Authoritarianism Without Borders: Belarus and Transnational Repression in Central and Eastern Europe

Written by: Dzmitry Hlotau, European Humanities University.^[1]

Abstract

This paper examines how the Belarusian regime projects repression beyond its borders, targeting exiled dissidents. These practices span a spectrum of methods, ranging from direct coercive measures like abductions and forced renditions, to legal and quasi-legal instruments, administrative and bureaucratic controls, and symbolic intimidation targeting relatives or diaspora groups abroad. Together, they illustrate the dilemmas Central and Eastern European (CEE) democracies face in balancing the protection of exiles with safeguarding national security. At the international level, the Belarusian case illustrates how authoritarian regimes adapt and exploit legal and institutional mechanisms abroad, challenging the integrity of international cooperation. Far from being an isolated anomaly, Belarus represents a broader global trend in which contemporary authoritarian rule increasingly operates across borders. Understanding this phenomenon is essential not only for analyzing Belarus itself but also for assessing the evolving nature of repressive practices in the international system.

1. Introduction

Alexander Lukashenko’s governance has expanded its oppressive power far beyond Belarusian borders in the wake of the controversial 2020 presidential election and the followong widespread protests that sparked after. What started as a local crackdown has evolved into transnational repression, a concerted effort to intimidate and silence Belarusian dissidents everywhere.

This paper explores the ways in which the Belarusian government exports repression to neighboring nations and even far-off states by enforcing what scholars call “authoritarianism without borders”. It looks at the basic mechanisms of this transnational authoritarianism, including the weaponization of passports and citizenship, the misuse of Interpol notices and extradition treaties, and the use of in absentia trials to support subsequent extradition requests.

The paper places Belarus’s practices in a broader context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by referencing a variety of reports and academic literature, case studies of the Belarusian diaspora in neighboring Poland and Lithuania, and theoretical frameworks of transnational repression. Additionally, it evaluates how Belarus’s cross-border persecution affects the resilience of young democracies that host exiles, and regional security.

2. Transnational Authoritarianism: Theoretical Framework

The phenomenon under scrutiny falls under what scholars term transnational repression or transnational authoritarianism. Sociologist Dana M. Moss (2022) defines transnational repression as the tactics through which authoritarian “home” regimes “deter, suppress, and punish criticism from diaspora communities and exiles”^[2]. In other words, even after dissidents or ordinary citizens flee beyond the regime’s territorial jurisdiction, the authoritarian state continues to target them – via surveillance, intimidation, legal pressure, or violence – to stifle dissent abroad. These tactics may include surveillance and harassment, threats to harm exiles or their families back home, cancellation of passports or scholarships, the issuance of Interpol “Red Notices” for wanted persons, and even assassinations. All are designed to send a clear message: exile offers no guarantee of safety from the regime’s reach.

Building on this understanding of transnational repression, political scientist Alexander Dukalskis (2021) emphasizes that contemporary dictatorships project power internationally to manage their image and silence critics. In his article of authoritarian “image management,” Dukalskis notes that autocracies not only promote a positive narrative of themselves abroad, but also “work to silence critics and criticisms wherever they occur, including beyond their own borders”^[3], treating outspoken exiles as serious threats.

Extending this perspective beyond image management, Marlies Glasius (2017) argues that authoritarianism needs to be understood not solely as a regime type limited to national boundaries, but as a governance framework characterized by certain activities that transcend territorial jurisdiction. Her theory of extraterritorial authoritarian practices defines five modes through which regimes govern populations abroad: inclusion as subjects, patriots, or clients, and exclusion as outlaws or traitors^[4]. This approach is especially helpful for understanding Belarus, where extradition requests, trials in absentia, and family intimidation exemplify inclusion as subjects, while passport restrictions and citizenship revocations reflect exclusion as outlaws, and the branding of exiles as ‘extremists’ or ‘terrorists’ illustrates exclusion as traitors; by contrast, the inclusionary modes of patriots and clients are scarcely applied in the Belarusian case.

A comparable approach is offered by Gerasimos Tsourapas (2021), who introduces the concept of transnational authoritarianism. He explains it as regimes trying to balance two goals: on the one hand, they want to benefit from emigration through remittances or reduced social pressures; on the other hand, they seek to limit the political risks that arise when exiles use their “voice” abroad. To manage this tension, Tsourapas identifies four main strategies: repression (surveillance, coerced returns, Interpol abuse), legitimation (appeals to patriotism among diasporas), co-optation (material benefits such as scholarships or career opportunities), and cooperation with non-state actors (including diaspora associations, corporations, and international institutions)^[5]. In the Belarusian case, these strategies are largely limited to repression and cooperation with allied actors, while legitimation and co-optation remain almost absent.

Beyond academic analyses, reports by policy organizations also document these patterns. Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer’s report for Freedom House “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach” is another key reference, systematically documenting transnational repression by authoritarian states such as Russia, China, and Turkey. The authors identify common tactics including assassination, rendition, surveillance, coercion through family members, and the abuse of international organizations like Interpol^[6]. This categorization of repression methods and geographic analysis underscores the global scope of these practices.

Similarly, Edward Lemon’s study “Weaponizing Interpol” examines how Central Asian regimes misuse international policing mechanisms^[7]. Lemon illustrates how authoritarian governments exploit Interpol’s Red Notice system to target dissidents abroad under fabricated criminal charges – a method not unique to Central Asia, but increasingly widespread across different regions, including Europe.

