By Christian Costamagna, Ph.D. (LinkedIn), and Marco Uncini.
1. Introduction: The proclamation of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and political dynamics in the Western Balkans
Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a complex issue, encompassing its origins, the events that led to it and its consequences. We would like to begin with some historical considerations. In 1974, Kosovo gained extensive autonomy within the socialist Yugoslav federation, becoming one of eight federal entities, alongside the six republics and the autonomous socialist province of Vojvodina. In March 1989, Serbia unilaterally revoked this authority by force. In September 1991, Kosovo’s dismissed parliament declared the independence of the Serbian province. However, at that time, this event did not attract much attention and went unnoticed. This was clearly attributable to the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia and Croatia. During the 1990s, parallel institutions were established in Kosovo, including educational institutions. During that period, a limited number of Kosovo Albanians participated in the institutions of the Republic of Serbia. Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova aimed to achieve independence through non-violent means. Starting in 1997, the situation evolved due to the more assertive involvement of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which sought to achieve independence by military means. During the 1998-1999 Kosovo War and NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia, Kosovo, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, remained formally part of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed of Serbia and Montenegro), under United Nations administration (UNMIK), supported by a NATO-led peacekeeping mission, notably KFOR, which continues to be present today. Prior to the Kumanovo technical-military agreement of June 1999, which marked the end of the conflict, Kosovo’s independence was a controversial issue. Claimed by the Kosovo Liberation Army and contested by Serbia, it was relegated (in the June 1999 agreements) to an indefinite limbo in order to force the parties involved to reach a peace agreement.
This broad but incomplete introduction may facilitate understanding of the circumstances of 2008. Unlike in 1991, the declaration of independence provoked reactions not only in the Western Balkans but also throughout Europe and beyond. During the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, Moscow used Kosovo’s independence, supported by the United States and its allies, as justification for its actions. The second aspect of the issue concerns the allies of the United States. Currently, several NATO and/or EU member states, together with almost half of the world’s nations, do not recognise Kosovo. This resistance is clearly, in many cases if not universally, linked to internal concerns, as there is a fear that it could set a precedent that could trigger a process of disintegration within their respective countries, as in the case of Spain. In south-eastern Europe, I suspect that the 2008 declaration of independence did not come as a surprise to many. It has been cited as a precedent by Republika Srpska, one of the two entities that make up the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then, relations between Belgrade and Pristina have fluctuated considerably, alternating between periods of apparent openness, as in 2013, and periods of high tension, particularly in the last two years. The debate, facilitated and supported by the EU and other entities, despite substantial efforts and initiatives, mostly related to the daily lives of citizens and the normalisation of relations, remains significantly incomplete after several years. This situation seemed inevitable, given that Serbia does not recognise Kosovo as an independent state and, according to the Serbian Constitution, ‘Kosovo and Metohija’ remains one of the two provinces of the nation.
Serbia’s reluctance to recognise Kosovo is not unexpected when one examines the key dynamics; from historical heritage, to cultural and religious policies of the nation. Transforming certain ideals, deeply rooted in society is a formidable challenge that cannot happen overnight. This is particularly true when these principles are actively promoted and supported by government officials. Furthermore, Belgrade considered itself the protector of the security of the Serbian population living in that region. On the contrary, it is widely recognised that numerous politicians in Belgrade exploit the Kosovo issue for internal political reasons and power struggles. The most striking example is undoubtedly Milosevic in the late 1980s, but even today, albeit in a different form, Belgrade’s policy remains influenced by these forces.
2. The European Union: political and social stability in the Balkans after the conflicts of the 1990s
The European Union would have benefited greatly from being united and cohesive before the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. After the collapse of the USSR and the first Gulf War, the United States supported the transfer of the Yugoslav crisis to European nations. However, trivial, insular and nationalistic interests quickly undermined the efforts of the European Union, which, together with the United Nations, allowed events to unfold almost unhindered. This course of action resulted in the deaths of approximately 100,000 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995. Ethnic cleansing, detention camps and the Srebrenica genocide are all significant events. Without the intervention of the Clinton administration in 1995, characterised by assertive diplomacy and an uncertain outcome, the Dayton Peace Agreement would not have materialised. Despite its many flaws and obvious structural dysfunctions, this agreement remains in force thirty years later. As a result, the United States expected Europe to commit itself at least to rebuilding, financing peacekeeping operations and taking all necessary measures to restore the former Yugoslavia after years of conflict and sanctions.
