The Integration of Montenegro in the European Union amidst Russian and Serbian Influence

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the think tank, its staff, or its affiliates. The organization assumes no responsibility for any interpretations or conclusions drawn by the author.

Written by: Pavol Potocar, Lancaster University.

Abstract

This article finds that Serbian and Russian influence are significant in disrupting Montenegrin europeanization. Both countries and their governments demonstrate significant power in influencing Montenegrin policymaking collaboratively through religious, media and economic channels. Montenegro’s absorption of europeanization as of 2025 seems very strong, as progress in closing accession negotiation chapters has been substantial^[1] and opinion of the EU amongst Montenegrins remains high^[2]. However, both Serbia and Russia have demonstrated a strong ability to change this if they desire doing so, as they both have strong footholds within the country through the aforementioned channels. While Montenegro’s domestic political situation and enlargement fatigue are valid outside factors to explore regarding the slowing down or curbing of europeanization, these cannot be adequately explored without discussing Serbian and Russian footholds within the country, especially within its parliamentary political landscape. Montenegro’s journey in achieving EU membership is uncertain and insecure while Serbian and Russian influence remains heavily entrenched and powerful.

1. Introduction

Montenegro became an independent and sovereign nation in 2006. Accession agreements started in 2007, and by 2008, the country applied for EU membership and began its pre accession period to reach candidate status^[3]. In 2010, the country would achieve candidate status and by 2012, would reach the accession negotiations stage that it has been at since^[4]. All 33 chapters have been opened, none blocked so far, and the country as of December 2025 has provisionally closed 12 chapters^[5]. With Montenegro’s current pro-EU government and recently swift progress through the accession negotiation chapters^[6], its declared goal of reaching membership by 2028 does not seem implausible^[7]. In order to reach this goal, all 33 chapters need to be opened and provisionally closed. With membership, both the EU and Montenegro stand to greatly benefit, in particular as Montenegro is one of two non-Eurozone countries in Europe to use the Euro^[8].

However, there are destabilising factors that stand in Montenegro’s way to reaching membership. While europeanization is underway in Montenegro, foreign interference from Serbia and Russia is hurting this. This article seeks to explore how Serbia and Russia engage in this effort and how they affect Montenegro’s journey to accession in relation to europeanization. Montenegrin europeanization will first be established through the measure of absorption from horizontal and vertical angles. This is followed by exploring Serbia and Russia’s efforts to derail europeanization through religious, media, and economic channels, with analysis on how this will specifically affect Montenegro’s europeanization. Finally, this

article will be balanced by exploring other factors such as domestic corruption and enlargement fatigue to demonstrate that Serbian and Russian influence are not the only factors affecting Montenegrin europeanization.

2. Methodology

This article will be a case study that follows a mixed methods approach, specifically through an argumentative approach. This article has a heavy slant towards utilising qualitative research. Due to this, alongside following an argumentative approach, it is crucial that quantitative evidence is used to strengthen the claims made and problems addressed^[9]. In addition to this, a mixed methods and argumentative approach will be effective at minimising any potential bias from the research gathered and utilised in this article^[10].

The bounds of this research are also important to establish. 2016-2025 has been chosen as it allows for the proper examination of events that have occurred to Montenegro after it gained its candidate status^[11]. A larger timeline has not been selected as it would move away from Montenegro’s accession journey that this article wants to explore, and a more succinct timeline was not chosen as to not lose any potentially important contextual information.

The unit of this research will be the Republic of Montenegro. More specifically, this article will view Montenegro through the lens of its government and as a candidate country to EU accession. Montenegro is specifically selected over other EU candidate countries for 2 reasons. Firstly, Montenegro is one of the most favoured countries to next receive EU membership^[12]. Secondly, unlike other favoured candidates, Russia and Serbia have taken covert and overt measures against Montenegro’s path to Western integration^[13]. It is important to note that Russia and Serbia will be examined interchangeably as both separate and unified actors. This is because both demonstrate overwhelming symbiosis and collaboration in their operations to influence Montenegrin politics^[14]: For instance, according to Montenegro’s special prosecutor, a coup d’état in Podgorica was allegedly planned and prepared for October 2016 by Russian intelligence agents over the country’s NATO accession – the Russian Government has denied any involvement^[15]. Alongside politics, a deeply entrenched Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) that has direct links to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is able to exert notable influence^[16]. Thus, it is important to explore to what extent the two countries continue to position themselves against Montenegrin Western integration, especially in its path towards EU integration. While the above is the main focus of this article, other factors such as enlargement fatigue and domestic political willingness to join the EU will also be explored.

Therefore, this article will follow an anti-foundationalist ontology with a pragmatist epistemology. This will be operationalised by examining the actions of institutions, These include: foreign states such as Russia and Serbia and their respective governments as of 2025; the SOC and ROC; the European Union’s institutions and its attitudes and progress towards Montenegrin EU accession; and the Montenegrin government. What will be the main aspect of examination is how the actions of entities hostile towards Montenegro’s journey to accession, such as the SOC, slow down or even hinder Montenegro in doing so. This will then however be challenged by separately exploring how the EU and the Montenegrin government contribute to this instead, and then concluding to what extent the three institutions are responsible for Montenegro’s slow progress towards accession.