Taken together, these scholarly and policy perspectives provide a useful lens for situating Belarus. In this broader comparative landscape, Belarus under Lukashenko has in recent years emerged as an illustrative case of transnational repression in Europe. While transnational tools of repression are not a new phenomenon and have been extensively used by regimes such as Russia, Turkey, and China (and beyond), the Belarusian case is notable for its rapid expansion, variety of methods, and geographic reach. The following sections examine Belarus’s transnational repression toolkit in detail and place it within the wider pattern of cross-border repressive measures worldwide.

3. Exporting Repression: Methods of the Belarusian Regime

3.1 Direct Extraterritorial Attacks: Abductions and Air Piracy

Direct extraterritorial attacks, including abductions or forced landings of civilian aircraft, exemplify what scholars identify as the most visible form of transnational repression. Glasius (2017) conceptualizes such practices as ‘inclusion as subjects,’ where regimes continue to exercise authority over individuals abroad as if they remained within the state’s territory. Similarly, Tsourapas (2021) categorizes abductions and coerced returns under the broader strategy of transnational repression. These methods serve not only to silence specific critics but, as Moss (2022) notes, to instill fear across the broader diaspora.

The most notorious incident was the forced landing of Ryanair Flight 4978 on 23 May 2021. Belarusian authorities scrambled a fighter jet and falsely warned of a bomb on a civilian airliner traveling between two EU capitals (Athens to Vilnius) in order to divert it to Minsk, where they arrested 26-year-old Belarusian journalist Raman Pratasevich and his companion Sofia Sapega^[8].

The European Council, convened on 24 May 2021, strongly condemned that act, describing it as endangering international aviation safety. The Council demanded the immediate release of Roman Protasevich and Sofia Sapega, urged the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to investigate, and called on Member States to implement additional sanctions, including banning Belarusian carriers from EU airspace and ports^[9].

The rationale, as Dukalskis observes, was that Pratasevich’s influential blogging had undermined the dictator’s image and authority, and “silencing a critic was worth the consequences” in Lukashenko’s calculus^[10]. While unusually dramatic, the Ryanair case exemplifies a broader pattern of transnational repression in which authoritarian regimes treat exiled dissidents as critical threats.

The incident is not isolated. Belarusian security services have reportedly pursued abductions of dissidents on foreign soil when possible. An example came in April 2021, when two Belarusian opposition figures – lawyer Yury Zenkovich (a dual U.S.-Belarus citizen) and political analyst Alexander Feduta – were kidnapped from a Moscow hotel by Russian FSB agents (with the support of Belarussian counterparts) and forcibly renditioned to Minsk^[11]. Reports indicate the men were secretly transported across the border, bypassing normal judicial procedures^[12]. But in February 2025 Zenkovich was declared wrongfully detained and released in April 2025 without a prisoner swap. U.S. officials suggested Belarus may be attempting to improve relations with the U.S^[13].

Such actions reflect tactics seen in other authoritarian contexts – from Soviet-era kidnappings to more recent Turkish renditions – underscoring how Belarus aligns with, rather than diverges from, a broader repertoire of coercive practices. For example, as of 2024 the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has orchestrated over 118 renditions since 2016, frequently bypassing legal norms with the cooperation of host governments.^[14] Their occurrence in the post-Cold War European context, however, underscores the risks authoritarian cross-border operations pose to regional security.

Additionally, Belarus has allegedly plotted violent attacks or assassinations against critics abroad, often in coordination with allied security services. Lithuania’s intelligence service disclosed in April 2025 that Belarusian and Russian agencies were “plotting attacks against Belarusians in Lithuania” – a country hosting many exiles – with the goal of intimidating the diaspora^[15]. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled Belarusian opposition leader, responded that these revealed plots “prove how much [the regime] fear[s] our solidarity and our work” abroad^[16]. While details of such plans are kept secret by security agencies, their public warnings suggest that physical threats to exiles (even assassination attempts) are taken seriously by host countries in the region. In 2024, prosecutors in Poland initiated an investigation into a crime directed against opposition leader Pavel Latushka, under legal provisions covering homicide and foreign intelligence activities^[17]. This step highlights the degree of concern among regional authorities regarding possible Belarusian security service actions beyond their borders.

In sum, the Lukashenko regime has demonstrated it will cross red lines – hijacking planes, kidnapping persons, and potentially plotting violence – in order to physically capture or eliminate dissidents outside Belarus. These direct attacks represent the most visible and extreme form of transnational repression, illustrating how Belarus’s actions resonate with broader patterns of cross-border repression and raise significant concerns for regional security.

3.2 “Weaponizing” Citizenship: Passports and the Diaspora Trap

Authoritarian regimes are increasingly weaponizing restrictions on freedom of movement as a tool of transnational repression. According to the Freedom House report “No Way In or Out: Authoritarian Controls on the Freedom of Movement” (August 2024), at least 55 governments worldwide have employed mobility restrictions to punish, coerce, or silence political opponents and perceived threats. These practices typically take the form of revoking citizenship, withholding or refusing to renew passports, denial of consular services, and imposing travel bans. Notably, in at least 12 countries, citizens living abroad are unable to renew their passports at consulates^[18].

The Belarusian authorities have increasingly employed bureaucratic instruments, such as passports and citizenship status, as tools of control over citizens abroad. In 2023, Lukashenko’s government made a drastic move to deny passport renewals for Belarusians living outside the country, effectively trapping exiles in legal limbo. Decree No. 278, signed by Lukashenko on 4 September 2023, ordered Belarusian embassies and consulates to stop issuing new passports or renewing existing ones for citizens abroad^[19]. This decree instantly affected an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 Belarusians in exile^[20], who are no longer able to obtain a valid travel document unless they returned to Belarus.

