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Piotr Wójcik – University of Warsaw

Piotr is M.A. in International Relations from the University of Warsaw, with a focus on the Three Seas Initiative. He also holds a postgraduate degree from the European Academy of Diplomacy (EAD) and has a wealth of experience from the field. He was Three Seas Partnership project coordinator for the Warsaw Institute and Research Intern at the Three Seas Initiative Research Centre Project (Polish Academy of Science). Since February 2024 he has been working for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Three Seas Initiative

Dark blue: Three Seas Initiative members – Light blue: Three Seas Initiative potential new members

The Three Seas Initiative: Embedding in regional cooperation in Europe

Having decided to create the Three Seas Initiative in 2015, by the initiative of Polish and Croatia presidents (Andrzej Duda and Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović) the 12 member countries (Poland, Croatia, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) set the aim to develop the economic collaboration. It had to enhance the cooperation in infrastructure, including the three priority dimensions such as transport, energy and digitalization. The constructed networks in these dimensions should contribute to further and faster development of the member states situated between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, and thus, they have to increase their economic significance in Europe.

So far, before the Three Seas, several forms of regional cooperation have been functionated in Central and Eastern Europe. The main examples of the existing formats (created before) were the Central European Initiative, the Visegrad Group (V4), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Poland-Romania-Turkey Trilogue. What differentiates these blocks of collaboration from the Three Seas Initiative (apart from CEI) is the consisting of smaller groups of countries, concentrated in peculiar parts of the widely interpreter Central and Eastern Europe. The composition visibly sees it of the member states, such as Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary in V4, and also Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in CBSS (with Germany, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden). The Polish-Romanian-Turkish trilateral partnership is also reduced to a particular area, between the Baltic and Black Seas states. Its construction is mainly based on the annual consultations between three significant countries on the Baltic-Black Sea axis which even do not border with one another. The exemption of concentrating the specific group of countries is the CEI which consists of the current 3SI countries (except Greece, and Austria – where the last one withdrew from it in 2018), the Western Balkan states, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

However, the above-mentioned formats have at least a few drawback issues in common which impacted the lowering of the development of the regional collaboration and creation of other Central and Eastern European associations in the following years, including the Three Seas Initiative. First of all, V4, CEI and CBSS’s fundamental goal was to support the introduction of political and economic reforms contributing to obtaining the membership of CEE countries in the European Union (EU). There should be perceived the recoveries of the cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe formats in the last years, like in the V4 Group in 2016 where its members succeeded in joint efforts to block the quota allocations of migrants who came to Europe in conjunction with the migration crisis in 2015.

Although when the aim of joining the CEE countries into the EU was fulfilled, the cooperation within these formats weakened. Furthermore, there appeared or had shown the new challenges more clearly to the states of the Central European area, resulting in new forms of collaborations, mainly the Three Seas Initiative. Apart from the objection of some EU-related factors – not only the migration issues but also the under-representation of CEE states in the European institutions, there had been intensifying threads from the East that boosted the regional partnership. It refers especially to the security issues, manifested in the increasing imperial policy of Russia in Central and Eastern Europe, the beginning of war in Ukraine at the breakthrough of 2013 and 2014. The mentioned factors, impacted more or less some individual states, on the creation of the Three Seas Initiative – a new format of Central and Eastern (CEE), North and Eastern (NEE) and South and Eastern Europe (SEE).

But, what is necessary to emphasize is that even though there are some discrepancies between the 3SI states and the EU, the creation and evolution of the 3SI partnership are based on the belonging of the member countries to the European Union whose policies aim to support a great extent the implementation of the Three Seas infrastructural investments. Having accepted the joint declaration on the first Three Seas Summit in Dubrovnik in 2016, the participating countries confirmed their membership in the EU and approval for being part of this international organization[1]. Furthermore, they decided that the Three Seas format should strengthen them, which constitute the Eastern part of the European Union and NATO and the whole of Europe. Besides that, it should be underlined that all 3SI states have to agree to consider the particular postulates in the joint declaration. This fact is the evidence, among others, of the consensus of every three-seas country concerning the significant attachment to the EU. Thus, the 3SI partnership ought to be considered the pro-European form of cooperation embedded in the solid membership in the EU Union. It is connected with the increasing awareness of the political dissidents, experts and societies of the Three Seas states of some drawbacks of the functioning of this organization. There is also noticed the rising consciousness of the necessity to create new, alternatives, within the EU the new forms of cooperation and actions to tackle its problems. On the other hand, the 3SI format and its potential development could be the medicine for some pains in the European Union, especially in a widely interpreted economy. So, it results, more, in the necessity to create new, alternatives, within the EU the new forms of cooperation and actions to tackle its problems, where the Three Seas Initiative signs in as the regional format.