Pragmatism as an approach has some limitations. One limitation relevant to this article is that utilising a pragmatist approach means that theory such as europeanization may

become irrelevant to Montenegro in future replicability of this research due to foresight. While pragmatism brushes with other research approaches such as constructivism^[17], it should be noted that this article does not seek to have the final and definitive say on analysis between Montenegro’s relationship with EU accession and outside actors both hostile and friendly to the country’s journey to membership. Instead, it should act as part of a larger picture that seeks to comprehensively analyse EU candidate countries’ accession processes. It should also act to explore actors the EU should be cautious of that possess hostility to its enlargement policy.

Related to the first limitation, the other is that future quantitative data regarding events and policies discussed in this article may also lead to this article becoming incapable in reifying them. In order for this to be alleviated, this article utilises more qualitative data. Future quantitative data should only serve to create new meaning or angles from which the qualitative research can be interpreted by future researchers or readers^[18].

Case studies also suffer from potential limitations, particularly around the scope and time. Creswell & Plano Clark^[19] state that case studies need to be properly represented. Research for this particular aspect of Montenegro has been conducted on and off from December 2024 – December 2025. Especially considering that much of the research on Montenegro comes from English, a language non-native to the country of examination, there are certainly some blind-spots or parts of the research that may be missing that could have further complimented this article due to language barriers. This has been alleviated through cross-examination of various sources in order to gain consistent and accurate insight into what is happening.

3. Literature Review

The definition of europeanization as a concept is contested. Buller & Gamble^[20] explore the concept in their work through the critique of early europeanization definitions by Gerring. Gerring^[21] finds that early definitions were too synonymous with already pre-existing terms such as political unification or policy transfer, where such definitions would refer to a European version of policy influence or policy exporting. Later definitions refer to Europeanization as joining the European Union (EU), which integrates a country into the European political community. However, Buller & Gamble^[22] disagree with such a definition as joining the EU is not the only way to integrate into the European political community. Rather it is one way for a country to unify into the European political community instead. Therefore, Buller & Gamble^[23] present two ways of viewing europeanization: where domestic politics becomes increasingly subjected to European policy-making; and where domestic actors acquiesce to European integration as a way of either implementing domestic changes, or legitimising the status quo at home through policy manoeuvering.

Not only can europeanization be witnessed on a policy level, Radaelli^[24] also mentions how europeanization affects cognitive and normative decisions by transforming the interests and preferences upon which negotiations are structured around. Such a thing can then lead to a few possible outcomes. Relevant to Montenegro is absorption, the outcome of where a country’s domestic institutions retain its core while adapting to EU policies^[25]. It is therefore witnessed that a country accommodates the policy requirements without real modification of

the essential structures and changes in the logic of an agent’s political behaviour. This has to be measured, and there are a few ways of doing so. Relevant to this case study are 2 measures: interaction and discourse. Interaction pertains to the relations between the core executives and their international relations with outside actors; discourse is how the EU is engaged with at the elite and mass public level^[26].

Radaelli^[27] also introduces the concepts of vertical and horizontal europeanization. Vertical europeanization pertains to the EU and domestic level, where policy is metabolised. Meanwhile, horizontal europeanization regards the social and market changes that europeanization affects. Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw^[28] explain the concepts of vertical and horizontal europeanization at the media level. Vertical europeanization is the dimension that focuses on Brussels, the EU more broadly and arguably its institutions. Horizontal europeanization focuses on what happens in EU member states, and things that happen specifically in those member states in relation to the EU^[29]. This article will utilise Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw’s definitions but operationalise it through Radaelli’s definitions. This means that horizontal europeanization is what the state under examination, regardless of whether it is in the EU or not, is doing domestically to fulfil or uphold the requirements of the acquis communautaire. Vertical europeanization regards how the EU is interacting with the state under examination.

4. Montenegrin Europeanization

Horizontal europeanization through the angle of absorption is evident. Discourse on a horizontal level is seen through the Montenegrin public’s consistent desire to join the EU. In a 2023 public opinion poll, nearly 80% of Montenegrin citizens supported their country joining the EU^[30]. Almost half of respondents from a similar poll done two years prior, with similar levels of support, said that the main benefits of joining the EU to them would be a better quality of life, better employment opportunities, more travel opportunities and more safety and security^[31]. Through the angle of interaction, domestic actors have also shown a strong desire to engage with the EU in a manner that seeks to gain membership. The current ruling party is the populist and pro-EU Europe Now! (EN). This is a party that seeks to get Montenegro into the EU by 2028 as one of its main pledges^[32].