The implications are far-reaching. Passports are essential for legal residence, work, and travel; without a valid passport or with an expired one, exiles risk losing immigration status in host countries and cannot freely travel. As Human Rights Watch noted, this policy “exposes people to the risk of politically motivated prosecution upon return” to Belarus – since those who do go back to renew documents could be arrested for their opposition activity^[21]. By weaponizing passport renewal, the regime effectively holds exiles hostage: either remain abroad with invalid papers (unable to travel or fully integrate) or come back and face potential imprisonment. It is a form of coercion through citizenship rights. Since September 2023, there have been documented cases of Belarusians being detained upon returning to the country to renew or obtain new passports^[22].

In parallel, Belarus has legally paved the way to strip citizenship from dissidents abroad. In December 2022, the National Assembly amended the citizenship law to allow revoking the citizenship of Belarusians residing abroad who are deemed to engage in “extremist activities” or cause “serious harm to the interests of Belarus”^[23]. In practice, “extremism” is a label the regime applies to almost any dissent – including independent media, NGOs, and opposition groups. This means exiled activists could be rendered stateless as an added punishment, a tactic of banishment and pressure.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has condemned these practices, recommending in its 2024 report that Belarus guarantee the right to nationality without discrimination and refrain from implementing the 2022 amendments allowing citizenship revocation on political grounds^[24].

Neighboring countries hosting large Belarusian diasporas have attempted to mitigate the impact. Lithuania’s government announced it would issue a one-year renewable “foreigner’s passport” – a temporary travel document – to Belarusian residents who “cannot return to Belarus for humanitarian or political reasons” so they can continue to live and travel legally^[25]. Poland likewise created a program allowing Belarusians with Polish residence permits to obtain a Polish-issued travel document if their Belarusian passport has expired^[26]. These stopgap policies by host countries underscore both the scale of Belarus’s passport decree and the commitment of neighboring states to shield the diaspora from Lukashenko’s trap. Nevertheless, such fixes are partial and not universally recognized, leaving many exiles in a state of uncertainty. The regime’s use of citizenship revocation and passport non-renewal thus stands out as a strategic form of transnational repression short of physical force – one that exploits exiles’ vulnerabilities under international travel and identity regimes.

In sum, Belarus’ restrictions on passport renewal and the threat of denaturalization demonstrate how authoritarian regimes can transform routine administrative procedures into instruments of repression. These measures not only constrain mobility but also deepen the precarity of exile, leaving affected individuals dependent on ad hoc protections by host states. These practices correspond to what Glasius (2017) terms “exclusion as outlaws”, whereby states deny emigrants the legal status of citizens and push them outside the protection of the polity.

3.3 Extradition and INTERPOL: International Legal Instruments as Tools of Repression

Another pillar of Belarus’s international crackdown is the manipulation of legal and law-enforcement tools – notably Interpol alerts and bilateral extradition agreements – to pressure other countries into detaining and returning exiles. The Minsk authorities have repeatedly sought to label dissidents abroad as common criminals or terrorists, in order to trigger arrests through international police cooperation. A key method is the misuse of Interpol’s “Red Notice” system, whereby a country can request the provisional arrest of a wanted person pending extradition. Authoritarian governments have abused Interpol by filing notices on trumped-up criminal charges against exiled opponents – and Belarus follows this broader pattern.

Edward Lemon notes that scholars have paid insufficient attention to the abuse of Interpol, despite its growing role in global policing. Most academic studies focus on the organization’s expanded mandate in response to transnational threats, while largely overlooking how authoritarian regimes exploit it for political repression^[27].

In April 2021, the Belarusian prosecution formally requested an international search (Interpol Red Notice) for Pavel Latushko, a former minister turned opposition leader, on charges including “conspiracy to seize state power” and “extremist activities”^[28].

Similarly, in late 2021, members of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s (the opposition leader and former presidential candidate) team, including the ByPol initiative, publicly urged Interpol to remove Minsk’s access after they attempted to place Tsikhanouskaya and several of her allies on wanted lists for “terrorism” and related charges^[29]. Interpol rejected Belarus’s attempt to issue a Red Notice against her, citing Article 3 of its Constitution, which prohibits involvement in cases of a political nature^[30], but Belarus’s repeated attempts highlight a familiar authoritarian pattern of abusing red notices as tools of political repression. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis stated firmly that they “would sooner let hell freeze over” than comply, reiterating Lithuania’s commitment to protecting those targeted for their democratic activism^[31].

In February 2021, the Latvian General Prosecutor’s Office formally refused Belarus’s request to extradite Valery Tsepkalo, a former presidential contender accused of corruption and large-scale bribery. Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs condemned the request as “an open attempt at political persecution,” a sentiment echoed by Justice Minister Jānis Bordāns^[32].

Since 2021, Poland repeatedly refused Belarusian demands for extradition, citing political persecution. A prominent example occurred on 28 November 2024, when the District Court in Poznań denied Poland’s extradition request for Belarusian activist Dmitry Pleskachev. The court found no legal basis for the request and confirmed that it was politically motivated^[33].