Evolution of the Three Seas: Characteristic directions and pillars

Focusing on the functioning of the Three Seas format from the beginning to the current time, its potential development should be analyzed by organizing the following 3SI Summits from 2016 to 2023. The fundamental decisions, which resulted in establishing core pillars of the Initiative, were taken at the Bucharest Summit in 2018. This event fruited in creating the list of the priority infrastructural projects (in communication, energy and digitalization), beginning with 48 ones. Another significant achievement was signing the intention list of appointment of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (3SIIF), by the initiative of Poland and Romania, which has to finance the infrastructural investments implemented within the format. During the summit, there was held the Business Forum at the first time. By gathering the politicians and entrepreneurs from the region, and beyond, it enabled us to conceive the platform of discussions about diverse details related to the collaboration within Three Seas.

Nonetheless, the three oncoming summits in 2019, 2020 and 2021 (accordingly in Ljubljana, Tallinn and Sofia) did not lead to the breakthrough decisions. It concerns particularly the 2020, where the summit was generally covered owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite this, there ought to be perceived some outcomes from these annual summits which cemented the core structure of the Three Seas Initiative. There was confirmed the formal registration of the 3SI Fund which gathered the development banks from Poland and Romania (adequately with the input of 500 mln. and 20 mln EUR)[2], and whose authorities included their representatives, also from Czechia. In Slovenia, it was settled that during every summit there would be presented the annual report of progress in the realization of flagship investments. The Summit in Estonia in 2020 led, above all, to the increase of the contribution of Poland (to 750 mln EUR) in the 3SSIF and joining Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, and Lithuania (each state declared the input of 20 mln EUR) and Slovenia (allocating 23 mln EUR) to this financial source[3]. Concerning the 3SI Summit in Bulgaria in 2021, it is worth mentioning the decision to boost the cooperation among the national coordinators of the Three Seas format to make more efficient the decisive process, including the implementation of the 3SI projects.

The escalated war in Ukraine on 24th February 2022 accelerated the discussions about enhancing regional energy cooperation, constructing some plans and increasing efforts to implement them in some countries in Central Europe. It also refers to the upcoming Three Seas Summit in June next month later, in Riga. At the time of this event, in Latvia, it was decided to grant Ukraine the status of a participating state – as a new form of cooperation within the 3SI, based on the boosted infrastructural cooperation in some Three Seas pillars (excluding taking part in the decisive process). Moreover, the United States declared to contribute to the 3SIIF for 300 mln EUR[4]. At the last Summit, in Bucharest in 2023, there were settled another important provision regards the further evolution of the Initiative, placing this annual event to the most significant editions (with the previous one from 2018). First of all, the 3SI partnership was extended for the first time, in Greece. Secondly, Moldova became the second participating country, with Ukraine, locating them in the status newly named participating partnership. Thirdly, the United States (after the Summit) finalized there, earlier declared input to the 3SIIF of 300 mln EUR[5]. What is more, the list of 3SI flagship investments, included above 100 infrastructure projects (twice as much as at the beginning of 2018). The last of the most essential conclusions from the Summit was the announcement of creating a new financial instrument within the format – The Three Seas Initiative Innovation Fund which has not yet materialized. This resource is intended to fund green-friendly infrastructure renewable energy and digital investments.