However, while absorption via discourse is nearly unanimous amongst Montenegrin citizens, the same cannot be said for interaction via discourse. Whilst the current government of EN shows a strong leaning to join the EU, it does however come with a big caveat. Modern Montenegrin electoral politics is impossible to engage with without coalition building. While EN won seats in parliament in 2023, so did at least 15 other parties^[33]. This led to EN, who won their election, forming a coalition with 5 other parties, some of which are pro-Serbian. This is important to note because pro-Serbian parties, such as those from the ‘For the Future of Montenegro’ bloc, have been staunchly anti-Western^[34]. What this demonstrates overall, is that while horizontally, there is a strong horizontal absorption that demonstrates Montenegro’s desire and willingness to fulfil the acquis and gain membership, politically, this is fragile and can be upended by parties in government who may politically desire to hamper this process.

Vertical europeanization from the angle of absorption however is more contestable. Interaction has been very strong between EU and Montenegrin actors. As of December 2025, 12 of the 33 provisional chapters have been opened and none have been blocked so far^[35]. Such progress has been steady since EN was elected^[36]. It also demonstrates that the EU is working with Montenegro to garner its membership. More broadly however, Montenegrin accession would be a massive success for the EU dispatching enlargement as its most effective and powerful tool that it has at its disposal^[37]. Cafiero^[38] outlines that Montenegro’s accession has the possibility of starting a domino effect that would bring the Western Balkans closer to the EU, which would be an incredible success of enlargement foreign policy power. It also has the potential in stabilising a region by incentivising other Balkan candidate countries to enact further reforms that would make their countries more transparent and democratic^[39].

Europeanization via discourse regarding Montenegro within the EU seems limited unfortunately. With the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, it initially appeared to open hope of accelerating accession for the western Balkans³⁹ as Bosnia received candidate status in 2022 and Kosovo applied for membership^[40]. However, the accession process has returned to the same pace as previously and Montenegrin accession looks even less likely than it did prior to 2022. Two reasons for this are believed to be enlargement fatigue, as Macron proposed a ‘European Political Community’, to which some experts interpret as an indication of enlargement fatigue^[41]. This is because focus is currently on the Russo-Ukrainian war, with the EU choosing to have closer commercial and political ties with Montenegro than mutually work towards accession^[42]. This is evident through the 2024 Interim Benchmark Assessment Report that was favourable towards Montenegro and its significant progress in governance and legislative reform, yet, Montenegrin analysts feel that this was more so the EU trying to demonstrate momentum in the enlargement process rather than actual achievements by Montenegro in its journey towards membership^[43].

5. Russia, Serbia, and the Orthodox Church

Russia and Serbia work collaboratively in many ways to keep a foothold within Montenegro to try to influence its social and political landscape. This includes religious, media and economic influence. It is impossible to discuss foreign influence within Montenegro without introducing the orthodox church, as it is arguably the most overt and powerful form of outside influence within Montenegro. The SOC possesses an influential grasp on Montenegro. In 2020, 62.3% of Montenegrins said they have a high or mostly high confidence in the church, the highest out of any institution^[44]. This is problematic for the reason that the SOC is strongly influenced by the current Russian government of Vladimir Putin. There are two indicators that the SOC is influenced and supported by the Russian government.

The first indication of influence is through its political actions. It is frequently involved in anti-NATO, anti-Western rallies and protests and a huge promoter of Russian originating political and social issues^[45]. Prior to Montenegro joining NATO in 2017, it was known to be the biggest opponent for the country joining the organisation^[46]. The SOC has played a role in the country’s politics since the Yugoslav wars^[47]. Montenegro’s involvement in that conflict polarised the Montenegrin people’s opinions at the time regarding, not only support for the country’s involvement in the conflict at that time, but also support and loyalty to remain tethered to Belgrade. The SOC has since acted as a significant actor in retaining pro-Serbian attitudes amongst the people of Montenegro^[48]. Today, prominent and high ranking bishop, Metodije, for example, employs tactics that consolidate a Serbian conservative agenda within Montenegro that cast doubt on its national identity^[49]. This creates anxieties for minority groups within the country, particularly for the non-orthodox christian Albanians^[50]. The SOC is also known to be sponsored by the ROC, of which itself has ties to the Russian government^[51]. Metodije himself is known to endorse pro-Kremlin events and narratives^[52]. He is known to sponsor a network of pro-Russian Serb nationalist, radical clerical orthodox organisations. Furthermore, he also promotes a militaristic culture that resembles the ROC through a coordination of Orthodox youth fraternities. Finally, he spreads scepticism himself regarding the validity of an independent Montenegrin and that Russia is a defender of Orthodox values^[53]. The ROC also has a physical foothold in Montenegro. 3 ROC churches have been built in the country, and ever since, an anti-NATO movement was established^[54]. The ROC is weaponised by the Russian government by posturing as the one true defender of the orthodox world and, in doing so, attempting to tie the slavic world together^[55]. Therefore, both the ROC and SOC have been key sponsors in supporting political movements that are overtly pro-Russia^[56], as seen with Bishop Metodije.

