 elections was under 4% [4], with ethnic Albanian candidates winning in areas where they constituted only a small minority. This outcome was rejected by the local Serb population and served to deepen distrust. The elected mayors were effectively unable to operate in the face of daily protests, which even led to a violent attack by Kosovo-Serbs to NATO KFOR troops, leaving several soldiers of the Italian and Hungarian contingent injured. After international and Serbian pressure, the Kosovar government accepted to call for a referendum to remove the ethnic Albanian mayors and proceed towards new elections. However, the referendum failed as it did not reach the requested turnout [5] following its boycott by the Kosovo-Serb community.
Ironically, the boycott strategy undermined the community’s own demand for democratic participation and exposed the limitations of externally influenced political leadership. However, it contributes positively in reaching the goals of the Serbian government, i.e. paralysing Kosovar institutions in the north.
5. Signs of progress: gradual integration into Kosovar institutions
Despite the political deadlock and recurring crises, there has been quiet progress [6] in the integration of the Serbian minority into Kosovar state structures. This integration is driven by pragmatism more than ideology. One of the most encouraging indicators is the increase in civil registration. Many Serbs are now registering births and other vital statistics with Kosovo’s civil registry to access healthcare, education, and social services. This trend represents not just a bureaucratic shift, but a tacit recognition of Kosovo’s administrative legitimacy. Similarly, the number of Kosovo Serbs applying for Kosovar passports has risen steadily. One key incentive is the 2024 implementation of visa liberalization for Kosovar citizens traveling to the Schengen Area. Another long-running issue – vehicle license plate registration – has also seen recent movement. For years, Kosovo Serbs in the north used Serbian-issued plates, in defiance of Kosovar law. After several failed enforcement attempts, the government introduced a phased policy for switching to RKS (Republic of Kosovo) plates. Though controversial, the policy has seen increasing and gradual – albeit very slow – compliance.
These forms of integration do not necessarily reflect political loyalty to Kosovo, but rather a shift toward coexistence based on practical needs and opportunities. In the long term, such civic engagement may lay the groundwork for a more inclusive society.
6. Conclusions
The relationship between the Serbian minority in northern Kosovo and the Kosovar government is marked by high political manipulation and parallel institutions continue to foster resistance and entrench division. Kosovo’s robust constitutional protections offer the framework for a truly multi-ethnic society. But representation must be matched by participation, and electoral legitimacy requires more than seats – it needs engagement.
Ultimately, the path forward depends on reducing external interference, fostering authentic local leadership, and investing in civic and economic inclusion. While geopolitical factors will continue to shape the landscape, it is the everyday decisions of ordinary citizens – whether to register a birth, apply for a passport, or vote in an election – that will determine the future of integration.
Sources
- https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/en/blog/the-first-final-results-from-the-census-of- population-households-and-housing-in-kosovo-are-presented/.
- https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/4557/
- https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/first-effects-of-eu-sanctions-sting-kosovo/
- https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/politics/two-years-election-albanian-mayors- northern-kosovo-citizens-north-mitrovica-still
- https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/north-kosovo-serbs-boycott-referendum- removing-ethnic-albanian-mayors-2024-04-21/
- https://x.com/albinkurti/status/1799857636076105798