One illustrative case is that of Andrey Gniot, a Belarusian journalist and pro-democracy activist who fled the country in 2021. In October 2023, Gniot was unexpectedly arrested upon arrival in Serbia based on an Interpol notice from Belarus accusing him of tax evasion. These charges were widely viewed as fabricated (Gniot is a co-founder of the sports union SOS BY and active in independent media). Despite having no previous knowledge of being sought by Interpol, he was detained.^[34] By June 2024, Serbia’s Higher Court upheld the extradition ruling, prompting Gniot’s transfer to house arrest while he appealed. However, in September 2024, the Belgrade Court of Appeal overturned the decision and sent the case back to the High Court for reconsideration, extending his house arrest. In November 2024, he was unexpectedly allowed to leave Serbia – reportedly aided by diplomatic channels – and Interpol removed him from its Red Notice list^[35].

Beyond Interpol, Belarus leans heavily on bilateral extradition treaties and security alliances – especially with allied states – to retrieve exiles. Most notably, Belarus exploits its close relationship with Russia. Under the Union State and CIS frameworks, Belarus and Russia have mutual extradition agreements, and Moscow has often complied with Minsk’s requests. This was seen in numerous instances where Belarusians who fled to Russia (perhaps thinking it safer than staying in Belarus) were handed back. For example, in 2021, there have been cases of ordinary protesters or opposition members detained in Russia and quietly extradited to Belarus outside of public view^[36]. Such cooperation makes any travel or refuge in Russia extremely perilous for Belarusian dissidents. In effect, Belarus treats Russia as an extension of its security territory. In practice, this demonstrates how authoritarian regimes can treat allied states as extensions of their own security space.

Belarus also tries to leverage extradition treaties with farther-flung countries – often those in the developing world or with authoritarian-leaning governments. A dramatic recent case involved Vasily Veremeychik, a Belarusian opposition activist and former volunteer fighter with Ukraine’s forces, who was captured in Vietnam in November 2024. The Belarusian KGB managed to secure Veremeychik’s extradition from Vietnam to Minsk, where he now faces terrorism charges and potentially the death penalty^[37]. Vietnamese authorities, apparently acting on Minsk’s request, detained Veremeychik (w+ho had traveled there visa-free) and put him on a special flight back to Belarus. Belarusian state television triumphantly showed him being led off the plane in Minsk, and a KGB official proclaimed on camera that this case was a warning to all “extremists and terrorists” abroad – boasting that “Belarusian justice will catch up with them at any point on earth”^[38].

This chilling message encapsulates the regime’s extraterritorial mindset. It also underscores that no country is too distant if a willing partner can be found to hand over an exile. In Veremeychik’s situation, his inability to enter EU countries (due to a Lithuanian ban stemming from a technicality of his past military service) pushed him to a more vulnerable locale, illustrating how even unintended Western restrictions can expose dissidents to extradition by regimes like Lukashenko’s^[39].

In addition to existing bilateral extradition treaties with several countries in Africa and Asia, Belarusian authorities are actively pursuing new agreements to expand their reach. In May 2025, Justice Minister Yevgeny Kovalenko announced that Belarus is negotiating extradition treaties with a total of nine additional countries, primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America^[40].

In sum, Interpol Red Notices and extradition requests are being wielded by Belarus to harness other states’ police powers for its repressive ends. While democratic nations typically reject political extradition demands, there have been enough instances of compliance (or delayed resistance) to sow fear among the diaspora. The practice also burdens host states’ legal systems, which must carefully discern genuine criminals from persecuted activists. Notably, several CEE countries – including Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland – have responded to these challenges by consistently refusing politically motivated extradition requests from Minsk. These refusals send an important signal of solidarity and legal principle. Belarus’s persistent efforts in this arena demonstrate the regime’s adaptation of global legal instruments for undemocratic purposes, undermining the integrity of international policing cooperation and justice.

3.4 Trials in Absentia

In July 2022, Belarus amended its Сriminal Procedure Code to authorize trials in absentia (so-called “special proceedings”) against citizens living abroad^[41]. This measure enables courts to convict and sentence Belarussian citizens without their presence in Belarus, notification, or access to legal defense^[42]. Such measures illustrate what Glasius (2017) terms inclusion as subjects – treating exiles as if they remained under domestic jurisdiction – and correspond to Tsourapas’s (2021) category of legal repression, whereby regimes employ pseudo-legal tools to extend coercion beyond borders.

The legal framework of special proceedings in the national criminal procedural legislation of Belarus contains partial provisions that formally justify the possibility of convicting a person in absentia. In practice, even these formal guarantees are not upheld by Belarusian courts. Furthermore, these procedures are included without the necessary protections of the accused’s right to defense, presence at trial, participation in evidence collection, and subsequent appeal of the verdict.

Already in September 2022, the newly introduced instrument was first tested by the Investigative Committee in the “Black Book of Belarus” case (a civic initiative that documented and published personal data of security officers involved in repression) – the defendants were later sentenced in absentia to 12 years of imprisonment. Shortly afterwards, the same procedure was applied in the cases of several prominent exiled figures – including the leaders of the Belarusian Sport Solidarity Foundation (an organization supporting athletes who opposed the regime), Aliaksandra Herasimenia and Alexander Opeikin; the human rights defender Dzmitry Solovyov; as well as leading opposition politicians Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, Olga Kovalkova, and others^[43].

The application of special proceedings demonstrates a consistent pattern of targeting a specific social group – individuals opposing the current dictatorial regime of Belarus, participating in protest activity, engaging in journalism and human rights work, or providing assistance to persecuted Belarusians.