The other indicator is through direct support. Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, for example, accused the United States of intending to bring a schism into the Orthodox world to destroy the integrity of the spiritual space in the Balkans and divide the Montenegrin people^[57]. In 2019, when a law on freedom of religion was passed by Montenegro, the harshest reactions came not only from the SOC, but additionally from the

ROC. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, reacted by expressing his support for the SOC in Montenegro^[58]. It is therefore not surprising when a report by the European Parliament finds that the SOC causes: “tensions between ethnic groups in the Western Balkans to inflame conflicts and divide communities”^[59]. As aforementioned, Montenegro’s nationhood is also questioned by the SOC. This is exacerbated by government figures close to the SOC that also weaponise such tactics. This is operationalised through viewing Montenegrin national identity as a sub-ethnicity of the Greater Serbian Nation, also known as the Srpski Svet agenda which has existed since the government of Slobodan Milošević and attempts to unite Serbian speaking peoples under the Serbian state^[60]. Prominent examples of actors who have collaborated and held strongly pro-Serbian views include Milan Knezevic and Andrija Mandic. Both figures have been opposition leaders within Montenegro, and in 2016, were found to be travelling to Moscow to receive instructions from their Russian financiers and mentors in regards to the suspension of sanctions against Russia^[61]. There is anxiety, particularly amongst NATO members, that with politicians such as Mandic in power, who is currently the president of the Montenegrin Parliament, it puts sensitive and classified information at risk of being tampered with^[62].

Media influence is one way of the main channels through which these countries do so. IN4S is a Russian propaganda Serbian language newspaper in Montenegro^[63]. It is responsible for spreading rhetoric that questions Montenegrin independence and a separate identity from Serbia. This has been exemplified in their vocal opposition to NATO accession and propagating the view that Montenegro is a second Serbian state^[64]. Even within academia, prominent figures such as Dr. Aleksander Rakovic propagate narratives that question whether

Montenegrin national identity is separate to Serb identity. He has done this explicitly in public and academic media, promoting the idea that Montenegrin identity is a product of Western influence^[65]. On top of this, much of the national media scene in Montenegro is owned by the Serbian state owned company Telekom^[66]. President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić personally also owns the Radio Jadran and A1 TV Channel, influential upon the media scene within Montenegro. Much of the media scene within Montenegro is pro-Serbian and anti-Montenegrin in nature. For example, Serbian tabloids are considered the most illiberal within the Balkans^[67]. This is because they habitually spread government propaganda. During the 2020 elections, negative articles were commonplace about Montenegro, used to raise tensions and support SOC demands. Serbian owned networks tend to celebrate pro-Serbian groups and war songs, display Serbian flags, and call for genocide against Albanians and Bosniaks, alongside attacks on mosques^[68].

Finally, financial control is considerable by Russians in particular within Montenegro. In 2016, 30% of Montenegro’s GDP was due to Russian FDI, and 13% of inward FDI, with Russia being one the largest investors of the country in that year^[69]. This has since decreased but investments are still concentrated in certain sectors, such as real estate, with a 2019 estimate finding that 70,000 properties in Montenegro belonged to Russian owners. One way that Russia has exercised its economic hold on the country is by hurting Montenegro’s tourism sector. 20% of Montenegro’s GDP in 2019 was accumulated through tourism^[70]. Due to Montenegro joining NATO in 2017, Russia has since launched an offensive media campaign to discourage Russians from visiting the country. As Russians are one of the largest holidaymaking groups in Montenegro, numbers have since plummeted, hurting Montenegro’s GDP^[71]. In 2023, over 10,000 companies were registered to Russian owners.

This was a number that more than doubled after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war^[72]. Other more historical, but notable, examples include the bankruptcy of the Aluminium Plant Montenegro (KAP) in 2013^[73]. Around 2010, KAP was worth 14% of Montenegro’s GDP and produced more than 50% of its exports. By 2013, the company went bankrupt due to mismanagement^[74]. Not only does Russia own a significant number of Montenegrin assets that it meddles with to the country’s detriment, financial support has also been provided to pro-Russian Serbian nationalists, as seen with the example of Mandic^[75].

Regarding how it affects absorption, direct political actions and support by the SOC and ROC show strong potential to veer discourse away from pro-EU attitudes, especially with overtly pro-Serbian and pro-Russian politicians in power during the current coalition. If discourse changes domestically, interaction has the strong possibility of also being affected, leading to a strain in dialogue between Montenegrin and EU actors. Europeanization and Montenegro’s accession process is therefore at risk of freezing. While support for the EU is very high amongst the electorate, continued religious influence could lead to apathy in joining the EU. It is uncertain if this would happen or how attitudes to accession amongst voters could change as in the early 2020s, this has remained resiliently high. One possibility is that it could further isolate any chances for ethnic Serbians to vote for pro-EU parties over pro-Serbian ones, making it harder for explicitly pro-EU and pro-Western parties to get into power, hurting absorption in the long-term and slowing EU accession.