According to the upcoming Three Seas Summit in Vilnius, in April this year, the continuing development of the format should be considered. It is worth discussing more, not only because the concrete decisions and directions of collaboration are officially settled mainly at (and before) the summits, but also of the Lithuanian presidency within the format, held for the first time by Lithuania. The leadership of a particular in the 3SI partnership starts after the last yearly event, to the organization of the next one. Because of the joint settlement between the member states (accepted in the joint declaration at the end of the event) at the Bucharest Summit in 2023, Lithuania began its presidency, which is responsible for holding the following summit and having the greater opportunity, among others, to promote its postulates into the Three Seas Initiative. Concentrating on the following evolution of this format after the Vilnius Summit, it seems that not so much will change. The main reason for this is the short time between the annual 3SI events in 2023 and 2024 (only 7 months) and the prioritization of Lithuania due to the three elections in this country this year (parliamentary, presidential and to the European Parliament in the coming months, and even weeks). But, regarding the interests of the Lithuanian side within Three Seas, it should be focused more on strengthening transatlantic ties (with the EU and the US) and investing in renewable energy and ecological transport. What is more, Lithuania is one of the countries most threatened by the war in Ukraine, and the Russian imperial policy should emphasize independence from a specific energy supplier (Russia). So the attention probably will be focused on the necessity to build or develop more critical infrastructure, like the LNG Terminal in Klaipeda and the synchronization of the electricity system of Baltic states with the European network (which means abandoning the Russian one). In addition, the Lithuanian presidency emphasizes the significance of building other regional connections in North and Eastern Europe, particularly Via Baltica and Rail Baltica. Moreover, being one of the countries that supports Ukraine the most, it is not excluded that Lithuania will insist on the extended partnership between the mentioned participating countries with the Three Seas Initiative, where the frameworks of cooperation have not been defined yet.

After the Summit in Vilnius, the next one will be held in Budapest. Despite Hungary’s foreign economic policy orientation towards China and Russia (at the expense of the European orientation), it has declared its willingness to host the event in 2025, while Poland has also tried to. The precise development of the 3SI format after this summit is hard to predict, as we do not know the previous development of the Vilnius format. But, what is the most important in the upcoming Hungarian presidency within 3SI is that it can be such a useful tool and chance for Hungary to encourage other states in the region to cooperate more, in the infrastructure at least. In the context of the external Hungarian policy, there should be taken into the consideration the partially reduced influence on European politics and loneliness. This is due to the distinctive attitude and specific actions towards the war in Ukraine and losing the empire by the coalition focused on right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) in Poland. Also, the noticeable fact is that Hungary is getting closer to the countries that have a similar stance towards these issues, like Slovakia.

And the main obstacles?

Regarding the last mentioned Poland, also other Three Seas members, and the Initiative as a whole, there should be paid the attention on several hurdles of the previous development of the format. At first, looking at the particular member states, they sometimes have different attitudes towards the 3SI partnership and outstanding engagement within it at once. This involvement can be stated, for example, due to the organizing of some Three Seas Summits (and the importance of decisions taken there), the stage of implementation of the priority projects and contribution to the 3SIIF of the members. The states which stand out because of their bigger activeness, are, apart from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania. Each of them has organized the 3SI summit (Romania event twice), except for Lithuania holding the annual event in April this year. Moreover, the realization of the Three Seas is predominantly more advanced in the states mentioned above than the other ones, such as the Interconnector Poland-Lithuania, synchronization of the electricity network of the Baltic countries with the European one, Via Carpatia and Rail Baltica. Apart from Poland and the Baltics, also Romania is highly involved in the 3SI partnership. The relatively big interest of the Romanian side could be observed due to holding two times the Three Seas Summits and the crucial decisions that were taken during them when Romania was the host country. Nowadays, they constitute the principal basis for the existence of the main 3SI pillars.

On the opposite side, there are the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria which are the least engaged. These members submitted the lowest number of projects within the 3SI flagship ones (Austria did not propose even no one) and they do not contribute to the 3SIIF. These three countries also make their activeness in the Three Seas Initiative dependent on the position of Germany towards this format, which is a very significant economic partner for them. Despite the better perception of 3SI with time, the German side has maintained a distance from it, which impacts the membership of Czechia, Slovakia and Austria in the Three Seas. For the last two years, there was noticed the more favorable of the Czech attitude towards 3SI, after Petr Fiala became the Czech prime minister at the end of 2021 and declared a positive stance toward the Initiative[6], with more approval than was seen in other Czech political dissidents. What is more, the escalation of the war in Ukraine in 2022 made Poland and the Czech Republic closer and made the reason to cooperate more within the format. After these two circumstances, the construction of the Stork II pipeline (bi-directional Polish-Czech Interconnector) was often discussed, which has to lower the dependence of Czechia on gas supply from Russia and enable it to transport the blue fuel from the LNG terminals in Swinoujście Gdańsk within the North-South Gas Corridor. In 2023, for the first time, the Czech Republic postponed two new projects to realize within the 3SI – the above-mentioned pipeline and the RS Brno-Přerov-Ostrava-CZ/PL border railway. Besides the non-active Danube-Oder-Elbe Connection, these investments were first submitted by Czechia in the format. However, there were no other actions taken by the Czech Republic to boost its engagement within the Three Seas.