The turning point, in many respects, was the overthrow of Milosevic in 2000. Since then, the regional situation as far as the international community is concerned has largely normalised, despite the lingering effects of the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. The European Union has provided significant assistance by financing reconstruction, infrastructure projects, investments, knowledge transfer and numerous initiatives such as Horizon and Erasmus. Since then, the EU has undoubtedly achieved a great deal for the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, the EU has probably been an ambitious goal for many people in the Western Balkans for many years. However, we believe that the prolonged delay has diminished interest in several countries, particularly in Serbia (where it was never substantial), but not only there. This is damaging to the EU at a systemic level. Now, it may be the ideal time, within the Berlin process, to jointly formulate a pragmatic and achievable path for the accession of new Member States.
Popular tensions in Serbia from the late 1980s to the present day
Serbia has experienced numerous popular protests over the last forty years. Without wishing to be exhaustive, it suffices to mention the so-called ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’ of 1987-1989, which expressed the deep discontent of Serbian citizens with the ruling elite, the economy and unemployment, openly condemning the disastrous conditions in which Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo were living, and turning to those who were derisively labelled ‘bureaucrats’, who, according to the narrative supported by Milosevic’s political faction within the League of Communists of Serbia, were opportunistically undermining the nation. Ultimately, from October 1988 to March 1989, public pressure forced the legitimate leaders of Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, as defined by the constitutional order of the time, which was markedly different from a liberal democracy, to resign.
A young communist led the ‘revolution’, which involved hundreds of thousands of people throughout Serbia and beyond for almost a year. His name was Slobodan Milosevic. In March 1991, at the height of Milosevic’s power, the first large public demonstration against the Serbian president was held in Belgrade, led by opposition leader Vuk Draskovic. Milosevic called in the army, which suppressed the protest. Draskovic had recently suffered defeat in the first multi-party elections held in December 1990. He claimed that Milosevic’s totalitarian regime, comparing it to that of Saddam Hussein, stifled free information and left no room for dissent on state television. In 1992, major student demonstrations took place. Subsequently, substantial student and opposition protests against Milosevic during the winter of 1996-1997 significantly undermined the already despised regime. In 2000, student demonstrations, the Otpor movement and opposition activities took place until Milosevic’s fall on 5 October. Subsequent demonstrations took place in the following years during the Vucic administration, including protests against the controversial urban reconstruction initiative ‘Beograd na vodi’ in 2015, as well as more recent opposition to the creation of lithium mines. In summary, student protests and mass demonstrations in Serbia are not uncommon and have sometimes led to profound changes.
3. The potential impact of recent protests on Serbian foreign policy and its relations with Western countries
The outcome of the ongoing student protests remains uncertain. The collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad, which killed sixteen people, has undoubtedly sparked deep outrage against a system perceived as corrupt. Corruption, as the students have stated in their slogans, is lethal. However, despite the support of some opposition parties, students have no specific political affiliation. In fact, there are different perspectives among their members: it is important to reiterate the widespread apathy of many Serbs towards EU membership. Not all protesters blame Vucic for his closeness to Russia. On the contrary, some blame him specifically for his closeness to the West.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, a seasoned politician who served as Serbia’s Minister of Information from 1998 to 2000 during Milosevic’s presidency, is trying to resist the protests. This is undoubtedly his most serious political dilemma. He is manoeuvring in several directions at once, with the aim of mitigating the political repercussions. He has officially agreed to the students’ demands, said he is open to dialogue and is urging his party’s militants and the police to show caution, tolerance and respect towards the protesters, despite some serious incidents involving students. He dismissed Milos Vucevic’s administration, saying there were two alternatives: either wait for a new government to be formed within the existing majority or return to elections. In April, any remaining doubts were dispelled with the formation of a new government led by Prime Minister Djuro Macut, a professional from the private sector rather than an experienced politician.