This is likely to occur as ethnic Serbs identify closest with their slavic heritage^[76]. With EN creating a coalition with pro-Serbian parties, it marks the end of the 30+ year dominance of Milo Đukanović’s pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). This could mean that the next election could see a pro-Serbian party with strong SOC ties taking power and truly halting the EU accession process. This is especially possible with EN losing popularity amongst Montenegrins, alongside a new attempt by Moscow to halt further Balkan expansion into Euro-Atlantic structures, something it deems a threat^[77]. After the alleged coup attempt by Russian GRU agents in Montenegro in 2016, anything is possible regarding its accession to NATO^[78]. Candidate EU countries, in particular those facing issues such as corruption, democratic deficits and ethnic tensions are ideal prey for Russia^[79].

Media and economic influence is also substantial. Media channels to influence Montenegrin opinion on Euro-Atlantic structures are very similar to religious channels. While more so explicitly pro-Serbian than pro-Russian in nature, both demonstrate a tendency to question the validity of an independent Montenegrin identity. Further contributions to this line of thought threatens europeanization discourse within the absorption line of europeanization. This is because it would further and intensify ethnic divisions among ethnic groups within the country and strain its social fabric, moving discourse away from europeanization and in negating the rising ethnic tensions the country faces^[80]. Cafiero^[81] discusses in their work the influence of China upon Montenegro. 25% of Montenegro’s debt is owed to China, which gives Beijing influence over the country. Similarly, with a substantial number of properties being owned by Russians, Moscow arguably has equal or even greater influence. Through Russian Foreign Direct Investment, capital could flow out of the country, and debt accumulation, as seen with KAP, could grow uncontrollably^[82]. As religious influence can sway Montenegrin policymaking, as outlined by Gardasevic^[83], Russia could use its economic sway to hurt Montenegrin europeanization if its religious channels do not succeed in doing so first. This would be completed through financial sway to hurt discourse and integration simultaneously and equally through financial political influence such as blackmail, discouraging pro-EU politicians.

6. Enlargement fatigue & domestic politics

While there is a strong case to be made that Serbian and Russian influences compromise Montenegro absorption of europeanization, there are also other valid factors to consider. When it comes to interaction, in the 2020s, this process has felt very one sided to Montenegrins. This references enlargement fatigue which is concerned over the impact of enlargement having on the EU’s ability to implement common policies, and on effective and accountable decision making^[84]. Vuk Vuksanovic and Dusica Tomovic, senior researcher and managing editor respectively, state that with the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, there is increasing hope of accelerating accession for the western Balkans^[85] as Bosnia received candidate status in 2022 and Kosovo applied for membership^[86]. However, the accession process has returned to the same pace as previously and Montenegrin accession looks even less likely than it did prior to 2022.

One of the main reasons for this issue is enlargement fatigue. For instance, Tomovic commented Macron’s proposed “European Political Community” as being “just another carrot for Western Balkan countries to keep us close but not in” the EU^[87], meaning that interest to enlarge is low. Furthermore, since focus is currently on the Russo-Ukrainian war, the EU is choosing to have closer commercial and political ties with Montenegro than mutually work towards accession^[88]. This is evident through the 2024 Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) that was favourable towards Montenegro and its significant progress in governance and legislative reform, yet, Montenegrin analysts feel that this was more so the EU trying to demonstrate momentum in the enlargement process rather than actual achievements by Montenegro in its journey towards membership^[89].

This is important to note because enlargement fatigue harms europeanization for member states. If interaction between EU actors and Montenegrin actors is limited due to a non-reciprocal relationship where EU actors lack interest in enlargement, then the interaction element of absorption does not occur, leading to reduced europeanization and a candidate country that may lose interest in fulfilling the requirements for membership. For a country like Montenegro, this is especially pertinent. With a country that is heavily influenced by actors like Serbia and Russia, this puts its ascendency into the EU in particular peril as it has very real potential from being steered away once demoralised in its efforts to achieve membership. Therefore, while factors like enlargement fatigue are valid in affecting europeanization, due to how extensive Serbian and Russian influence are, enlargement fatigue has the potential to act as more of a catalyst rather than direct contributor to affecting Montenegro’s europeanization.

When it comes to discourse, this has the potential to be affected by Montenegro’s own political landscape. With the electoral victory of the League of Communists, later evolving into DPS in 1990, authoritarian traditions were passed on, marking the creation of a hybrid regime in Montenegro that has set the country’s political status quo^[90]. As the country shifted towards a democracy, DPS continued autocratic aspects from the communist period and regularly won elections for the next 30 years. With their incumbency, autocratic practices were commonplace, materialised through a lack of media freedom, corruption at all levels of government, a strong clientelistic network, and a party disinterested in democratisation and strengthening the rule of law^[91]. Vujović & Nenezić^[92] describe corruption in Montenegro under

DPS as deeply rooted and ingrained, creating widespread social dissatisfaction exploited by internal and external forces. It persists simply because Montenegro does not have the checks and balances in its institutions to root it out, with DPS consolidating control over the judiciary, law enforcement and the media^[93].