On the other hand, the Polish-Czech bilateral cooperation, and also the further development of the 3SI form of collaboration depends on the efforts of Poland too. It is worth mentioning, that this country was the most active within it and initiated a lot of undertakings within the format. It should not be excluded from the strengthening relations between the Polish side and others in the Three Seas region in the coming months or years. However, focusing on the priorities of the new Polish government of Civic Coalition under the dominancy of the Civic Platform Party (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), Third Way consisting of Polish Agricultural Party Poland 2050 Party, and New Leftist Party (Nowa Lewica), with the leadership of Prime Minister Donald Tusk deriving from PO, will put emphasis more on restoring and developing relations with bigger players in the European Union – especially with Germany and France within the Weimar Triangle and other forms cooperation with these states. The predictable trend in the foreign policy of Poland (towards the bigger states in the EU) may be quite different from the priorities of the Law and Justice Party and its coalition partners which prioritized closer collaboration with the Central European states situated between Germany and Russia, and also the United States particularly during the presidency of Donald Trump. Nonetheless, there ought to be avoided the stereotypical perception of the foreign politics of the two opposite sides of the Polish political scene. It is not excluded that there could be some factors that may dynamize or weaken the collaborations of Poland with other 3SI countries within the 3SI, and also its relations with the bigger players in Europe. For example, after the invasion of Russia in Ukraine in 2022, Poland got closer not only to Czechia but also to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which also strongly opposed this Russian aggression. Meanwhile, there was noticed the weakness of the Polish-Hungarian ties where Hungary took such a different position towards the invasion, looking favorable to the Russian Federation and criticizing Ukraine in the context of the invasion and following sequence of events. Even though the accents in international actions differ from the parties on the political scene in Poland, there is a cross-party consensus when it comes to various aspects of Polish foreign policy.

The evolution of the Three Seas Initiative, sometimes referred to as the Polish-Croatian format, also depends on other states like Croatia. During the presidency of Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović (who comes from the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ) this country performed a more positive stance towards the format and also held the first 3SI Summit in Dubrovnik. But, owing to the change of the Croatian president in 2020, its stance on the presidential level became completely different. Then, Zoran Milanović (derived from the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, SDP) became the next president of Croatia who even before the election emphasized that the Three Seas is a harmful format and approved the boosting collaboration of his country with Germany and Russia[7]. This change resulted in the rivalry between the head of state and the prime minister, Andrej Plenković. It was very visible a few days before the 3SI Summit in Tallinn 2020. Despite being invited to this event, the office of Milanović claimed that he would not be there and Croatia would be represented by the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs. In turn, the government confirmed that the Croatian side by Plenković, who appeared at the summit as a representative of Croatia. After the event, the Croatian government announced the creation of an office that would coordinate the activities of the ministries responsible for the realization of national activities within the Three Seas. This decision was criticized by Milanović, who stated that this initiative would increase bureaucracy and unnecessary state expenditure. The Croatian president also disapproved of the declaration of the Plenković government to pay EUR 20 million for the 3SIIF and the further input of it[8].