As of May 1, 2025, the above-described special proceedings had been applied to 147 persons to the best of the knowledge of the author.^[44] An analysis of open-source evidence, including media articles, leads to the unequivocal conclusion that special proceedings were applied to at least 53 individuals in relation to political charges, i.e., on the basis of politically motivated persecution. The Belarusian regime employs both explicitly “political” criminal charges (most commonly so-called “anti-extremist”), as well as charges related to economic activity, property crimes, crimes against public safety, and crimes against public administration. Judicial acts issued within the framework of special proceedings lack legal character and fail to meet the standard of fair trial, which contradicts the requirements of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the practice of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC).

In January 2025, UN human rights experts expressed deep concern over the growing use of trials in absentia in Belarus, which lack basic fair trial guarantees. Verdicts frequently include long prison terms, heavy fines, and property confiscation. Experts stressed that Belarus’s in absentia trial practices violate international human rights obligations and serve as tools of repression against exiled opposition figures^[45].

The significance of these absentia convictions is twofold. First, they serve propaganda purposes: the regime can claim its exiled opponents are not legitimate politicians but rather criminals convicted of serious offenses (often labeled as terrorism or treason). This helps justify repression to domestic audiences and seeks to discredit the opposition internationally. Second, and crucially, the convictions lay the groundwork for future extradition requests. If any of these exiled leaders were to travel to a country that cooperates with Belarus, Minsk would point to the outstanding prison sentence as grounds for extradition, arguing they are fugitives from justice.

The examined institution, as reflected in Belarusian law enforcement practices, exhibits features of organized and systematic persecution of the civilian population, rendering it subject to analysis within the framework of international criminal law. According to Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such actions fall under the category of crimes against humanity, as they constitute part of a state policy aimed at suppressing dissent through pseudo-legal procedures. Under subparagraph (h) of paragraph 1 of Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, “persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights of a group of people on political grounds as part of a widespread or systematic attack^[46].

Therefore, the current practice of applying special proceedings in Belarus possesses all the characteristics of a crime against humanity in the form of persecution, as defined under international criminal law, and requires proper legal assessment at the international level. This assessment aligns with the preliminary examination opened by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in response to Lithuania’s referral in September 2024, which specifically addresses allegations of crimes against humanity, including persecution, committed against the Belarusian civilian population^[47].

Thus, in absentia trials are by their nature antithetical to due process – the defendants have no opportunity to defend themselves. The Belarusian regime’s use of them violates basic fair trial standards, a point made by international human rights monitors. Verdicts delivered in absentia should not be mistaken for genuine judicial outcomes; they are extensions of the regime’s persecution by judicial means (often termed “lawfare”). The practice also inflicts psychological pressure: exiles know that heavy sentences are hanging over their heads if they ever fall into the regime’s grasp. These developments may also fall under the scope of international criminal law, raising concerns that such practices could amount to crimes against humanity.

3.5 Threats and Proxy Punishment: Fear as a Transnational Tool

Lastly, it is important to note the regime’s use of less formal intimidation methods that nonetheless have cross-border effect. Belarus employs a strategy of threatening and punishing the relatives or associates of exiles who remain in Belarus^[48], in order to torment those abroad – what Dana Moss calls “proxy punishment”.

For instance, Belarusian activists abroad frequently report that police or KGB agents harass their family members back home – conducting interrogations, issuing warnings, or even jailing a parent, sibling, or spouse on trumped-up charges – solely because of the exile’s activities abroad^[49]. This creates a painful dilemma for many: continue speaking out and put your loved ones at risk, or stay silent to protect them. Similarly, the regime targets businesses or property owned by exiles. In 2023, authorities began seizing property and assets of those who left, and banning the sale of such assets, explicitly as retribution against “fugitives.”^[50] Laws were amended to permit confiscation of property of people convicted of extremism (which includes most prominent exiles). This not only punishes the individual but also sends a message to others about the cost of opposition.

Belarusian security services have also engaged in cyber harassment and surveillance of the diaspora. Reports include hacking of exiles’ email and social media accounts, online threats, and attempts to track their activities abroad. In Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, exiled organizations have been targeted by phishing attacks likely linked to Belarusian or Russian intelligence^[51]. Even threatening messages from afar – such as anonymous emails or phone calls telling activists “we will get you” – are part of the repertoire^[52].

In summary, Belarus’s transnational repression manifests through a multi-faceted campaign: direct coercion (abductions, forced repatriations), legal warfare (Interpol, extradition, in absentia verdicts), administrative pressure (passport and citizenship controls), and intimidation (threats, family reprisals, surveillance) . While particularly pronounced in the Belarusian case, such practices mirror broader patterns of transnational repression by authoritarian states, often pursued in coordination with allies (notably Russia) and through exploitation of international systems.

4. Impact on Regional Security, Democratic Resilience, and Legal Integrity

The fallout of Belarus’s repressive export has been felt acutely in neighboring Central and Eastern European (CEE) states that host the largest Belarusian exile communities. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia – all democratic neighbors of Belarus – have received thousands of Belarusian opposition activists, journalists, professionals, and ordinary families fleeing persecution since 2020. These countries have consequently become important arenas of Lukashenko’s transnational repression, while also facing challenges common to host states of authoritarian diasporas.

This dynamic reflects what Adamson (2020)^[53] describes: diaspora politics should not be seen solely as spaces of freedom and democratization, but as arenas of contestation shaped by both host-country dynamics and long-distance authoritarianism. This perspective is particularly relevant for the Belarusian case: exile communities in CEE countries are simultaneously important actors in strengthening democratic resilience and direct targets of Minsk’s attempts to extend repression beyond its borders.