The current ruling party is the populist and pro-EU “Europe Now!”. It is in a coalition with 5 other parties, some of which are pro-Serbian. This is important to note because pro-Serbian parties, such as those from the “For the Future of Montenegro” bloc, have been staunchly anti-Western^[94]. EN’s position can be characterised by two policy positions: joining the EU by the 2028 goal; and increasing wages for Montenegrins^[95]. With regards to increasing wages, EN is simply continuing a policy from the previous government where net wages are set to increase by exempting employers from paying for healthcare contributions for workers^[96].

EN is in a precarious political situation. This is not helped by the fact that the current prime minister of Montenegro is embroiled in controversy. Milojko Spajić initially ran for the position of president of Montenegro, but was disqualified due to his possession of Montenegrin and Serbian dual citizenship^[97]. In fact, it is illegal to possess this type of dual citizenship as Montenegro does not have a dual citizenship agreement with Serbia, and this was revealed after he publicly stated that he did not have dual citizenship^[98]. He would instead take power as Prime Minister, and have his deputy, Jakov Milatović, run for president instead. Although the two were on good terms in 2023, in 2024, the two would fall out, leading to Milatović leaving the party^[99]. Nevertheless, it can be argued that this decision was made in part due to Milatović’s role as president requiring him to step down to be representative of all citizens. This incident tanked support for EN, and this was not assisted by Spajić’s questionable behaviour, which includes insulting members of his own party^[100].

Montenegro’s political situation therefore has the potential to affect discourse within absorption regarding the country’s europeanization. Montenegro is considered by Freedom House to be a transitional regime^[101], which very much aligns with issues pertaining corruption and a weak rule of law. While the current coalition is headed by a party with a pro-EU agenda, the presence of pro-Serbian parties within it makes this fraught as at any point, EN can be hampered by these parties due to their anti-Western slant. While EN shows promise, Prime Minister Spajić and his conduct makes it reasonable to question confidence in the government’s ability to carry out policy to fulfil the acquis communautaire to close chapters in Montenegro’s accession negotiations stage. This affects discourse, and to some extent interaction, as corruption and reliable conduct harm the government’s ability to engage properly with accession negotiations. Once again, Serbian and Russian influence is also notable, as pro-Serb parties act as a proxy for both countries’ anti-Euro-Atlantic interests.

7. Conclusion

This article finds that Russian and Serbian influence upon Montenegro via religious, media and financial means are substantial in derailing Montenegrin europeanization. This is particularly true through the dimension of absorption which has been explored through interaction and discourse. Absorption is important to consider, because if it is affected, it harms the horizontal and vertical europeanization benefits that membership will bring to both Montenegro and the EU. The SOC and ROC are strong forces within Montenegro that contribute most to polarisation regarding the validity of independent Montenegrin national identity. This is achieved through pro-Serbian narratives that seek to either view Montenegrin national identity as a subset of Serbian identity. This movement within the orthodox church is supported by Serbian media within Montenegro such as IN4S. On top of this, religious and media influences have an anti-NATO, pro-Russia slant. This is important to note as the Russian government is hostile towards countries that further integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures like the EU and NATO, particularly within the Balkans¹⁰². Montenegro’s case is particularly notable after the alleged coup in 2016 in reaction to Montenegro’s accession into NATO by Russian state agents¹⁰³. Economic influence has historically shown to also be substantial, although not through the same cultural and psychological means that religious and media influences utilise, sizeable Russian ownership gives Moscow significant leverage in controlling Montenegro’s economic landscape if it chooses to, especially after the financial hit of the bankruptcy of KAP¹⁰⁴.

However, there are also two other factors that affect europeanization absorption within Montenegro outside of Serbian and Russian influence.

The first is enlargement fatigue. The EU shows disinterest in expanding the EU, as seen with the announcement of the European Political Community¹⁰⁵. Enlargement fatigue presents an issue in relation to interaction, as a non-reciprocal or unmotivated relationship between EU and Montenegrin actors hurts absorption.

Secondly, and perhaps more pressingly, is the current government. While EN demonstrates an explicitly pro-EU policy direction, confidence in achieving and enacting this has very real potential to halt due to their choice in coalition partners. As Russia has shown overt and covert hostility to further Euro-Atlantic integration, these parties possess direct political power to endanger the discourse aspect of absorption through the blocking of policy meant to fulfil Montenegro’s accession agreements to obtain membership.

To argue against this, since the current government’s incumbency in 2023, Montenegro closed a further 9 chapters. While the current coalition seems fragile on the surface, EN seems to be swiftly making progress towards achieving its goal of EU accession by 2028. While the country is also being regularly broadcasted with pro-Serbian and pro-Russian messaging, this has not effectively translated into swaying Montenegrins into souring their views over the EU. While it would be sound to conclude that Serbia and Russia are not greatly influencing Montenegrin europeanization, this article has demonstrated that both actors possess significant capabilities and means to do so in the future. Therefore, future observers of Montenegro’s accession journey ought to closely examine the current coalition’s collaborative efforts in fulfilling the acquis and the Montenegrin public’s attitudes towards the EU. It is very likely that as these two drivers worsen, Serbian and Russian influence are very likely to be the culprits of this.