Another 3SI country worth referring to is Greece which ought to be an additional catalyzator for the development of the Three Seas. For now, the Hellenic Republic is potentially involved only in two Three Seas investments, Via Carpatia and the Adria Flood and Drought Risk Mitigation System. However, the Greek side will probably submit new projects in the coming months and years and may contribute to 3SSIF. Greece urges to realize the internal routes linking the biggest Greek cities, such as Thessaloniki and Athens, and also with other urban centers with one another, to get better access to transportation to the rest of Europe where particularly Bulgaria ensures the linking for it with the other countries of the EU. The Hellenic state will also be keen on the modernization of the existing infrastructure, including among others the highways and ports, which are significant to connect Southern and Eastern Europe with other parts of the continent. When it comes to energy, Greece is likely to promote the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (within the Southern Gas Corridor) and several undertakings being part of it (like terminals and gas storages) to the 3SI flagship investments. They should increase the significance of the Hellenic Republic in the infrastructure of the SEE region and further contribute positively also to other Three Seas members.

Except for the internal political situations in the 3SI member states, there is also one fundamental aspect that is a restraint for the deployment of the format – the financial one. By reminding the establishment of the 3SI, it is necessary to add that this resource is worth only 1,23 bln euros[9] (with the goal of the contribution of 3-5 bln euros[10]). It is intended mainly to invest in commercial and point investments, such as green data centers, ports, companies specializing in logistics and windmills in the countries of the Three Seas area. Referring to the finances secured to implement the priority 3SI projects, only 38% are secured as about 72 bln euros only 11 have been realized so far, also including the national and EU funds[11]. It proves that it demands to allocate much more funds to construct the Three Seas investments. It is hard for the medium-income countries from the 3SI, where according to some estimations, the shortfall in investments in communication, energy and digitalization has grown to above 1 trillion euros over the years[12].

Conclusions: What are the perspectives in the future?

The prospects for the future of the Three Seas Initiative in the following years should be analyzed in, almost a few dimensions. First of all, regards the willingness of some particular members to develop 3SI, it should refer to the biggest number of the countries of the region. Especially, it concerns Poland which has initiated a big part of the undertakings in the previous years. Due to the change of the government in Poland between 2023 and 2024, there should be prioritized more cooperation with the bigger and stronger political and economic countries in the European Union, such as Germany and France, and it could have an impact on the Three Seas in following years.

But the taking accents more on the realization of foreign policy into the EU should not result in less intensified relations of Poland with other Central European states. Regarding cooperation with the CEE, NEE and SEE countries (and the other way), the new Polish government is likely to prioritize more use of the existing EU instruments to boost regional infrastructural cooperation, such as the appointed in December 2021 Global Gateway (GG) strategy which aims to strengthen the relations between the European Union and the third countries, from Europe (including Ukraine) and other continents. It should also focus on other tools like the Connecting Facility Europe (CEF) and funds from the European banks which feed a fundamental part of the construction of the current 3SI projects. Looking at the other Three Seas members, it is probable that, owing to the previous evolution of the Initiative, their involvement within it will not grow so much. Even if the deployment of the 3SI partnership is lower in the next years, it will soon cease to exist due to the big efforts taken by particular policymakers, think tanks and analysts for international relations.

Furthermore, some unexpected internal and external dimensions may boost or weaken the peculiar elements of the collaboration within Three Seas, which happened in recent years. On one hand, the increase of new countries joining 3SI there was observed, by examples of obtaining membership by Greece and getting the participant-state status for Ukraine and Moldova. They could affect the enhancing interest of cooperation of some other particular 3SI countries, like Poland with Ukraine, Romania with Moldova and Bulgaria with Greece.

Entering the Hellenic Republic to the Initiative much extended the surroundings of the Three Seas for the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea. What is also worth adding, the war in Ukraine released more countries, among others in Central Europe, to find alternatives for the energy supply and ensure stable transport. It also came closer to some concrete groups of members such as Poland with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. On the other hand, the outstanding attitudes of some states like Austria, Slovakia and Hungary (with the intensification of particularly two last ones) will probably differ more in the member countries to settle the joint undertakings in the 3SI format.

Recommendations: How could 3SI effectively respond to the challenges?