The situation has also tested and in many ways affirmed the democratic resilience of CEE countries. The influx of Belarusian exiles and the need to guard against Minsk’s interference have prompted these countries to strengthen their democratic institutions and solidarity networks. For instance, the presence of Belarusian independent media in exile has enriched the information space in host countries, often spurring local media to pay more attention to human rights issues. Civil society collaboration across borders has increased: Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian NGOs working with Belarusian human rights defenders to document abuses, or helping Belarusian refugees navigate asylum systems. This cross-border solidarity can be seen as a democratic resilience success. The Belarusian diaspora’s activism abroad – organizing protests, speaking to European parliaments, mounting creative resistance like hacktivism against Minsk – has kept the Belarus crisis on the international agenda. It also demonstrates that Lukashenko’s attempt to silence opponents can backfire by inspiring more coordinated global support for the cause of Belarusian freedom. This illustrates how repression at home can inadvertently catalyze stronger global networks of opposition, a dynamic also observed with other authoritarian diasporas such as those from Russia, Turkey, or China.

Host countries, for their part, have had to balance security screening of incoming Belarusians (to weed out possible infiltrators) with maintaining an open, hospitable environment for genuine refugees and activists.

However, tensions have existed. In Lithuania, some initial public unease arose in 2021–22 about the large number of Belarusian (and Russian) migrants arriving, amid growing security concerns related to the authoritarian crackdown in Belarus and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In response, the Lithuanian government responded with a law restricting the issuance of new visas to Belarusian citizens except on humanitarian grounds, and increased vetting for those with possible regime ties^[54]. In 2024 alone, Lithuanian authorities identified 598 Belarusian citizens as posing a potential threat to state security, resulting in visa denials, permit cancellations, and entry bans.^[55] While these measures aim to address legitimate security risks, they also raise concerns about overreach and the potential stigmatization of political exiles. The case of a Belarusian volunteer like Veremeychik, who was denied entry to Lithuania and later extradited from Vietnam, exemplifies how such policies can have unintended consequences.

Public debates have also occasionally intensified these tensions. In August 2025, for instance, around fifty people gathered outside Lithuania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to demand the closure of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office in Vilnius. The protest, led by MP Vytautas Sinica, followed the ministry’s refusal to consider revoking the office’s accreditation or withdrawing its support^[56]. While numerically small, such demonstrations highlight the politicization of Belarusian exile issues within Lithuania’s domestic discourse.

Elsewhere, Poland generally treats Belarusian asylum seekers as victims of political repression, though some have been denied protection or flagged as security risks – particularly individuals with past ties to state institutions or unclear backgrounds^[57]. While, neighboring Czech Republic has suspended visa issuance for Belarusian and Russian citizens due to the war in Ukraine since June 2022^[58]. Estonia has banned the issuance of visas to Belarusian citizens for short-term work, entrepreneurship (including startups), and remote work, as part of tightened security measures^[59]. Since September 1, 2025, Latvia has required citizens of countries outside the EU, NATO, and the OECD, primarily targeting Russians and Belarusians, to fill out a special form before each entry. Travelers must provide detailed information about the purpose, duration, and itinerary of their trip, as well as disclose past or current employment in government or security agencies and military service of themselves or their close relatives. Noncompliance can lead to fines of up to €2,000^[60].

In sum, Belarus’s repressive reach has become a serious challenge for neighboring democracies. Yet these dynamics are not entirely unique: they mirror broader patterns of authoritarian states projecting repression abroad. What makes the Belarusian case particularly relevant is its regional concentration in CEE, where proximity, historic ties, and the geopolitical environment intensify dynamics that are also visible in other cases of transnational repression.

5. Conclusion

The Belarusian case demonstrates how repressive strategies can transcend national boundaries and affect not only the lives of dissidents living in exile but also the political, legal, and security environments of neighboring democracies. In order to silence critics abroad and discourage dissent at home, the Lukashenko regime has developed a sophisticated apparatus of transnational repression through a wide range of tactics.

These practices can be grouped into several overlapping categories. First, there are direct coercive measures, including abductions, renditions, and threats of physical violence, as seen in the Ryanair hijacking and the attempted kidnappings abroad. Second, the regime employs legal and quasi-legal instruments, such as politically motivated extradition requests, Interpol abuse, and trials in absentia, which provide a veneer of judicial legitimacy to repression. Third, Belarus relies on administrative and bureaucratic tools, notably the non-renewal of passports, revocation of citizenship, and property confiscation, which coerce exiles through restrictions on mobility and legal status. Finally, there are intimidatory and symbolic strategies, including harassment of relatives at home, surveillance and cyberattacks on diaspora groups, and the stigmatization of opponents as “extremists” or “terrorists.” Together, these methods reveal the regime’s capacity to combine hard and soft forms of coercion to extend its reach across borders.

For host countries in Central and Eastern Europe, these dynamics have produced a dual outcome. On the one hand, they have fostered democratic resilience by encouraging solidarity networks, cross-border civil society cooperation, and principled refusals of politically motivated extradition requests. On the other hand, they have also prompted stricter migration controls and intensified security screening, reflecting the dilemmas democracies face when trying to balance protection of exiles with safeguarding national security.