At the same time, a prominent opposition leader, Dragan Djilas, strongly reiterated his refusal to participate in new elections, perhaps out of fear of failing to gain sufficient support to form a majority, as Vucic himself has reiterated. The opposition aims to establish a technical transition government that includes all major parties. This is exactly what Vucic does not intend to do. On the contrary, Vucic has launched what appears to be a preventive election campaign, travelling even to the most remote communities from southern to northern Serbia in an attempt to galvanise his electorate. At these meetings, he is often asked to exercise his presidential authority to intervene, for example by facilitating the resurfacing of roads, among other issues. It was a sort of oral and collective rendition of the cahiers de doléances, in which the president listened attentively for hours to the complaints and grievances of citizens (evidently among those who sympathise with him) and, with his authoritative presence, similar to that of a miracle-working sovereign, he promised to address the existential dilemmas of many people in need, pledging to hire people with disabilities, guarantee them job opportunities and provide expensive medical care to the sick. In addition to all this, the Serbian president promised to open new industries in some of the country’s economically disadvantaged regions.
Vucic and his party have repeatedly complained about the intervention of foreign intelligence agencies, which he claims are inciting students against him, and have consistently shown firmness against any attempt at a ‘colour revolution’ against his regime. He has stated this publicly during his countless rallies, including in Vojvodina. The president has said that – according to his party – this province has excessive autonomist and separatist tendencies, arguing that Vojvodina ‘has been, is and always will be Serbia’. This is reminiscent of the slogans used for decades regarding Kosovo.
In this context, Vucic has been seen in the West, albeit not unanimously, as a guarantor of stability in the Balkans. A conservative figure, Vucic recently compared himself to French President Charles de Gaulle, known for his resilience during the 1968 protests. He enjoys the respect of European conservatives and has managed to attract significant investment to Serbia, contributing to job creation, the stabilisation of the dinar, higher wages and pensions, and improvements to the country’s road and rail infrastructure. These achievements are a source of pride that the president has consistently highlighted on television, reiterating the progress made over the years. Furthermore, Serbia is currently pursuing EU membership. This aura of stability probably contributed to the information blackout in the West during the initial phase of the protests against him – perhaps to support him. This is conjecture. Indeed, it is. However, the persistent information vacuum, which eased slightly a few months after the protests, cannot be overlooked. Similarly, it is interesting to note that, during the protests, Donald Trump Jr., the eldest son of US President Trump, visited Vucic in Belgrade last March.
Nevertheless, Vucic is also the head of state (a real exception in Europe, apart from Belarus) who did not vote for sanctions against Russia when it went to war and invaded Ukraine in February 2022. This is clearly the perspective that Western diplomatic circles disapprove of, given the exceptionally friendly relations between Russia and Serbia. Vucic happily informed his supporters during rallies that he had received the Order of Alexander Nevsky from the Russian Federation.
Given Serbia’s political position of military neutrality, particularly its reluctance to join NATO – probably due to the 1999 NATO bombing and its ties to Russia – along with its generally favourable relations with the West, historical ties to Russia and commitment to the People’s Republic of China, which echoes the non-aligned movement of the socialist period, it is difficult to imagine that the ongoing student protests will have a significant impact on Serbia’s foreign policy or its relations with the West. Unless, in a moment of frustration, the police or militants affiliated with Vucic’s party begin to crack down on the mass protests. Despite widespread and ongoing demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in recent months, along with notable incidents such as the ‘sound cannons’ issue last March, the situation has remained in a fragile balance. Tension between the factions and the persistent mockery of Vucic’s supporters by protesters, including the ‘students who just want to study’ (who represent a much more diverse social group) camped out in Pionirski Park in front of the Serbian parliament, remain. The authors believe that only violent repression of the protesters would constitute a definitive break with the West. The Serbian president is aware of this, recognising that it would jeopardise a fundamental aspect of his programme, namely foreign investment and the trust that places in Western governments. This would mark a point of no return, ushering in an era of great uncertainty. Perhaps a new date: 5 October 2000.