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Endnotes

1. European Council. “24th Accession Conference with Montenegro, 16 December 2025” European Council.December 17th, 2025.

   https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-ministerial-meetings/2025/12/16/. ↑

2. Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro. “Record high public support for Montenegro’s EUmembership.” European Union External Action. June 15th, 2023.

   https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/montenegro/record-high-public-support-montenegros-eu-membership_e

   n?s=225. ↑

3. European Commission. “Montenegro.” EC. January 4th, 2025a.https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/montenegro_en. ↑
4. European Commission. “Montenegro”. ↑
5. European Council. “24th Accession Conference”. ↑
6. Zlatko Vujović & Ana Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises: Navigating Political Turmoil and the Path toEuropean Integration.” Südosteuropa Mitteilungen, no.2 (January 2023): 25–44. ↑
7. Hartwell, Leon. “Montenegro’s fight for EU membership amid Serbian revanchism.” new Eastern Europe. November 21st, 2024. https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/11/21/montenegros-fight-for-eu-membership-amid-serbian-revanchism/. ↑
8. European Commission. “The euro outside the euro area.” EC. January 4th, 2025b. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/use-euro/euro-outside-euro-area_en#:~:text=The%20euro%20as%20de%20facto,facto%20currency%20in%20these%20areas. ↑
9. John Creswell & Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. (Sage Publications, 2018), 20. ↑
10. Creswell & Plano Clark. Designing and Conducting, 20. ↑
11. European Commission, “Montenegro”. ↑
12. Hartwell. “Montenegro’s fight for EU membership”. ↑
13. Vesko Garcevic. “Russia’s soft and sharp power in southeast Europe – the Russian hybrid influence operation in Montenegro” Reality Check Series: Sources, Tools and Impact of External Non-EU-Engagement in Southeast Europe, no.1 (October 2019): 71–83. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/40820. ↑
14. Garcevic. “Russia’s soft and sharp power,” 79. ↑
15. Ivana Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro: How and Why a Centuries Old Relationship Ruptured” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 17, no.1 (2018): 61–75. https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.17.1.04. ↑
16. Heather Conley & Matthew Melino. “Russian Malign Influence in Montenegro” CSIS, May, 2019,https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep22363.pdf. ↑
17. Alex Gillespie & Vlad Glăveanu, Pragmatism and Methodology: Doing Research That Matters with Mixed Methods (Cambridge University Press, 2024), 38. ↑
18. Gillespie & Glăveanu, Pragmatism and Methodology, 15 ↑
19. Creswell & Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods. ↑
20. Jim Buller & Andrew Gamble. “Conceptualising Europeanisation.” Public Policy and Administration 17, no.2 (2002): 4–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/095207670201700202. ↑
21. John Gerring. “What Makes a Concept Good? A criterial Framework for Understanding ConceptionFormation in the Social Sciences”, Polity 31, no. 3 (1999): 357–393. https://doi.org/10.2307/3235246. ↑
22. Buller & Gamble. “Conceptualising Europeanization”. ↑
23. Ibid. ↑
24. Claudio Radaelli. “The Europeanization of Public Policy” In The Politics of Europeanization, ed. Kevin Featherstone & Claudio Radaelli, (Oxford University Press, 2003). ↑
25. Radaelli. “The Europeanization of Public Policy”. ↑
26. Ibid. ↑
27. Ibid. ↑
28. Michael Brüggemann & Katharina Kleinen von Königslöw. “‘Let’s talk about Europe’. Explaining vertical and horizontal Europeanization in the quality of press.” EconStor, January 1st, 2007,https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/24972. ↑
29. Brüggemann & Kleinen von Königslöw, “Let’s talk about Europe”. ↑
30. DEUM. “Record high public support”. ↑
31. Ibid. ↑
32. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
33. “Montenegro.” Europe Elects, Europe Elects. Effective January 3rd, 2025. https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/. ↑
34. Milan Nič; Dimitar Bechev; Sébastien Maillard; Zoran Nechev; Frauke Seebass; Wouter Zweers; & Gjoni Iliriana. “Montenegro’s EU Push: Imminent Opportunities and Challenges.” German Council on Foreign Relations. March 5th, 2024. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/montenegros-eu-push-imminent-opportunities-and-challenges. ↑
35. European Council. “24th Accession Conference”. ↑
36. European Commission. “Montenegro”. ↑