At the international level, Belarus illustrates how regimes adapt and exploit legal and institutional mechanisms abroad, thereby challenging the integrity of international cooperation. Far from being an isolated anomaly, Belarus exemplifies a wider global trend of transnational repression. Understanding these dynamics is therefore essential for analyzing not only Belarus itself but also the broader ways in which contemporary authoritarian rule increasingly operates across borders.

Endnotes

1. Dzmitry Hlotau is a law graduate at the European Humanities University and a third-year student in the joint Bachelor’s programme in World Politics and Economy at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania, and the European Humanities University in Vilnius, Lithuania. He specializes in international law and political science with a particular focus on transnational repression, migration policy, and human rights. Alongside his studies, he works as a Specialist in International Advocacy at the Legal Initiative, a Belarusian human rights NGO in exile, where he contributes to research and advocacy efforts aimed at protecting politically persecuted Belarusians abroad and strengthening international accountability mechanisms. ↑
2. Moss, Dana M. 2022. The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism Against Authoritarian Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ↑
3. Dukalskis, Alexander. “Nothing to See Here: Transnational Repression and Authoritarian Image Management” Power 3.0: Understanding Modern Authoritarian Influence, June 9, 2021, https://www.power3point0.org/2021/06/09/nothing-to-see-here-transnational-repression-and-authoritarian-image-management/. ↑
4. Glasius, Marlies. 2017. “Extraterritorial Authoritarian Practices: A Framework.” Globalizations 15 (2): 179–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1403781. ↑
5. Tsourapas, Gerasimos. 2021. “Global Autocracies: Strategies of Transnational Repression, Legitimation, and Co-Optation in World Politics.” International Studies Review 23 (3): 616–644. ↑
6. Schenkkan, Nate and Linzer, Isabel. “Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression”, Freedom House, February 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/Complete_FH_TransnationalRepressionReport2021_rev020221.pdf. ↑
7. Lemon, Edward. “Weaponizing Interpol,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 15–29. ↑
8. United Nations Security Council, “Belarus Improperly Diverted Passenger Flight, Endangered Lives, International Civil Aviation Organization Senior Official Tells Security Council,” press release SC/15088, October 31, 2022, United Nations, https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15088.doc.htm ↑
9. Council of the European Union. “European Council Conclusions on Belarus, 24 May 2021.” Press release, 24 May 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/05/24/european-council-conclusions-on-belarus-24-may-2021/ ↑
10. Dukalskis, Alexander. “Nothing to See Here: Transnational Repression and Authoritarian Image Management” Power 3.0: Understanding Modern Authoritarian Influence, June 9, 2021, https://www.power3point0.org/2021/06/09/nothing-to-see-here-transnational-repression-and-authoritarian-image-management/. ↑
11. The Moscow Times. “American Lawyer Detained in Russia Alongside Veteran Belarus Opposition Leader – Reports.” July 7, 2021. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/07/07/american-lawyer-detained-in-russia-alongside-veteran-belarus-opposition-leader-reports-a74447.. ↑
12. ABC News. “Wife Fears for American Snatched from Moscow and Taken to Belarus.” ABC News, April 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/International/wife-fears-american-snatched‑moscow‑belarus/story?id=78807539. ↑
13. Hansler, Jennifer. “American Detained in Belarus Is Freed.” CNN, April 30, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/04/30/politics/american-detained-belarus-freed/index.html. ↑
14. Stockholm Center for Freedom. Turkey’s Transnational Repression: 2024 in Review. February 5, 2025. https://stockholmcf.org/turkeys-transnational-repression-2024-in-review/. ↑
15. LRT. “VSD: Rusijos ir Baltarusijos žvalgyba organizuoja išpuolius prieš baltarusius Lietuvoje.” LRT.lt, April 23, 2025. https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/2543828/vsd-rusijos-ir-baltarusijos-zvalgyba-organizuoja-ispuolius-pries-baltarusius-lietuvoje. ↑
16. LRT. “Tsichanouskaya: Attacks against Belarusians in Lithuania Show Lukashenko’s Fear.”, April 28,  2025. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2547956/tsichanouskaya-attacks-against-belarusians-in-lithuania-show-lukashenko-s-fear. ↑
17. Charlish, Alan. 2024. “Poland Investigating Crime against Belarusian Opposition Figure.” Reuters, July 19, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-investigating-crime-against-belarusian-opposition-figure-2024-07-19/. ↑
18. Slipowitz, Amy, Jessica White, and Yana Gorokhovskaia. 2024. No Way In or Out: Authoritarian Controls on the Freedom of Movement. Special Report, August 2024. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/2024/no-way-or-out-authoritarian-controls-freedom-movement. ↑
19. President of the Republic of Belarus. 2023. Decree No. 278 of September 4, 2023: On the Procedure for Issuing Documents and Performing Actions in Foreign Institutions of the Republic of Belarus. Published September 4, 2023. https://president.gov.by/ru/documents/ukaz-no-278-ot-4-sentyabrya-2023-g ↑
20. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe news release. “Belarusians in Exile: An Overlooked Issue Addressed by the Parliamentary Assembly”, January 25, 2023, https://pace.coe.int/en/news/8955/belarusians-in-exile-an-overlooked-issue-addressed-by-the-parliamentary-assembly. ↑