Ultimately, two other aspects are important to consider. Historically, Western chancelleries have effectively supported Belgrade, often turning a blind eye to its actions aimed at ensuring regional stability in the Balkans. This continued for decades, during Western support for Marshal Tito’s socialist dictatorship. Later, with the Dayton Accords of 1995, the West reluctantly recognised Milosevic as a guarantor of peace in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milosevic was, if not respected, at least tolerated (as the lesser evil) until the end of 1998.
The second issue is that those in power in Belgrade can maintain their position as long as they enjoy the support and trust of the police and the army. This is a decisive and crucial point, which was particularly evident in October 2000. The security forces abandoned Milosevic. Another senseless massacre was thus avoided. At present, there are no definitive indications that anything similar is happening in Belgrade, other than conjecture. Meanwhile, despite the new government, protests continue and have spread to Brussels, initially through groups of students on bicycles and then through marathons. However, Vucic remains firmly in power and intends to publish his new manual on how to resist and overcome colour revolutions in the autumn. He plans to publish the book in other languages and believes that, given the interest in the subject, particularly in countries such as China, it could achieve considerable print runs. He is considering donating the proceeds to charity to help Serbs in Kosovo.
4. The policies implemented by Italy to promote peace between Belgrade and Pristina
Italy has been consistently involved, as it was in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania, sending Italian soldiers and carabinieri on KFOR missions since June 1999, and this presence continues today. This is a clear sign that Italy, regardless of the political orientation of its government, is allocating resources to security in a region adjacent to its borders. Furthermore, Italy is a member of the Kosovo Quintet, which includes Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to promote positive dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. In addition, Italy has consistently expressed its desire to facilitate the accession of the Western Balkan countries to the EU over the years. Not to mention that Italy is a major investor in Serbia and one of its main economic partners. Italy has a direct interest, intrinsically linked to its own security, in promoting peace and development in the Balkans. Furthermore, there are undoubtedly factors that go beyond security concerns and include spheres of influence that are not only economic but also cultural, as well as prestige. Historically, during the Risorgimento, Italy supported Serbian nationalism because of a common enemy, Vienna. During the Second World War, Fascist Italy supported Albanian nationalism and divided Kosovo, integrating it into Italian-administered Albania, in collaboration with the German occupiers. Fortunately, those times are now over. More recently, Italy has sought to demonstrate its ability to ‘project security’ in Albania, as evidenced by the Alba mission in 1997 and the Arcobaleno mission in 1999. The D’Alema government joined NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999, partly because of Italy’s security concerns, despite the lack of public support for the action at the time.
The Arcobaleno mission was launched specifically to address the crisis of Albanian refugees expelled from Kosovo by Serbian forces during the war, particularly from the end of March 1999, when NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. For Italy, the security sector inevitably also includes the influx of migrants from the Balkans.
5. Bibliographical references
- Ramet, S. P. (2005). Thinking about Yugoslavia. Cambridge University Press.
- Thomas, R. (1999). The politics of Serbia in the 1990s. Columbia University Press.
- Čolović, I. (2002). The politics of symbol in Serbia. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.
- Coletti, R., & D’Urso, D. (Eds.). (2020). Al di là dell’Adriatico. Donzelli Editore.
- Uvalic, M. (2010). Serbia’s transition: Towards a better future. Palgrave Macmillan London.
- Bieber, F., Kmezić, M., & Pollozhani, L. (2025). The future of protests and democracy in Serbia. BiEPAG.
- Radio Television of Serbia. OKO. https://oko.rts.rs/
- Nova S. Utisak nedelje. https://nova.rs/tag/utisak-nedelje/
- Coletti, R., & D’Urso, D. (Eds.). (2020). Al di là dell’Adriatico. Donzelli Editore.
- Bieber, F., Kmezić, M., & Pollozhani, L. (2025). The future of the protests and democracy in Serbia. BiEPAG. https://www.biepag.eu/publication/the-future-of-the-protests-and-democracy-in-serbia