37. Ulrich Sedelmeier. “Enlargement: From Rules for Accession to a Policy Towards Europe.” In Policy-making in the European Union, eds. Helen Wallace; Mark Pollack; & Alasdair Young (Oxford University Press, 2010). ↑
38. Giorgio Cafiero. “Will Montenegro Become the Next EU Member?” American Security Project, January 1st, 2025. https://www.americansecurityproject.org/will-montenegro-become-the-next-eu-member. ↑
39. Cafiero. “Will Montenegro”. ↑
40. Devin Haas. “Increasingly, the Western Balkans are ready for the EU. But is the EU ready for the Western Balkans?” Emerging Europe, October 6th, 2023, https://emerging-europe.com/analysis/increasingly-the-western-balkans-are-ready-for-the-eu-but-is-the-eu-ready-for-the-western-balkans/. ↑
41. Cafiero. “Will Montenegro”. ↑
42. Haas. “Increasingly, the Western Balkans are ready for the EU.” ↑
43. Hartwell. “Montenegro’s fight for EU membership”. ↑
44. Centre for Strategic & International Studies. “Russia’s Weaponization of Tradition: The Case of theOrthodox Church in Montenegro.” CSIS, September 25, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/russias-weaponization-tradition-case-orthodox-church-montenegro. ↑
45. CSIS. “Russia’s Weaponization of Tradition”. ↑
46. Ibid. ↑
47. Florian Bieber. “Montenegrin politics since the disintegration of Yugoslavia.” In Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood, ed. Florian Bieber, 11–42. Graz: Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 2003. ↑
48. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
49. Ljubomir Filipović. “CONFLUENCE OF INFLUENCE: RUSSO-SERVIAN INFLUENCE OPERATION(S) IN MONTENEGRO” National security and the future 24, no. 3 (December 2023): 69,https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.24.3.3. ↑
50. Filipović. “CONFLUENCE OF INFLUENCE”, 69–70. ↑
51. Filipović. Ljubomir. “Analysis of the foreign malign influence in Montenegro 2019-2021” National Security and the Future 22, No. 3 (December 2021): 24. https://doi.org/10.37458/nstf.22.3.6. ↑
52. Filipović. “CONFLUENCE OF INFLUENCE”, 76. ↑
53. Ibid. ↑
54. Gardasevic. “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
55. Conley & Melino. “Russian Malign Influence”. ↑
56. Filipović. “Analysis of the foreign”, 24. ↑
57. CSIS. “Russia’s Weaponization of Tradition”. ↑
58. Ibid. ↑
59. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
60. Hamza Karcic. “Serbia is Taking a Page Out of Russia’s Book.” Foreign Policy, April 24th, 2023.https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/24/serbia-balkans-expansionism-russia-montenegro-elections/. ↑
61. Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
62. Filipović. “Analysis of the foreign”, 33. ↑
63. Filipović. “CONFLUENCE OF INFLUENCE”, 71–73. ↑
64. Ibid, 71–72. ↑
65. Ibid, 74. ↑
66. Filipović. “Analysis of the foreign”, 29. ↑
67. Ibid, 29–30. ↑
68. Ibid, 31–32. ↑
69. Conley & Melino. “Russian Malign Influence”. ↑
70. Ibid. ↑
71. Ibid. ↑
72. Ivan Ivanovic. “Russian Business Influx into Montenegro More a Means to Residence” BalkanInsight, October 30th, 2023. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/30/russian-business-influx-into-montenegro-more-a-means-to-residence/. ↑
73. Garcevic. “Russia’s soft and sharp power,”, 66. ↑
74. Ibid. ↑
75. Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
76. Conley & Melino. “Russian Malign Influence”. ↑
77. Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
78. Garcevic. “Russia’s soft and sharp power,”, 68. ↑
79. Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
80. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
81. Cafiero. “Will Montenegro”. ↑
82. Miklós Szanyi. “Experiences with Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe”. Advantages andDisadvantages, 36, no. 3, (February, 2018): 28–48. doi.org/10.1080/00128775.1998.11648659. ↑
83. Gardasevic, “Russia and Montenegro”. ↑
84. Sedelmeier. “Enlargement”. ↑
85. Cafiero. “Will Montenegro”. ↑
86. Haas. “Increasingly, the Western Balkans are ready for the EU.” ↑
87. Cafiero. “Will Montenegro”. ↑
88. Ibid. ↑
89. Hartwell. “Montenegro’s fight for EU membership” ↑
90. Jovana Marovič. “Montenegro: A Long Road to Democracy.” In Political History of the Balkans(1989-2018), eds. József Dúró & Zoltán Egeresi, 91–106. Budapest: Ludovika University Press Non-Profit Ltd,

    2020 ↑

91. Marovič. “Montenegro”. ↑
92. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
93. Ibid. ↑
94. Nič et al. “Montenegro’s EU Push”. ↑
95. Vujović & Nenezić. “Montenegro in Crises”. ↑
96. Ibid. ↑
97. Ibid. ↑
98. Ibid. ↑
99. Hartwell. “Montenegro’s fight for EU membership”. ↑
100. Ibid. ↑
101. “Montenegro”, Freedom House. Accessed January 31st, 2026. https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro. ↑