Although there are some disparities within the Three Seas Initiative, it should be clearly emphasized that the implementation of it is in the interest of each 3SI member country. The format consists above one hundred priority investments of the configurations of various states, where every project intends to bring profits for each participating one. It is not only Via Carpatia (involving among others Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) or Rail Baltica (including Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland), but also, as the example the BRUA pipeline (through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria) and the Hungary-Slovenia-Italy Gas Corridor (HUSIT). So, it is worth accenting the community character of the Three Seas and the construction of the joint projects bringing together various combinations of countries. What also concerns the 3SI projects, is its financial dimension, where there is a huge lack of proper amount of money to allocate to their realization. The recommended solution is to prioritize common projects to realize when it comes to the joint character of the Three Seas investments, rather than one-partial and bilateral ones, which should persuade other countries to contribute more money to the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund. Moreover, it will be helpful for the 3SI to implement the Three Seas Innovation Fund principally focused on the 3SI’s modern-based undertakings. One important thing is not to duplicate the existing investment source but to complement its functioning, and also other pillars.

Having seen the previous evolution of the 3SI partnership, its specific tendency is primarily very visible – “the deployment from the summit to summit”. To increase the dynamics of the Initiative, establishing the Three Seas secretariat should be considered, which will liquefy organizing the annual event and the decisive process. This new, stable structure, ought to be one of the 3SI core pillars, and because of its operational character, accelerate previous collaboration and postpone new elements to it.

What was also lacking previously within the Initiative, or under-estimated, was the necessity of promotion of the 3SI brand and its recognition, not only on the political level but also on society. Policymakers from different Three Seas countries should be more aware of the existence of this form of collaboration and the potential results from its implementation. The Initiative also has to include more actions towards the bigger number of different social groups (among others young people) and show by the communication tools the great idea of the 3SI which should be taken into reality, like in social media. Furthermore, due to the growing contemporary challenges such as climate, environment and sustainable development, the Three Seas ought to find more solutions to deal with them and prove that this form of cooperation can tackle them effectively. It is worth adding that the 3SI flagship investments contribute to making the economies of the region more developed and achieve climate and sustainable goals simultaneously.

In addition, regarding the often-touched European dimension of the Three Seas Initiative, the further development of this format demands more synchronization of its realization with the EU instruments dedicated to infrastructure, such as Global Gateway (GG), Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), funds from the European Investment Bank (EBI), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Connecting Facility Europe (CEF). In this context, the Three Seas ought to the implementation of its undertakings which are the EU infrastructural investments at once. In the construction of some projects, the 3SI states should cooperate more on the EU level, postponing more joint-infrastructure proposals to implement within the European Union, among others, the above instruments. This movement will contribute better to the financial aspect of the Three Seas, ensuring more money to the constriction of its investments.

Within the deployment of the 3SI, there also ought to underline the transregional aspect of this format, potentially involving Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkan states where the majority of them are approved to join the Initiative. It will prove the transregional character of the Three Seas that could expand into new countries, and bring economic profits to more 3SI members due to the increased state-in-state cooperation. Last but not least, regards other third countries to the Three Seas, some of its projects are also in their interest, where for example Rail Baltica and the implementation of the High-Performance Computing (HPC) which include Germany. These 3SI investments will contribute to better economic connections between Germany, Poland and the Baltics and thus, the orientation also to the Western neighboring of the Three Seas. They would lead to joint development and make the whole European Union stronger and more resilient economically.

References

  1. The Joint Statement on the Three Seas Initiative (The Dubrovnik Statement), Three Seas, https://media.voog.com/0000/0046/4166/files/DUBROVNIK_deklaratsioon_2016.pdf (04.03.2024)
  2. Three Seas Initiative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/three-seas-initiative (04.03.2024)
  3. Ibidem (04.03.2024)
  4. Ibidem (04.03.2024)
  5. Ibidem (04.03.2024)
  6. Policy Statement of the Government, Government of the Czech Republic, https://vlada.gov.cz/en/jednani-vlady/policy-statement/policy-statement-of-the-government-193762 (03.03.2024)
  7. Milanovic says Three Seas Initiative unnecessary, potentially harmful, N1info, https://n1info.hr/english/news/a565888-milanovic-says-three-seas-initiative-unnecessary-potentially-harmful/
  8. Three Seas Initiative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/three-seas-initiative (04.03.2024)
  9. Ibidem (04.03.2024)
  10. 3SIIF, BGK, https://www.en.bgk.pl/3siif/ (04.03.2024)
  11. Status Report of 2023, Three Seas, https://projects.3seas.eu/report (03.03.2024)
  12. Three Seas Story, Three Seas, https://3seas.eu/about/threeseasstory (03.03.2024)
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