21. Human Rights Watch. “Belarus: Decree Puts Exiled Citizens at Risk.” Human Rights Watch, September 8, 2023. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/09/08/belarus-decree-puts-exiled-citizens-risk. ↑
22. Zerkalo. “Belarusians Returning to the Country for a New Passport Have Begun to Be Detained: Details from BYSOL.” September 27, 2023. https://news.zerkalo.io/life/49951.html. ↑
23. Library of Congress. “Belarus: New Laws for Stripping Nationals of Citizenship and Property Adopted”, Global Legal Monitor, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-02-12/belarus-new-laws-for-stripping-nationals-of-citizenship-and-property-adopted/. ↑
24. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Situation of Human Rights in Belarus in the Run-up to the 2020 Presidential Election and in Its Aftermath. A/HRC/55/61. Geneva: United Nations ↑
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26. PCS Legal. “Newly Available for Belarusians: A Polish Travel Document as an Alternative to Belarusian Passport.” PCS Legal, March 4, 2024. https://pcslegal.pl/en/gmi-legal-update-newly-available-for-belarusians-a-polish-travel-document-as-an-alternative-to-belarusian-passport/. ↑
27. Lemon, Edward. “Weaponizing Interpol,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (April 2019): 15–29. ↑
28. BelTA. “Belarusian Prosecution Initiates International Search for Pavel Latushko.” 18 January 2021. https://eng.belta.by/society/view/belarusian-prosecution-initiates-international-search-for-pavel-latushko-136660-2021/. ↑
29. Motolko.Help. “Tsikhanouskaya and BYPOL sent a letter to Interpol.” October 28, 2021. https://motolko.help/en-news/tsikhanouskaya-and-bypol-sent-a-letter-to-interpol/. ↑
30. BBC News Russian. “Interpol Refuses to Issue Red Notice for Belarusian Opposition Leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.” BBC, November 5, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-59165793. ↑
31. Associated Press. “Lithuania Refuses to Extradite Belarus Opposition Figure.” Spectrum News, March 5, 2021. https://spectrumlocalnews.com/ap-top-news/2021/03/05/lithuania-refuses-to-extradite-belarus-opposition-figure. ↑
32. The Baltic Times. “Belarus’ Demand to Extradite Opposition Politician Tsepkalo Has to Be Denied – Foreign Minister.” February 9, 2021. https://www.baltictimes.com/belarus__demand_to_extradite_opposition_politician_tsepkalo_has_to_be_denied_-_foreign_minister/. ↑
33. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya Official Website. “Polish Court Denied Lukashenka Regime’s Request to Extradite Belarusian Activist Dmitry Pleskachev.” tsikhanouskaya.org, November 29, 2024. https://tsikhanouskaya.org/en/news/polish-court-denied-lukashenka-regimes-request-to-extradite-belarusian-activist-dmitry-pleskachev.html. ↑
34. ARTICLE 19. “Serbia: Court Must Free Belarusian Journalist and Prevent His Deportation.” News release, May 6 2024. https://www.article19.org/resources/serbia-court-must-free-belarusian-journalist-and-prevent-his-deportation/ ↑
35. Sota Project. “Andrei Gnet: Before and After Political Arrest in Serbia”, 12 December 2024, https://sotaproject.com/story/andrei-gnet-do-i-posle-politicheskogo-aresta-v-serbii. ↑
36. Legal Initiative. “Safe Travel Map: Risks of Extradition for Belarusians.” https://safetravel.legin.info/#RU. ↑
37. Reuters. “Belarus Opposition Fears Former Ukraine Volunteer Extradited by Vietnam.” November 21, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/belarus-opposition-fears-former-ukraine-volunteer-extradited-by-vietnam-2024-11-21/. ↑
38. Karatch, Olga. “Belarus: Banned by Lithuania and Extradited by Vietnam – V. Veremeychik May Face Execution.” Human Rights Without Frontiers. November 26, 2024. https://hrwf.eu/belarus-banned-by-lithuania-and-extradited-by-vietnam-v-veremeychik-may-face-execution/. ↑
39. Novaya Gazeta Europe. “Belarusians in Vilnius Held a Rally in Honor of Volunteer Vasil Veremeychik, Extradited from Vietnam to Belarus.” November 22, 2024. https://novayagazeta.ee/articles/2024/11/22/belarusy-v-vilniuse-vyshli-na-aktsiiu-v-chest-dobrovoltsa-vasiliia-veremeichika-ekstradirovannogo-v-belarus-iz-vetnama-news. ↑
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44. Data collected by the Belarusian human rights organization Legal Initiative. Further details may be provided upon request. See: https://legin.info/. ↑
45. United Nations News. “Belarus: UN Experts Alarmed by Widespread Use of Trials in Absentia.” UN News, January 22, 2025. https://news.un.org/ru/story/2025/01/1460591. ↑
46. International Criminal Court. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf. ↑
47. International Criminal Court. Preliminary Examination: Republic of Lithuania/Republic of Belarus (ICC-01/24). https://www.icc-cpi.int/lithuania-belarus. ↑
48. Kozenko, Andrei, and Maria Evstafieva. “How the Belarusian Authorities Persecute Not Only Opponents, but Also Their Relatives: Three Stories.” BBC Russian, May 10, 2023. https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-65404427. ↑
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50. JURIST Staff. “Belarus Dispatch: Property Confiscation Has Become Another Tool of Political Repression.” JURIST, February 21, 2024. https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/02/belarus-dispatch-property-confiscation-has-become-another-tool-of-political-repression/. ↑
51. Menn, Joseph. “Russia and Belarus Conducted Widespread Phishing Campaigns in Ukraine, Google Says.” The Washington Post, March 7, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/03/07/russia-belarus-conducted-widespread-phishing-campaigns-ukraine-google-says/. ↑
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